When Gen. Halleck assumed command he constructed magnificent fortifications, and they were a splendid monument to his engineering skill, but they were never occupied. He was like the celebrated king of France, who "with one hundred thousand men, marched up the hill and then down again." Gen. Halleck had under his immediate command more than one hundred thousand well equipped men, and the people of the North looked to him to administer a crushing blow to the then retreating enemy. The hour had arrived—the man had not.
"Flushed with the victory of Forts Henry and Donelson," said the envious Halleck in a dispatch to the war department, previous to the battle, "the army under Grant at Pittsburg Landing was more demoralized than the Army of the Potomac after the disastrous defeat of Bull Run."
Soon after the battle the venerable Gen. Scott predicted that the war would soon be ended—that thereafter there would be nothing but guerrilla warfare at interior points. Gen. Grant himself in his memoirs says that had the victory at Pittsburg Landing been followed up and the army been kept intact the battles at Stone River, Chattanooga and Chickamauga would not have been necessary.
Probably the battle of Pittsburg Landing was the most misunderstood and most misrepresented of any battle occurring during the war. It was charged that Grant was drunk; that he was far away from the battleground when the attack was made, and was wholly unprepared to meet the terrible onslaught of the enemy in the earlier stages of the encounter. Gen. Beauregard is said to have stated on the morning of the battle that before sundown he would water his horses in the Tennessee river or in hell. That the rebels did not succeed in reaching the Tennessee was not from lack of dash and daring on their part, but was on account of the sturdy resistance and heroism of their adversaries. According to Gen. Grant's own account of the battle, though suffering intense pain from a sprained ankle, he was in the saddle from early morning till late at night, riding from division to division, giving directions to their commanding officers regarding the many changes in the disposition of their forces rendered necessary by the progress of the battle. The firm resistance made by the force under his command is sufficient refutation of the falsity of the charges made against him. Misunderstanding of orders, want of co-operation of subordinates as well as superiors, and rawness of recruits were said to have been responsible for the terrible slaughter of the Union forces on the first day of the battle.
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The battle of Pittsburg Landing is sometimes called the battle of Shiloh, some of the hardest lighting having been done in the vicinity of an old log church called the Church of Shiloh, about three miles from the landing.
The battle ground traversed by the opposing forces occupied a semi-circle of about three and a half miles from the town of Pittsburg, the Union forces being stationed in the form of a semi-circle, the right resting on a point north of Crump's Landing, the center being directly in front of the road to Corinth, and the left extending to the river in the direction of Harrisburg—a small place north of Pittsburg Landing. At about 2 o'clock on Sunday morning, Col. Peabody of Prentiss' division, fearing that everything was not right, dispatched a body of 400 men beyond the camp for the purpose of looking after any body of men which might be lurking in that direction. This step was wisely taken, for a half a mile advance showed a heavy force approaching, who fired upon them with great slaughter. This force taken by surprise, was compelled to retreat, which they did in good order under a galling fire. At 6 o'clock the fire had become general along the entire front, the enemy having driven in the pickets of Gen. Sherman's division and had fallen with vengeance upon three Ohio regiments of raw recruits, who knew nothing of the approach of the enemy until they were within their midst. The slaughter on the first approach of the enemy was very severe, scores falling at every discharge of rebel guns. It soon became apparent that the rebel forces were approaching in overwhelming numbers and there was nothing left for them to do but retreat, which was done with considerable disorder, both officers and men losing every particle of their baggage, which fell into rebel hands.
