Special rates on goods for export.
Special rates on imports.
Even this long list does not cover the whole field. The cases on record do not exhaust the possibilities of discriminations. The following bit of testimony shows how easy it is to invent new ways of passing railroad moneys into the treasuries of favored shippers,—ways that would not be interfered with by any law short of public control of the purchase and sale of merchandise. Mr. Gavin, the agent of the Vandalia line, was being examined by the Interstate Commerce Commission in March, 1901. On the question as to how business could be got by giving advantages to shippers without cutting rates Mr. Gavin said: “There is nothing to prevent my going down to the packing-house and paying $10 apiece for hams if I wanted to; if I did not want to cut a rate, there is generally a way out of the hole.”
“Commissioner Clements. A good many ways; and it is your belief that a good many of these have been practised, is it not?
“Mr. Gavin. I do not know. I would not like to say.
“Commissioner Prouty. If you bought hams enough at $10 apiece the packing-house could give you the traffic at full rates?
“Mr. Gavin. Yes, sir.
“Commissioner Prouty. Have you ever known that to be done?
“Mr. Gavin. No, sir; but I say there are lots of ways out of the woods.”
Almost everybody agrees, in public, that railway favoritism ought to be stopped.[[346]] It disturbs the fair distribution of wealth, undermines industrial justice, business morals, and political honesty; builds monopoly; wastes resources, and causes enormous loss to the railroads as well as to the persons and places that are discriminated against.