CHAPTER XV.
CONFEDERATE PROSPECTS AFTER THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE—THE MILITARY SITUATION—PRIMARY OBJECTS OF THE CONFEDERATES—AFFAIRS IN THE WEST—A BRIEF CONSIDERATION OF SEVERAL PLANS OF CAMPAIGN SUGGESTED TO THE CONFEDERATE AUTHORITIES—VISIONARY STRATEGY—AN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ADOPTED—THE INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA JUSTIFIED—CONDITION OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA AT THIS PERIOD—THE MOVEMENT FROM THE RAPPAHANNOCK—LEADING FEATURES OF THE CONFEDERATE PLAN—LEE’S STRATEGY AGAIN ILLUSTRATED—GETTYSBURG—A FATAL BLOW TO THE SOUTH—LEE RETURNS TO VIRGINIA—THE SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG—OTHER REVERSES—EXULTATION OF THE NORTH—THE CONFEDERATE ADMINISTRATION AGAIN ARRAIGNED BY ITS OPPONENTS—THE CASE OF GENERAL PEMBERTON—POPULAR INJUSTICE TO A GALLANT OFFICER—A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE SUBJECT—PEMBERTON’S APPOINTMENT RECOMMENDED BY DISTINGUISHED OFFICERS—HIS ABLE ADMINISTRATION IN MISSISSIPPI—HIS RESOLUTION TO HOLD VICKSBURG, AS THE GREAT END OF THE CAMPAIGN—HIS GALLANTRY AND RESOURCES—NOBLE CONDUCT OF THIS PERSECUTED OFFICER—A FURTHER STATEMENT—THE MISSION OF VICE-PRESIDENT STEPHENS—ITS OBJECTS—PRESIDENT DAVIS SEEKS TO ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERINGS OF WAR—MAGNANIMITY AND HUMANITY OF THE OFFER—PROUD POSITION IN THIS MATTER OF THE SOUTH AND HER RULER—THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DECLINES INTERCOURSE WITH MR. STEPHENS—EXPLANATION OF ITS MOTIVES—CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MESSRS. DAVIS AND STEPHENS.
The situation of affairs, so eminently favorable to the Confederacy, after the victory of Chancellorsville, admitted no doubt that the opportune occasion would be promptly seized, for the delivery of a telling blow, which should hasten an acknowledgment of Southern independence. A brief summary of the military situation, at the opening of summer, 1863, will show the simple and judicious policy, by which the Confederate administration proposed to make efficient use of its advantages.
The battle of Chancellorsville, followed by the disorganized retreat of the largest force yet consolidated for the capture of Richmond, and the signal failure of an attempt, which, at its outset, the North declared to be conclusive of the fate of the Confederacy, secured the safety of the Confederate capital, at least, until another campaign could be organized. Moreover, it tendered to the Confederate authorities the choice of a vigorous offensive, holding out tempting inducements; or a detachment of a portion of Lee’s army for the relief of other sections of the Confederacy. With two-thirds of his own force, Lee had repulsed and crippled the enormous army of Hooker, and it appeared reasonably certain, that the same force could maintain a successful defensive, while the segment, or its equivalent, which was absent at Chancellorsville, might be sent, for a temporary purpose, to Bragg, in Tennessee, or to the relief of Pemberton in Vicksburg.
At the opening of spring the primary objects of the Confederacy were the safety of Richmond, the safety of Vicksburg—the key to its tenure of the Mississippi Valley—and the holding of its defensive line in Middle and East Tennessee, the barrier between the enemy and the vitals of the Confederacy. The first of these objects was amply secured by the victory of Chancellorsville, leaving to the main Confederate army, its own choice of the field of future operations.
In the Western Department, commanded since December, 1862, by General Joseph E. Johnston, the situation was less promising, though by no means forbidding hope of a favorable solution. General Bragg maintained a somewhat precarious defensive against Rosecrans, who confronted the Confederate commander, with an army much larger than that with which he had fought the battle of Murfreesboro’. General Pemberton, after a series of actions, had retired within the lines of Vicksburg, where he was closely besieged by General Grant with a numerous army—the Federal fleet in the river, meanwhile, continuing its bombardment. The characteristic stubbornness of Grant, aided by his ample force, made evident the ultimate fate of Vicksburg and Pemberton’s army, either by famine, or the assaults of the enemy, unless succor should come in the shape of a demonstration against the besieging army, with which the garrison might be expected to coöperate. Not long after Pemberton’s retirement into Vicksburg, General Johnston reached Mississippi and began the collection of a force, by which it was expected that the besieged stronghold and its garrison would be relieved.
But while the situation in the West thus seemed to invite the presence of a portion of the army of Northern Virginia, relieved of any immediate danger from its antagonist, there were cogent considerations in behalf of another policy which was adopted. Two weeks, at least, would have been required, in the indifferent condition of the Southern railroads, for the transportation of a force from Virginia, competent to enable Bragg to assume the aggressive. A much longer period would have been required to transfer to Jackson, such a force as General Johnston would have deemed sufficient to justify an attack upon Grant. Besides, the government was fully satisfied, that the reënforcements sent to Johnston would soon enable him to make an effective demonstration against the besieging army, which, sustained by a simultaneous attack by Pemberton in front, would have a reasonable prospect of success.