In nineteen cases out of twenty the magistrates agree that it would be rather hard on Brown to refuse; and accordingly they grant the renewal. The risks of losing a licence are so small that they are hardly worth taking into consideration. First of all, there is very little probability of the police proceeding against a house, except when compelled by outside pressure. Then, when the police do proceed and secure a conviction, the licence is not usually endorsed. Even after endorsement, a judicious change of tenants can be made; and so the licence retained.
The system of “tied houses” is bad for every one except the brewer. It is bad for the publican, for it reduces him from master of his own house to a servant of the wholesale firms. He has to take such liquor as they please, and pay the price they demand for it. It is a recognised custom in the trade for some if not all of the brewers to charge their “tied” customers more than they do the free.
The plan is bad for the public. In place of the main business of the publican being to satisfy his customers, it is to retain the good-will of the owner of the house. In a district where one firm controls all the houses, there is no longer competition between the different publicans as to which shall sell the best drink, for all sell the same; and the brewer is able to palm off his worst brews on the people there.
Last, but chief of all, it is bad for good order and for the general well-being. The licensed victualler, being placed in such a position, is too often willing to adopt risky methods for attracting custom, which he would not venture to employ had he a substantial stake in the house. By this he not only injures the character of his own premises, but compels his rivals, who own free houses, to imitate him in order that they may not lose their trade. And so the whole method of conducting business in the neighbourhood is lowered.
The Times cannot be accused of teetotal bias; and an utterance by it on this matter will command weight. “The natural tendency of a brewer is simply to push the sale of his beer,” said that journal in a leading article on 12th September, 1892. “Provided no forfeiture of the licence be incurred, the especial manner in which the business is conducted does not matter much to him. His main desire is that the neighbourhood shall drink as much as possible. His servant, the publican, who has little or no property invested in the premises, has no strong personal motive for caution. He wishes to ingratiate himself with his employer by promoting a liberal consumption. The fear of risking the licence affects him far less than if it meant for him positive commercial ruin. From the point of view even of the customers, it has been felt that a spread of the monopoly of brewers is inconvenient. When a brewer is absolute master of a house he can, unchallenged, supply it with bad or unwholesome liquors.... Practical experience, at all events, has created a keen jealousy of the system of tied houses, and a determination to make a stand against its unlimited predominance.... Where the function of a court is the commission to certain persons to conduct a trade under its supervision, its manifest duty is to see that its delegates are free agents. A publican who can be ejected at once, or be subjected to ruinous penalties, if he exercise the least liberty of choice of his stock, and unless he accept any trash a brewer consigns to him, is a cipher.”
A remedy lies all ready in the hands of the licensing justices, if they would only use it. Nothing would be easier than for them to demand the production of all agreements under which the publicans are occupiers of their houses, and to refuse (after due notice) to grant the renewal of the licence of any house in which the tenant is not a bonâ-fide free agent. But there is little prospect of the licensing justices doing this until they are compelled. The most practicable remedy seems to be a short Act of Parliament, providing that in no case is a licensed victualler to enter into any contracts which will make him responsible to any but the licensing authority for the conduct of his house; and that it shall be illegal for him to bind himself to purchase his stock in whole or part from any particular firm or firms. It should be forbidden for brewers or wholesale spirit merchants to own all or part of any public-houses. It might be further provided that the licensing authority is to satisfy itself that the publican is genuinely a free agent before granting or renewing his licence.
Such an Act would no doubt receive considerable opposition from many brewers, though even to some of them it would not be unwelcome. The present method compels them to sink a vast amount of capital in buying up licences, and gives the small brewer (who possibly produces better drink than his wealthier rivals) little chance of competing against the great firms. To the majority of publicans such a law would be acceptable, for it would raise their position and increase their profits. And the gain to public order would be greater than that which is likely to result from many more ambitious schemes.