At 8:30 o'clock the fight had become general, the second line of divisions having received the advance in good order and made every preparation for a suitable reception of the foe. At this time many thousand stragglers, many of whom had never before heard the sound of musketry, turned their backs to the enemy, and neither threats or persuasion could induce them to turn back. The timely arrival of Gen. Grant, who had hastened up from Savannah, led to the adoption of measures that put a stop to this uncalled-for flight from the battle ground. A strong guard was placed across the thoroughfare, with orders to hault every soldier whose face was turned toward the river, and thus a general stampede was prevented. At 10 o'clock the entire line on both sides was engaged in one of the most terrible battles ever known in this country. The roar of the cannon and musketry was without intermission from the main center to a point extending halfway down the left wing. The great struggle was most upon the forces which had fallen back on Sherman's position. By 11 o'clock quite a number of the commanders of regiments had fallen, and in some instances not a single field officer remained; yet the fighting continued with an earnestness that plainly showed that the contest on both sides was for death or victory. The almost deafening sound of artillery and the rattle of musketry was all that could be heard as the men stood silently and delivered their fire, evidently bent on the work of destruction which knew no bounds. Foot by foot the ground was contested, a single narrow strip of open land dividing the opponents. Many who were maimed fell back without help, while others still fought in the ranks until they were actually forced back by their company officers. Finding it impossible to drive back the center of our column, at 12 o'clock the enemy slackened fire upon it and made a most vigorous effort on our left wing, endeavoring to drive it to the river bank at a point about a mile and a half above Pittsburg Landing. With the demonstration of the enemy upon the left wing it was soon seen that all their fury was being poured out upon it, with a determination that it should give way. For about two hours a sheet of fire blazed both columns, the rattle of musketry making a most deafening noise. For about an hour it was feared that the enemy would succeed in driving our forces to the river bank, the rebels at times being plainly seen by those on the main landing below. While the conflict raged the hottest in this quarter the gunboat Tyler passed slowly up the river to a point directly opposite the enemy and poured in a broadside from her immense guns. The shells went tearing and crashing through the woods, felling trees in their course and spreading havoc wherever they fell. The explosions were fearful, the shells falling far inland, and they struck terror to the rebel force. Foiled in this attempt, they now made another attack on the center and fought like tigers. They found our lines well prepared and in full expectation of their coming. Every man was at his post and all willing to bring the contest to a definite conclusion. In hourly expectation of the arrival of reinforcements, under Generals Nelson and Thomas of Buell's army, they made every effort to rout our forces before the reinforcements could reach the battle ground. They were, however, fighting against a wall of steel. Volley answered volley and for a time the battle of the morning was re-enacted on the same ground and with the same vigor on both sides. At 5 o'clock there was a short cessation in the firing of the enemy, their lines falling back on the center for about half a mile. They again wheeled and suddenly threw their entire force upon the left wing, determined to make the final struggle of the day in that quarter. The gunboat Lexington in the meantime had arrived from Savannah, and after sending a message to Gen. Grant to ascertain in which direction the enemy was from the river, the Lexington and Tyler took a position about half a mile above the river landing, and poured their shells up a deep ravine reaching to the river on the right. Their shots were thick and fast and told with telling effect. In the meantime Gen. Lew Wallace, who had taken a circuitous route from Crump's Landing, appeared suddenly on the left wing of the rebels. In face of this combination the enemy felt that their bold effort was for the day a failure and as night was about at hand, they slowly fell back, fighting as they went, until they reached an advantageous position, somewhat in the rear, yet occupying the main road to Corinth. The gunboats continued to send their shells after them until they were far beyond reach. This ended the engagement for the day. Throughout the day the rebels evidently had fought with the Napoleonic idea of massing their entire force on weak points of the enemy, with the intention of braking through their lines, creating a panic and cutting off retreat.
The first day's battle, though resulting in a terrible loss of Union troops, was in reality a severe disappointment to the rebel leaders. They fully expected, with their overwhelming force to annihilate Grant's army, cross the Tennessee river and administer the same punishment to Buell, and then march on through Tennessee, Kentucky and into Ohio. They had conceived a very bold movement, but utterly failed to execute it.
Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston, commander of the Confederate forces, was killed in the first day's battle, being shot while attempting to induce a brigade of unwilling Confederates to make a charge on the enemy.