The Life of Jefferson Davis

by Frank H. Alfriend

Auxiliary to the command of Beauregard, but operating independently of that officer, was a force at Harper’s Ferry, on the Potomac, commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, an officer of reputed skill, who had earned honorable distinction in Mexico, and enjoyed high rank and reputation in the Federal service. This force had a mission second in value only to that of the army at Manassas. It was charged with the defense of the rich and populous Shenandoah Valley, teeming with supplies, and inhabited by a hardy and patriotic population. Its position was intermediate between the forces operating in Western Virginia, and those in front of Washington, and threatening to the enemy’s line of communication westward via the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.

In Western Virginia were the commands of Generals Wise and Garnett, respectively, in the Kanawha Valley, and upon the main line of communication between the sections east and west of the Alleghany mountains. The forces of Wise and Garnett were designed for the double purpose of defending the sections of territory in which they were respectively located, and for the aid and encouragement of the patriotic portion of the population, then under the joint domination of the Union men and Federal soldiers.

Under Magruder, promoted for his victory at Bethel, was a comparatively small force, holding the peninsula of James and York Rivers, the direct route to Richmond from the coast; and at Norfolk were several thousand men, under command of General Huger.

No very acute analysis is required to penetrate the motives of this distribution of forces in the face of the plain necessities of the situation. Yet a vast amount of conceit has been expended in glittering verbiage, aiming to exhibit the early partiality of President Davis for the weak policy of dispersion, and that aversion to the “concentration” of troops, for overwhelming victories, to be followed by decisive results, which, it is alleged, adhered to his military policy to the last. To this cant about “concentration,” a sufficient answer relative to this disposition of troops is, that it has the sanction of Lee’s great name, to say nothing of the complete success that followed it. There was no phase of the situation, either then or for months afterward, which could have justified for any result, then attainable by “concentration,” the surrendering to the enemy of vast sections of country, which, then and subsequently, fed the army and supplied thousands of soldiers. Popular confidence, so indispensable to a government under such circumstances, was not to be won by such a policy, at the very incipiency of the contest. Were the patriots of Western Virginia, thousands of whom made heroic sacrifices, to be abandoned without an effort for their rescue? Magruder and Huger, too, had duties of no insignificant character to perform. Fortress Monroe, commanding the tributaries of the Chesapeake—the avenues leading to the very heart of Virginia, to the doors of Richmond, and the rear of the armies upon the northern borders—presented, during the entire war, an insuperable difficulty in the defense of Virginia. More than once it was the impregnable asylum for discomfited Federal hosts; and as a base of operations for the enemy, there was no period of the war when it did not challenge a vigilant observation from Richmond. To the efficient, bold, and skillful defense of the peninsula, by Magruder, the Confederate capital owed its safety for twelve months, not less than to the successful defense made upon the Potomac border. Dependent upon the command of Huger was the defense, not only of Norfolk and Portsmouth, but of an extensive back country, besides the naval defenses then in preparation at Gosport.

But in addition to these important objects, is to be remembered the inexperience of both officers and men, totally disqualifying them for those prompt and vigorous movements for which they were subsequently distinguished. Discipline and organization were yet to be supplied. The army at Manassas in July, 1861, at Centreville, in the ensuing autumn, or even in front of Richmond, in the summer of 1862, was altogether a different instrument from that compact force, which the genius of Lee had welded, when he threw it, with crushing impetus, upon the columns of Hooker at Chancellorsville. But, after all, as will be abundantly exhibited hereafter, concentration was preëminently the characteristic of the Confederate military policy. Especially did the present campaign, in all its parts, hinge upon the successful execution of this principle.

Confronting the command of Beauregard, at Manassas, was a considerable Federal army, under General McDowell, covering Washington, and threatening an advance along the line of the Orange and Alexandria and Virginia Central Railroads. Under General Patterson another large Federal force confronted General Johnston, and threatened the Shenandoah Valley. General McClellan, with a force greatly outnumbering the small commands opposed to him, operated in Western Virginia—the common name of the section of country embraced between the Ohio and Cheat Rivers, and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Great Kanawha and Gauley Rivers. A heavy force at Fortress Monroe, threatening, with incursions, the entire tide-water section of the State, sufficiently occupied the commands of Magruder and Huger.

The Confederate plan of campaign, approved in the early summer, in its leading features was adhered to with pertinacity and success. This plan, jointly approved by the Government and the two commanders upon whom its execution devolved, contemplated defensive operations, and the union, at the critical moment, of the forces of Beauregard and Johnston, for the destruction of McDowell’s command, whenever it should begin its march southward. President Davis and General Lee, at Richmond, were in regular communication with the two commanders in the field, and all operations were directed with a view to the destruction of the main body of the enemy.

General Scott, upon the Federal side, also looked to the coöperation of Patterson with McDowell, and expected him either to defeat Johnston, or to so employ him as to prevent his reinforcement of Beauregard, when the latter should be assailed by the overwhelming force of McDowell. The remoteness of Magruder and Huger, and the impossibility of sufficient secrecy in the transfer of any portion of their commands to the theatre of operations, placed them outside of the calculation. The same may be said of the Confederate forces in Western Virginia. Apprehension of danger from the command of McClellan was experienced by the Confederate authorities, especially after the disastrous defeat of General Garnett. There can be little doubt, however, that the Government and people of the North considered their army, immediately upon the ground, ample for the contemplated work, and did not feel the necessity of looking elsewhere for reinforcements.

The small force at Manassas, when General Beauregard assumed command, was increased by subsequent accessions, until, by the middle of July, it numbered about twenty thousand men. His duties were a vigilant observation of the enemy and such defensive preparations as were necessary. The pivot of the campaign was elsewhere. If Patterson could successfully occupy Johnston until the crisis at Manassas was passed, the result was doubtful, at least; but if Johnston, at the required moment, could elude his adversary, and reinforce Beauregard, the probabilities were most promising to the Confederates. In the sequel, this proved a result far more easily attained than had been hoped for. The campaign thus became a series of maneuvres, with the Confederates in possession of the decided advantage of an interior line.

General Patterson, apparently imbecile or bewildered, committed a series of blunders, to be accounted for upon no possible hypothesis accrediting to him even ordinary acquaintance with the palpable principles of the science of war. What his repeated advances, retreats, and flank movements could have been designed to accomplish, it is difficult to imagine, as his situation plainly prevented his escape from Johnston and reinforcement of McDowell, before Johnston could reach Beauregard. General Patterson’s failure to attack Johnston preordained the disaster to McDowell on the 21st of July. Johnston, aided by the vigilance and daring of the “indefatigable” Stuart, was fully apprised of every movement of his adversary. With comparatively little difficulty he escaped from his front, and, in accordance with the plan previously indicated, reinforced Beauregard with the greater portion of his force.