“R. C. Vilas, General Freight Agent of the Erie (and brother of Geo. H. Vilas, Auditor of the Standard Oil Co.), absolutely refused us cars, saying the Standard Oil Co. had engaged them all.

“J. H. Rutter, General Freight Agent, New York Central, would not furnish any cars, and also said, ‘We have no terminal facilities now.’”

A. J. Cassatt testified before the New York Committee that in 18 months the Standard Oil had received rebates amounting to $10,000,000.

In addition to many other advantages enjoyed by the Standard people the Pennsylvania Railroad in 1878 gave the Combine, through the “American Transfer Co.,” a “commission” of 20 cents a barrel on all shipments of petroleum,—not only on their own shipments, but on shipments made by the independents also. At the same time the New York Central and the Erie were paying the Standard “commissions” of 20 to 35 cents a barrel on all the oil shipped over those roads.

At one time the transcontinental lines charged $105 to return an empty “cylinder” tank car from the Pacific Coast to the Missouri River, while making no charge to the Standard for returning their “box” tank cars, each of which contained a cylinder, which, however, was set upright instead of being placed longitudinally; a distinction without a difference, but it served to make a discrimination of over $100 a car in favor of the Trust.

The railroads allowed the Oil Trust to stop its cars and divide up a tank load at two or more stations, but denied this privilege to the competitors of the Trust.

The Hepburn Committee reported (1879) that “the Standard Oil Co. receives rebates from the trunk lines, ranging from 40 cents to $3.07 a barrel on all oil shipments: That the trunk lines sell their oil-tank car equipments to the Standard and agree to build no more: That the Standard controls the terminal facilities for handling oil of the four trunk lines by purchase or lease from the railroads: That it has frozen out and gathered in refineries of oil all over the country: That it dictates terms and rates to the railroads: That the trunk lines have hauled its oil 300 miles for nothing to enable it to undersell seaboard refineries not then under its control: That it has succeeded in practically monopolizing the oil business: That the transactions of the Standard are of such character that its officers have been indicted, and that its members decline under oath to give details lest their testimony should be used to convict them of crime.”[[25]]

The oily people were able in one way or another to gain ascendency over all the railroads. “We made our first contract with the Standard Oil Company,” said Mr. Cassatt, “for the reason that we found that they were getting very strong, and they had the backing of the other roads, and, if we wanted to retain our full share of the business and get fair rates on it, it would be necessary to make arrangements to protect ourselves.”

The Combine used the railroads to ruin its rivals, and did it with a definiteness and vigor of attack never before attempted, and with a success that would have been impossible without the use of the railroad power. An example or two will make the matter clear.

Mr. Corrigan, an oil refiner of Cleveland, became so prosperous in the seventies that he attracted the attention of the Standard Oil, and in 1877 he began to have trouble. He could not get the crude oil he bought shipped to Cleveland, nor his product shipped away, with reasonable promptness. The railroads refused him cars, and delayed his shipments after they were loaded. And he was driven to lease and finally sell his works to the Standard, which had no difficulty in getting cars and securing prompt service.