The mind of primitive man

by Franz Boas

As a matter of fact, quite a number of cases can be given in which convergent evolution, beginning from distinct beginnings, has led to the same results. I have referred before to the instance of primitive art, and have mentioned the theory that geometrical form develops from realistic representations, which lead through symbolic conventionalism to purely æsthetic motives. We may remark here that a great diversity of objects might in this way have given rise to the same decorative motives, so that the survival of the same decorative motive would not lead back to the same realistic origin; but more important than this, we may point out that geometrical motives of the same type have developed from the tendency of the artist to play with his technique as the virtuoso plays on his instrument; that the expert basket-weaver, by varying the arrangement of her weave, was led to the development of geometrical designs of the same form as those that were developed in other places from realistic representations. We may even go a step farther, and recognize that geometrical forms developed from the technique suggested animal forms, which later on were modified so as to assume realistic forms; so that in the case of decorative art the same forms may just as well stand at the beginning of a series of development as at the end (Von den Steinen).

Another example may not be amiss. The use of masks is found among a great number of peoples. The origin of the custom is by no means clear in all cases, but a few typical forms of their use may easily be distinguished. They are intended to deceive spirits as to the identity of the wearer, and may thus protect him against attack; or the mask may represent a spirit which is personified by the wearer, who in this way frightens away supernatural enemies. Still other masks are commemorative, the wearer personifying a deceased friend. Masks are also used in theatrical performances illustrating mythological incidents (Andree). While it is not at all necessary to assume that these explanations given by the wearer of masks represent the actual historical development of the custom, the explanations themselves suggest the improbability of a single origin of the custom.

I will give another example. Primitive tribes are very often divided into a definite number of subdivisions. There is little doubt that this form of social organization has arisen independently over and over again. The conclusion is justified that the psychical conditions of man favor the existence of such an organization of society, but it does not follow that it has developed everywhere in the same manner. Dr. Washington Matthews has shown that the groups of the Navaho have arisen by the association of independent elements. Captain Bourke has pointed out that similar occurrences have given rise to the Apache groups, and Dr. Fewkes has reached the same conclusion in regard to some of the Pueblo tribes. On the other hand, we have proof that such groups may originate by division. Such events have taken place among the Indians of the North Pacific coast (Boas). Other divisions of tribes seem to have had an entirely different origin; as, for instance, the frequent twofold exogamic division of tribes, which may, perhaps, be adequately explained by the application of the laws of exogamy in a small community. Thus it would seem that a variety of causes has led to results which appear identical to all intents and purposes.

The principal obstacle in the way of progress on these lines seems to my mind to be founded on the lack of comparability of the data with which we are dealing. Attention has been directed essentially to the similarity of ethnic phenomena, while the individual variations were disregarded. As soon as we turn our attention in this direction, we notice that the sameness of ethnic phenomena is more superficial than complete, more apparent than real. The unexpected similarities have attracted our attention to such an extent that we have disregarded differences; while in the study of the physical traits of distinct social groups, the reverse mental attitude manifests itself. The similarity of the main features of the human form being self-evident, our attention is directed to the minute differences of structure.

Instances of such lack of comparability can easily be given. When we speak of the idea of life after death as one of the ideas which develop in human society as a psychological necessity, we are dealing with a most complex group of data. One people believes that the soul continues to exist in the form that the person had at the time of death, without any possibility of change; another one believes that the soul will be reborn in a child of the same family; a third one believes that the souls will enter the bodies of animals; and still others believe that the shadows continue our human pursuits, waiting to be led back to our world in a distant future. The emotional and rationalistic elements which enter into these various concepts are entirely distinct; and we can readily perceive how the various forms of the idea of a future life may have come into existence by psychological processes that are not at all comparable. If I may be allowed to speculate on this question, I might imagine that in one case the similarities between children and their deceased relatives, in other cases the memory of the deceased as he lived during the last days of his life, in still other cases the longing for the beloved child or parent, and again the fear of death,—may all have contributed to the development of the idea of life after death, the one here, the other there.

Another instance will corroborate this point of view. One of the striking forms of social organization which occurs in many regions wide apart is what we call “totemism,”—a form of society in which certain social groups consider themselves as related in a supernatural way to a certain species of animals or to a certain class of objects. I believe this is the generally accepted definition of “totemism;” but I am convinced that in this form the phenomenon is not a single psychological problem, but embraces the most diverse psychological elements. In some cases the people believe themselves to be descendants of the animal whose protection they enjoy. In other cases an animal or some other object may have appeared to an ancestor of the social group, and may have promised to become his protector, and the friendship between the animal and the ancestor was then transmitted to his descendants. In still other cases a certain social group in a tribe may have the power of securing by magical means and with great ease a certain kind of animal or of increasing its numbers, and the supernatural relation may be established in this way. It will be recognized that here again the anthropological phenomena which are in outward appearances alike are, psychologically speaking, entirely distinct, and that consequently psychological laws covering all of them cannot be deduced from them (Goldenweiser).

Another example may not be amiss. In a general review of moral standards we observe that with increasing civilization a gradual change in the valuation of actions takes place. Among primitive man, human life has little value, and is sacrificed on the slightest provocation. The social group among whose members any altruistic obligations are binding is exceedingly small; and outside of the group any action that may result in personal gain is not only permitted, but even approved; and from this starting-point we find an ever-increasing valuation of human life and an extension of the size of the group among whose members altruistic obligations are binding. The modern relations of nations show that this evolution has not yet reached its final stage. It might seem, therefore, that a study of the social conscience in relation to crimes like murder might be of psychological value, and lead to important results, clearing up the origin of ethical values; but I think here the same objections may be raised as before; namely, the lack of comparable motives. The person who slays an enemy in revenge for wrongs done, a youth who kills his father before he gets decrepit in order to enable him to continue a vigorous life in the world to come, a father who kills his child as a sacrifice for the welfare of his people, act from such entirely different motives, that psychologically a comparison of their activities does not seem permissible. It would seem much more proper to compare the murder of an enemy in revenge with destruction of his property for the same purpose, or to compare the sacrifice of a child on behalf of the tribe with any other action performed on account of strong altruistic motives, than to base our comparison on the common concept of murder (Westermarck).

These few data may suffice to show that the same ethnic phenomenon may develop from different sources; and we may infer that the simpler the observed fact, the more likely it is that it may have developed from one source here, from another there.

When we base our study on these observations, it appears that serious objections may be made against the assumption of the occurrence of a general sequence of cultural stages among all the races of man; that rather we recognize a peculiar tendency of diverse customs and beliefs to converge towards similar forms. In order to interpret correctly these similarities in form, it is necessary to investigate their historical development; and only when the historical development in different areas is the same, will it be admissible to consider the phenomena in question as equivalent. From this point of view the facts of cultural contact assume a new importance (see p. [166]).

An important theoretical consideration has also shaken our faith in the correctness of the evolutionary theory as a whole. It is one of the essential traits of this theory that, in general, civilization has developed from simple forms to complex forms, and that extended fields of human culture have developed under more or less rationalistic impulses. Of late years we are beginning to recognize that human culture does not always develop from the simple to the complex, but that in many aspects two tendencies intercross,—one from the complex to the simple, the other from the simple to the complex. It is obvious that the history of industrial development is almost throughout that of increasing complexity. On the other hand, human activities that do not depend upon reasoning do not show a similar type of evolution.