The vulnerability of the South upon the sea-coast, and along the lines of her navigable rivers, measured the extent of the good fortune of the enemy. The North was shortly to yield a reluctant recognition of the comparatively insignificant influence of its long train of triumphs in the promotion of subjugation. Upon the soil of Virginia—classic in its memories of contests for freedom, the chosen battle-ground of the Confederacy—was soon to be shed the effulgence of the proudest achievements of Southern genius and valor—a radiance as splendid as ever shone upon the blazing crest of war.
CHAPTER XIII.
THE “ANACONDA SYSTEM”—HOW FAR IT WAS SUCCESSFUL—TERRITORIAL CONFIGURATION OF THE SOUTH FAVORABLE TO THE ENEMY—ONE THEATRE OF WAR FAVORABLE TO THE CONFEDERATES—THE FEDERAL FORCES IN VIRGINIA—THE CONFEDERATE FORCES—THE POTOMAC LINES—CRITICAL SITUATION IN VIRGINIA—EVACUATION OF MANASSAS—TRANSFER OF OPERATIONS TO THE PENINSULA—MAGRUDER’S LINES—EVACUATION OF YORKTOWN—STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSING FORCES BEFORE RICHMOND—DESTRUCTION OF THE “VIRGINIA”—PANIC IN RICHMOND—MR. DAVIS’ CALMNESS AND CONFIDENCE—HE AVOWS HIMSELF “READY TO LEAVE HIS BONES IN THE CAPITAL OF THE CONFEDERACY”—REPULSE OF THE GUNBOATS—“MEMENTOES OF HEROISM”—JACKSON’S VALLEY CAMPAIGN—A SERIES OF VICTORIES, WITH IMPORTANT RESULTS—BATTLE OF “SEVEN PINES”—A FAILURE—GENERAL JOHNSTON WOUNDED—PRESIDENT DAVIS ON THE FIELD—PRESIDENT DAVIS AND GENERAL JOHNSTON—AN ATTEMPT TO FORESTALL THE DECISION OF HISTORY—RESULTS OF LEE’S ACCESSION TO COMMAND—JOHNSTON’S GENERALSHIP—MR. DAVIS’ ESTIMATE OF LEE—LEE’S PLANS—THE ADVISORY RELATION BETWEEN DAVIS AND LEE—THEIR MUTUAL CONFIDENCE NEVER INTERRUPTED—CONFEDERATE STRATEGY AFTER M’CLELLAN’S DEFEAT BEFORE RICHMOND—MAGICAL CHANGE IN THE FORTUNES OF THE CONFEDERACY—THE INVASION OF MARYLAND—ANTIETAM—TANGIBLE PROOFS OF CONFEDERATE SUCCESS—GENERAL BRAGG—HIS KENTUCKY CAMPAIGN—CONFEDERATE HOPES—BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE—BRAGG RETREATS—ESTIMATE OF THE KENTUCKY CAMPAIGN OF 1862—OTHER INCIDENTS OF THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN—REMOVAL OF M’CLELLAN—A SOUTHERN OPINION OF M’CLELLAN—BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG—BATTLE OF MURFREESBORO’—BATTLE OF PRAIRIE GROVE—THE SITUATION AT THE CLOSE OF 1862—PRESIDENT DAVIS’ RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS—HIS VISIT TO THE SOUTH-WEST—ADDRESS BEFORE THE MISSISSIPPI LEGISLATURE.
The Federal Government frankly accepted the true teachings of the war in its earlier stages, and no feature of the lesson was more palpable than the inferiority of the North in the art of war and military administration. No longer trusting, to any extent whatever, to a contest of prowess with an enemy whose incomparable superiority was already established, Mr. Lincoln, his cabinet, and his military advisers, were concurrent in their convictions of the necessity of a policy which should make available the numerical superiority of the North. The “anaconda system” of General Scott, adhered to by General McClellan, and sanctioned by the Government and the people, though by no means new in the theory and practice of war, was based upon a just and sagacious view of the situation.
To overwhelm the South by mere material weight, to crush the smaller body by the momentum of a larger force, comprehends the Federal design of the war, undertaken at the inception of operations in 1862. The success attending the execution of this design we have described in preceding pages. We have accredited to the enemy the full extent of his successes, and endeavored to demonstrate that they resulted not from Confederate maladministration, but from a vigorous and timely use of his advantages and opportunity by the enemy. But while according to the North unexampled energy in preparation, and an unstinted donation of its means to the purpose, which it pursued with indomitable resolution, no concession of an improved military capacity is demanded, from the fact that use was made of obvious advantages not to be overlooked even by the stupidity of an Aulic council.
We have shown that the preponderating influence in the achievement of the enemy’s victories in the winter and spring of 1862, was his naval supremacy. Even at that period it was palpable that, without his navy, his scheme of invasion would be the veriest abortion ever exposed to the ridicule of mankind. The maritime facilities of the enemy were, in the end, decisive of the contest in his favor.
Upon those fields of military operations which have thus far occupied our attention, we have seen how propitious to the enemy’s plans, in every instance, was the geographical configuration. Wherever a navigable river emptied into the sea, which was the undisputed domain of the North, or intersected its territory, a short and, in many instances, almost bloodless struggle had ended in the expulsion or capture of the Confederates defending its passage. Yet, in many instances, these results had a most serious bearing upon the decision of the war. It was impossible for Sidney Johnston to hold Kentucky and Tennessee unless the Mississippi, running parallel with his communications, and the Cumberland and Tennessee, running in their rear, should remain sealed to the enemy. It was equally impracticable to hold the region bordering upon the North Carolina sounds after the fall of Roanoke Island. After the fall of New Orleans, the entire avenue of the Mississippi, except the limited section between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, was open to the enemy, giving him bases of operations upon both its banks, and opening to his ravages vast sections of the Confederacy.
Thus had the naval supremacy of the enemy brought him, in a few days, to the very heart of extensive sections of territory, which never could have been reduced to his sway, had he been compelled to fight his way overland from his frontiers. Thus was the great element of space, usually so potent in the defense of an invaded people, annihilated, almost before the struggle had been fairly begun.