The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong

by Franz Brentano

Further reflections go to confirm this view, and among these one consideration as to the nature of the judgment requires to be emphasized on account of its special importance. Miklosich combats those who, like Steinthal, deny that there is any reciprocal relation between grammar and logic, at the same time repelling the attacks which, on the ground of such a reciprocal relation, might be made against his doctrine by psychologists and logicians. Indeed he arrives at the result that, in consequence of the special peculiarity of certain judgments, subjectless propositions must from the very first be expected in language. According to his view it is wrong to suppose that every judgment is a relation existing between ideas. It often happens that in a proposition only one fact is affirmed or denied. In such cases a mode of expression is also necessary, and it is obvious that this cannot well consist in a combination of subject and predicate. Miklosich shows how philosophers have been repeatedly led to this knowledge, though, as a rule, they have not appreciated sufficiently the significance of their discovery. Not sufficiently clear themselves as to the new truth to which they gave expression, and, at the same time, clinging with strange indecision to certain residues of the older view, it came about that what at first they affirmed they at last essentially deny. Thus Trendelenburg chose to find expressed in the proposition, “it lightens,” in the last resort, no real judgment, but only the rudiments of a judgment which precedes the notion of lightning and settles down into it, thereby forming the basis for the complete judgment, “lightning is conducted by iron.” Herbart finally declared such judgments as “es rauscht,” to be no judgments in the ordinary sense, not, he thought, what in logic is, strictly speaking, termed a judgment. The passage in which our author censures the inconsistency of these philosophers, and shows that the source of their confusion lies in their misunderstanding of the nature of judgment and in their erroneous definition of it (p. 21 seq.), is excellent.

From all this Miklosich draws the conclusion that his subjectless propositions are completely assured. And not only does he consider their existence beyond doubt, he further shows that their appearance is by no means so rare as might be supposed from the controversy into which it has been necessary to enter concerning them. Their great variety had led him, in the second part of his treatise (pp. 33-72) to set forth their chief classes, and there we find subjectless propositions with the Active Verb, the Reflexive Verb, the Passive Verb and the verb “to be,” each of these four classes being illustrated by means of numerous examples from the most various languages. This is especially the case with the first class, where he makes an eightfold division with the object of grouping the propositions according to the difference in their content. He mentions as universally true (p. 6) that the finite verb of the subjectless propositions always stands in the third person singular, and, where the form admits a difference of gender, in the neuter.

In other directions also he traces the matter further. He shows how these propositions did not arise later than those which predicate something of a subject, but appear from the very outset among the various forms of propositions (p. 13 seq., p. 19), and how, in the course of time, they have disappeared from several languages (p. 26). He proves that the languages in which they are preserved enjoy an advantage, inasmuch as their application lends to the language a special liveliness (26), and he shows how in other respects also it is not always possible to substitute for the subjectless proposition the categorical form, with which it is supposed to be identical. “Ich friere” is, for instance, not fully identical with “mich friert.” Instead of, was frierst du draussen? Komme doch herein! we cannot say: was friert dich’s draussen? etc. “Mich friert” cannot be applied if I expose myself voluntarily to the cold (p. 37).

II

This, shortly, is the substance of his book, regarding which I venture to make a few critical observations.

I have sufficiently expressed in this summary, my approval of the treatise in general, especially in respect of the main argument. The proofs appear to me to be of so cogent a nature, that even the unwilling will scarcely be able to escape from the truth. Quite independent of these arguments, however, I had myself, long ago, arrived at the same view, by way of a purely psychological analysis, and gave, in the most decisive manner, public expression to it, when in 1874 I published my Psychology.

Great, however, as were the pains I then took to set the teaching in a clear light and to show every former view untenable, my success so far has been slight. Apart from isolated individuals, I have been just as little able to convince the philosopher, as Miklosich, in his first edition, was able to convince philologists. Where a prejudice has, during centuries, become ever more and more firmly rooted, where a doctrine has penetrated even to the primary school, when a theory has come to be regarded as fundamental upon which much else rests, and so, as it were, by its weight rendered the foundation immovable, in such a case, it is not to be expected that the error will immediately disappear as soon as its refutation is established; on the contrary, it is to be feared that distrust of the new view will be so great, as not even to admit of a closer examination being made regarding the grounds on which it rests. And yet when two investigators completely independent of each other agree in their testimony, when by quite different paths they arrive at the same goal, it may be hoped that this concurrence will not be regarded as a mere coincidence, but that a more careful attention will be bestowed upon the arguments on either side. I hope that this will be so in the case of the new edition of Miklosich, in which I am glad to see regard paid to my own work.

The agreement with regard to the main points makes subordinate points, in respect of which we differ, of less moment. I shall, notwithstanding, briefly touch on these.

Miklosich has termed those simple propositions, in which there is contained no combination of subject and predicate, and in the recognition of which I am in agreement with him, “subjectless propositions.” I am not able entirely to approve his use of the term and the grounds which he has given for its use.

Subject and predicate are correlative conceptions and stand or fall together. A proposition which is truly without a subject must with equal right be regarded as without a predicate. It does not therefore seem to me quite fitting that Miklosich should always term such propositions subjectless, and it is quite incorrect when he calls them mere predicative propositions. (Cf. pp. 3, 25, 26, and elsewhere.) This might suggest the view that he likewise believes a second conception (the subject) is understood though not expressed, had he not in the most decided manner denied this (p. 3 seq. and elsewhere); or that he regarded such propositions as stunted forms of categorical propositions, and the latter form as the original, had he not expressly refuted this also (p. 13 seq.). His view rather seems to be, that the natural development from the simple to the categorical form in thinking and speaking is generally accomplished in such a way that the notion which stands alone in the former proposition is combined with a second as subject. “The subjectless propositions,” he says, p. 25, “are propositions which consist only of a predicate, of what, in the natural process of thought-formation must, in a great number of propositions, be regarded as the prius, for which a subject may, but not necessarily must be sought.”