Waiving all consideration of the peculiar strategic difficulties of the South, Frederick first had the advantage of his English alliance. Frederick never fought odds greater than two to one, while the South fought three, four, sometimes five to one—but never equal numbers. Again, Prussia was inaccessible except by overland marches—not penetrated, like the South, in every direction by navigable rivers, and nearly surrounded by the sea. Frederick, too, was absolute in Prussia, and had the lives and property of all his subjects at his control. Mr. Davis, on the other hand, never could consolidate the resources of the South as he desired, being constantly hampered by demagogism in Congress, which could at all times be coerced by the press hostile to the administration, or influenced by the slightest display of popular displeasure. Pretending to place the whole means of the country at the disposal of the President, Congress yet invariably rendered its measures inoperative by emasculating clauses providing exemptions and immunities of every description. President Davis was too sincere a republican, and had too much regard for the restraints of the Constitution to violently usurp ungranted powers.
It is to be remembered, too, that the South received no foreign aid, while Frederick was at last saved by the accession of Peter to the Russian throne, which event dissolved the coalition against Prussia.
[80] General Hood’s magnanimous acknowledgment is sufficient for the acquittal of Mr. Davis from any responsibility for this ill-starred movement. On taking leave of his army, in January, 1865, Hood said, speaking of the late campaign: “I am alone responsible for its conception, and strove hard to do my duty in its execution.”
But in addition to this, there was a correspondence, between Mr. Davis and a Confederate officer of high rank, which completely exculpated Mr. Davis. In accordance with Mr. Davis’ accustomed magnanimity and regard for the public welfare, this correspondence was never published. The facts in this matter conspicuously illustrate the persistent and reckless misrepresentation, which has not ceased with the termination of the war. With a class of writers, the facts regarding Mr. Davis are things least to be desired. In many instances, their attacks upon his fame are puerile, but in others, where facts are either distorted or wantonly disregarded, the object seems to be merely to gratify a wicked spirit of detraction.
[81] In the autumn of 1864, General Price advanced into Missouri, proclaiming his purpose to be a permanent occupation. The expedition ended in disaster. Defeated in an engagement on the Big Blue, Price retreated into Kansas, and finally into Southern Arkansas. The campaign did not affect the current of the war elsewhere, and was a failure.
[82] The author has seen an absurd statement, made without any inquiry into the facts, that Mr. Davis was seen to turn “ghastly white” at the moment of receiving the intelligence of the disaster at Petersburg. It is simply one of a thousand other reckless calumnies, with as little foundation as the rest.
We do not feel called upon here to relate the details of the evacuation of Richmond and the occupation of the city by the Federal army. They are, doubtless, known to every intelligent reader, and we are here specially concerned only in the movements of Mr. Davis.