An important theoretical consideration has also shaken our faith in the correctness of the evolutionary theory as a whole. It is one of the essential traits of this theory that, in general, civilization has developed from simple forms to complex forms, and that extended fields of human culture have developed under more or less rationalistic impulses. Of late years we are beginning to recognize that human culture does not always develop from the simple to the complex, but that in many aspects two tendencies intercross,—one from the complex to the simple, the other from the simple to the complex. It is obvious that the history of industrial development is almost throughout that of increasing complexity. On the other hand, human activities that do not depend upon reasoning do not show a similar type of evolution.
It is perhaps easiest to make this clear by the example of language, which in many respects is one of the most important evidences of the history of human development. Primitive languages are, on the whole, complex. Minute differences in point of view are given expression by means of grammatical forms; and the grammatical categories of Latin, and still more so those of modern English, seem crude when compared to the complexity of psychological or logical forms which primitive languages recognize, but which in our speech are disregarded entirely. On the whole, the development of languages seems to be such that the nicer distinctions are eliminated, and that it begins with complex and ends with simpler forms, although it must be acknowledged that opposite tendencies are not by any means absent.
Similar observations may be made on the art of primitive man. In music as well as in decorative design we find a complexity of rhythmic structure which is unequalled in the popular art of our day. In music, particularly, this complexity is so great that the art of a skilled virtuoso is taxed in the attempt to imitate it. If once it is recognized that simplicity is not always a proof of antiquity, it will readily be seen that the theory of the evolution of civilization rests to a certain extent on a logical error. The classification of the data of anthropology in accordance with their simplicity has been re-interpreted as an historical sequence, without an adequate attempt to prove that the simpler antedated the more complex.
Notwithstanding this serious criticism, much of the older theory seems plausible; but presumably a thorough revision and a more individualized aspect of the development of civilization in different parts of the world will become necessary.
The psychological aspect of anthropology, which was first emphasized by Bastian, is also undergoing rapid development, particularly in so far as the problem of the origin of elementary ideas is concerned, the investigation of which Bastian considered as impossible. Here, again, the study of language promises to point the way in which many of our problems may find their solution. I have stated before that the languages of primitive tribes are, on the whole, complex, and differentiate nicely between categories of thought. It is very remarkable to find that these categories, which can be discovered only by an analytical study of the languages, and which are unknown to the speakers of these languages, although they are constantly used, coincide with categories of thought which have been discovered by philosophers. It would be possible to find in the languages of primitive people grammatical forms corresponding to a variety of philosophical systems; and in this we may perhaps recognize one of the most brilliant proofs of the correctness of Bastian’s and Dilthey’s theory of the existence of a limited number of types of thought.
We infer from these linguistic facts that the categories of thought, and the forms of action, that we find among a people, do not need to have been developed by conscious thought, but that they have grown up owing to the fundamental organization of the human mind. Linguistic evidence is of such great value, because grammatical categories and forms have never risen into the consciousness of the speaker, while in almost all other ethnological phenomena people have come to observe what they think and what they do. With the moment that activities and thoughts rise into consciousness they become the subject of speculation; and for this reason the peoples of the world, primitive as well as more advanced, are ever ready to give explanations of their customs and beliefs. The importance of the constant occurrence of such secondary explanations cannot be overrated. They are ever present. The investigator who inquires into the history of institutions and of customs will always receive explanations based on such secondary interpretation, which, however, do not represent the history of the custom or belief in question, but only the results of speculation in regard to it.
I will mention one other psychological point that seems of special importance in the discussion of the significance of primitive culture and its relation to more advanced types. In primitive culture certain activities appear closely connected which in more advanced types of civilization have no longer any relation. Thus it is one of the fundamental traits of primitive culture that social organization and religious belief are inextricably related. To a limited extent this tendency persists in our own civilization; but, on the whole, there has been a marked tendency to separate social and political organization, and religion. The same is true of primitive art and religion; and of primitive science, social organization, and religion. So far as we are able to investigate the causes for the peculiar associations between these varied manifestations of ethnic life and the history of their gradual disappearance, we find that in the stream of consciousness of primitive man a sensory stimulus is very liable to release strong emotions, which are in turn connected with certain groups of ideas. Thus the emotions common to both establish associations between groups of ideas that to us appear entirely unrelated. For the same reason it seems impossible for primitive man to establish those purely rationalistic associations between sense-impressions and acts determined by volition which are characteristic of civilized man. A study of primitive life shows that particularly every customary action attains a very strong emotional tone, which increases the stability of the custom. These forces are still acting in our own civilization. In order to make this clear, I only need to remind you of any of those actions which we call good manners, for which no satisfactory reason can be given; which nevertheless have acquired an emotional tone so strong that a breach of good manners is felt as a grave offence. It would, for instance, be impossible to give a reason why a gentleman should not be allowed to keep on his hat indoors, while it is good form for a lady to do so; and the instantaneous judgment by which we characterize an offender against these rules as rude, and the discomfort felt when we unwittingly commit a breach of good manners, show how deep-seated their emotional values are.
There is no doubt that the further pursuit of the psychological investigation, which has hardly been begun, will help us to find a more satisfactory explanation of many anthropological phenomena than those that we have been able to give heretofore.
You will perceive that anthropology is a science that is only beginning to find its own bearings, that many of the fundamental questions are still open to discussion, and that the promising lines of approach are just opening.