Scott had been elected President before the alleged bribery transactions, but had left soon after for the East. The Prosecution held that Scott did not assume his duties as president until after his return from the East, when the alleged briberies had been completed. Delmas concluded his argument on Scott’s possible responsibility as follows:
“And then you are called again further on in this same process of elimination. ‘We expect to prove to you that Halsey had no power to expend moneys without a voucher, and that no person at that time in the Telephone Company had any power to expend money without the approval of the executive Board of Directors, except Glass, and Scott, who was away.’ Scott had gone, we were told, on the 18th or 19th. These transactions took place on the 22d, 23d and 24th. Scott could not have authorized them from the simple fact that Scott was then in the East, and he was not here in San Francisco to direct or authorize the management of the affairs of this corporation. A true elimination, gentlemen, if the facts were true, but the facts are not true. Mr. Scott did not leave for the East—bear this in mind—Mr. Scott did not leave for the East until all these transactions were closed; he did not leave until the 27th of February when the last of these checks had been paid. Who drew it? Scott himself. I challenge contradiction. The Assistant District Attorney told you on the first day that he addressed you that Scott left on the 18th or 19th. Did he know that Scott did not leave until the 27th? Did he? If he did, then there are no words that would apply to the deception that was sought to be practiced upon you, and I do not charge any such deception. Had Mr. Scott informed the District Attorney that he left on the 18th or 19th? I do not know. There is no evidence before you that he had. How, then, did he get the idea which he made to you under the oath of his office as District Attorney that Scott left on the 18th or 19th, when in point of fact Scott did not leave until the 27th? He came back from Portland on Monday or Tuesday of the preceding week. He was here during the whole of these transactions; he remained until the last check had been paid. He remained until the ordinance had been passed on the 26th of February, and left the defeated camp on the next day. How, then, upon that evidence, is Scott eliminated from this transaction? And I do not want you to understand that I am charging Mr. Scott with crime. That is no part of my business. It is no part of my office. I am assuming, upon the theory of this prosecution, that a crime was committed, and I say you, yourselves, Mr. District Attorney and your attendants, have undertaken by the process of elimination which you have selected, to show us that Mr. Scott could not have committed this crime. It is sufficient for us to show you that he could without charging that he did.”
The following are taken from interviews with the several jurors which appeared in the Examiner of July 29, 1907:
Juror Jacob Wertheimer—“I voted as I did (for acquittal) because there was a reasonable doubt in my mind as to whether or not Glass had authorized the giving of the money. There were too many others that might have been the ones.”
Juror Charles P. Fonda—“I voted not guilty. It was simply a question of whether Glass paid over this money as charged. Five of us did not believe that the Prosecution produced sufficiently convincing evidence to find the defendant guilty.”
Juror Michael C. Samuels—“The evidence did not link Glass up. So far as the bribery went, it might have been done by another official of the company than Glass.”
Juror Hugo Schnessel—“There was always something lacking in the evidence to convince me beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. It seemed to me that possibly some one else other than Glass might have paid over the money.”
Of the delaying tactics in the Glass case, The San Francisco Call in its issue of August 14, 1907, said: