The Life of Jefferson Davis

by Frank H. Alfriend

“The condition of slavery in the several States will remain just the same, whether it (the rebellion) succeed or fail. There is not even a pretext for the complaint that the disaffected States are to be conquered by the United States, if the revolution fail; for the rights of the States, and the condition of every human being in them, will remain subject to exactly the same laws and form of administration, whether the revolution shall succeed or whether it shall fail.”

There was little room to doubt the purpose of the North to emancipate the slaves of the South, if at any period of the war such action could be advantageously taken. Mr. Lincoln always manifested great timidity and reluctance in approaching the subject, and it was observable that, at critical moments of the war, he courted the sympathy of the Democratic party, which was opposed to the policy of emancipation, so importunately urged upon him by the radical wing of the Republican party.

General McClellan had, with noble firmness, refused to countenance the revolutionary designs of the radical faction, and his removal from command after his repulse at Richmond was the palpable and decisive triumph of the emancipation policy in the sympathies of Mr. Lincoln. Restored to command, in order that he might save Washington from capture, no other officer being deemed to have the requisite ability and confidence of the army, he retained his position but a few weeks after that object was accomplished. By successive steps, Mr. Lincoln was finally brought to issue a preliminary proclamation of emancipation, in September, 1862, which went into effect January 1, 1863. After the battle of Antietam, no farther necessity for concealment was deemed necessary, and to the design of subjugation was now added the proclaimed purpose to destroy the organic existence of the States and two thousand millions of Southern capital.

Emancipation was justified by the Federal administration as a “military necessity”—a wretched explanation from those who had boasted their ability to “exterminate the South” in a few months. Since the war, a claim of philanthropy, as the motive of emancipation, has been falsely asserted. Reckless of the fate of the slave, the North sought only vengeance against his master. In the sequel, each step of despotism becoming easier than its predecessor, malice against the master has been still the motive which instigated the enfranchisement of his former slave.

The New-Year’s proclamation of Mr. Lincoln, reaching the Confederacy at the most auspicious period of its fortunes, was received with evidences of just indignation, and of a more stern purpose in the conduct of the war. President Davis thus referred to the subject in his message to Congress:

“The public journals of the North have been received, containing a proclamation, dated on the first day of the present month, signed by the President of the United States, in which he orders and declares all slaves within ten of the States of the Confederacy to be free, except such as are found within certain districts now occupied in part by the armed forces of the enemy. We may well leave it to the instincts of that common humanity which a beneficent Creator has implanted in the breasts of our fellow-men of all countries to pass judgment on a measure by which several millions of human beings of an inferior race—peaceful and contented laborers in their sphere—are doomed to extermination, while, at the same time, they are encouraged to a general assassination of their masters by the insidious recommendation ‘to abstain from violence unless in necessary self-defense.’ Our own detestation of those who have attempted the most execrable measure recorded in the history of guilty man, is tempered by profound contempt for the impotent rage which it discloses. So far as regards the action of this Government on such criminals as may attempt its execution, I confine myself to informing you that I shall—unless in your wisdom you deem some other course more expedient—deliver to the several State authorities all commissioned officers of the United States that may hereafter be captured by our forces, in any of the States embraced in the proclamation, that they may be dealt with in accordance with the laws of those States providing for the punishment of criminals engaged in exciting servile insurrection. The enlisted soldiers I shall continue to treat as unwilling instruments in the commission of these crimes, and shall direct their discharge and return to their homes on the proper and usual parole.”

Mr. Davis urged upon the people the evidence, given by this measure, of the utterly ruthless and unscrupulous character of the war waged upon the South, and counseled the resolution of “absolute and total separation of these States from the United States.” The eloquent appeals of Mr. Davis were sustained by the united press of the Confederacy, and by unmistakable indications of a thoroughly aroused popular indignation.

The results of military operations, in the winter months of 1863, were of a character altogether favorable and re-assuring to the Confederates. Movements on a large scale were prevented by the heavy rains and extreme rigor of the season, though there were many incidents evincing activity and enterprise on both sides. Early in January occurred the recapture of Galveston, Texas, by General Magruder. This exploit, marked by a display of energy, daring, and skill, was a handsome vindication of a most meritorious officer, who, for some months previous, had suffered unmerited censure. General Magruder had commanded a portion of the Army of Northern Virginia, in the assault upon McClellan, at Malvern Hill. The partial failure of the attack secured the Federal retreat, and the public, impatient at the check sustained at a moment of so much promise, visited an unwarranted censure upon Magruder. President Davis acknowledged, in a most flattering letter to his former classmate, the brilliant achievement of his command at Galveston.

After the battle of Murfreesboro’, the more important operations, in the West, were enacted in the State of Mississippi. The successful defense of Vicksburg, in the summer of 1862, effectually closed the Mississippi to the Federal fleets. To reduce this stronghold became an object of prime importance to the Federal Government, the North-western States being especially interested in securing the unobstructed navigation of the great river. The Confederate Government, equally apprized of the value of Vicksburg, concentrated forces for its defense, and made the maintenance of that position one of the leading features of its designs in the West.

A second attempt, under the auspices of General Sherman, was made against Vicksburg, in December, 1862. The signal failure attending this expedition brought upon Sherman a degree of reproach, at the North, in singular contrast with the applause which he received twelve months later. A few weeks later, the third attempt against Vicksburg was undertaken by General Grant, who sought to turn the Confederate defenses, through the smaller rivers connecting the Yazoo and Mississippi. This attempt was doomed to a failure no less decided and humiliating than that of its predecessor. On the 14th of March the Confederate batteries at Port Hudson, the lower defense of the Mississippi, repulsed the fleet of Farragut, who sought, by passing the batteries, to coöperate with Porter’s fleet above.