[144]. I. C. C. Rep. 1895, p. 29; 1896, pp. 16–23. In March, 1896, the U. S. Supreme Court considered the case on appeal, and apparently accepted the decision of the Commission on the question of similar conditions, but overruled another part of its order, requiring the railroad not to charge more than $1 per hundred on first-class goods from Cincinnati to Atlanta. The Court placed its decision on the ground that the Commission has no authority to fix rates, maximum, minimum, or absolute. It may determine that a past rate is unreasonable, but cannot fix a rate for the future. Interstate Commission v. Cincinnati, New Orleans, and Texas Pacific, 162 U. S. 184; and 167 U. S. 479. I. C. C. v. Texas and Pacific, 162 U. S. 197.

[145]. 6 I. C. C. Decis. 343; and Rep. 1895, pp. 29–31.

[146]. Rep. 1895, p. 31.

[147]. I. C. C. Rep. 1899, p. 68; 7 I. C. C. Decis. Dec. 1897, p. 431. The Commission ordered that the charge to La Grange should not exceed the rate for the longer haul to Atlanta, and two years later the Circuit Court sustained the order (102 Fed. Rep. 709), but the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision in May, 1901 (108 Fed. Rep. 988), and in May, 1903, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals against the Commission (190 U. S. 273).

[148]. I. C. C. Rep. 1902, p. 48; 7 I. C. C. Decis. 431; 8 I. C. C. Decis. 377; 118 Fed. Rep. 613; Sen. Com. 1905, pp. 2316, 2317, 2926. No appeal appears to have been taken from the Circuit Court.

[149]. 8 I. C. C. Decis. Feb. 1900, p. 409; Rep. 1900, p. 34.

[150]. 8 I. C. C. Decis. 93, reversed by the Circuit Court, August, 1902 (117 Fed. Rep. 741), and by the Court of Appeals, May, 1903 (122 Fed. Rep. 800); now on appeal to U. S. Supreme Court.

[151]. 8 I. C. C. Decis. 142.

[152]. I. C. C. Rep. 1895, p. 39.

[153]. See 6 I. C. C. Decis. 257, 361, 458, 488, 568, 601; 7 I. C. C. 61, 224, 286; 8 I. C. C. 93, 214, 277, 290, 304, 316, 346. See also vol. 9 of the Decisions, and Rep., 1898, pp. 33, 246; 1899, p. 28; 1900, p. 40; 1901, pp. 57, 65; etc. Wherein conditions substantially differ the exemption is applied. For example, the Santa Fe is justified in charging lower rates from the Pacific to the Missouri River than to Denver on rice, hemp, blankets, books, boots, etc. (9 I. C. C. Decis. 606); and a higher rate on lumber to Wichita from Western points than to Kansas City is approved (9 I. C. C. Decis. 569).