“Resolved by the General Assembly, That this General Assembly expresses its desire that the capital of the State be defended to the last extremity, if such defense is in accordance with the views of the President of the Confederate States; and that the President be assured, that whatever destruction or loss of property, of the State, or individuals shall hereby result, will be cheerfully submitted to.”
Two days after, at a public meeting of the citizens of Richmond, Governor Letcher said, that under no circumstances would he approve the surrender of the city, and avowed his readiness to endure bombardment, if necessary. In the same stout spirit spoke Mayor Mayo:
“I say now—and I will abide by it—when the citizens of Richmond demand of me to surrender the capital of Virginia, and of the Confederacy, to the enemy, they must find some other man to fill my place. I will resign the mayoralty. And when that other man elected in my stead shall deliver up the city, I hope I may have physical courage and strength enough left to shoulder a musket and go into the ranks.”
[55] It is only fair to state that General Johnston proposed operations, similar in their main features to those of Lee, though it does not therefore follow that they would have been equally successful. Johnston’s ability as a strategist can not be questioned, and to those who closely and intelligently studied his campaigns, there can be little doubt as to his aggressive qualities, though in this respect, results were not in his favor.
[56] Mr. Davis was every day upon the battle-field, and from this circumstance the impression prevailed in Richmond that he was directing the army in person. A common report, which I have never seen contradicted, was that the President narrowly escaped death during the progress of the battles. As related to the writer, the circumstance was as follows: The President, in company with General Magruder and other officers, was at a farm-house, upon which one of the Federal batteries was preparing to open. General Lee, apprised of the President’s whereabouts, sent a courier to warn him of his danger, and he and his companions escaped without injury, just as the Federal battery opened fire.
[57] A serious disadvantage suffered by General Lee was the capture of his plan of battle by General McClellan. Completely informed as to his adversary’s movements, and with ninety thousand men against thirty-three thousand, the wonder is, that McClellan did not overwhelm the Confederate army. The means by which the enemy obtained this important paper was a subject of much gossip in the Confederacy.
[58] A sufficient proof of the injury done the South by the pretended neutrality of England was the confession of the British Foreign Secretary. Said he: “The impartial observance of neutral obligation by Her Majesty’s Government has thus been exceedingly advantageous to the cause of the more powerful of the two contending parties.”
[59] General Lee stated the proportion of the Federal strength to his own as ten to three. Mr. Swinton states Hooker’s force at one hundred and twenty thousand infantry, twelve thousand cavalry, and four hundred guns. Lee’s effective force was considerably less than fifty thousand.
The absence of Longstreet was severely felt by General Lee in his operations against Hooker. The presence of a force was absolutely indispensable upon the south side of James River, in the early spring, to meet the formidable Federal force in the neighborhood of Suffolk. An impression, altogether erroneous, however, prevailed, that Longstreet’s detention from Lee was caused by President Davis. The President eventually ordered Longstreet to Lee, after his delay at Richmond.
[60] “Of Stonewall Jackson, Mr. Davis spoke with the utmost tenderness, and some touch of reverential feeling, bearing witness to his earnest and pathetic piety, his singleness of aim, his immense energy as an executive officer, and the loyalty of his nature, making obedience the first of all duties.... He had the faculty, or, rather, gift of exciting and holding the love and confidence of his men to an unbounded degree, even though the character of his campaigning imposed on them more hardships than on any other troops in the service. Good soldiers care not for their individual sacrifices, when adequate results can be shown, and these General Jackson never lacked.... ‘For glory he lived long enough,’ continued Mr. Davis, with much emotion; ‘and if this result had to come, it was the Divine mercy that removed him. He fell like the eagle, his own feather on the shaft that was dripping with his life-blood. In his death, the Confederacy lost an eye and arm; our only consolation being that the final summons could have reached no soldier more prepared to accept it joyfully.’”—Craven’s Prison Life of Jefferson Davis, pp. 180, 181.