During the day I experience the want of seeing clearly. There exists one thing calculated to satisfy that want—namely, the light of the sun. My judgment pronounces in favour of the utility of that thing, and . . . it has no value. Why? Because I enjoy it without calling for the services of any one.
At night I experience the same want. There exists one thing capable of satisfying it very imperfectly, a wax candle. My judgment pronounces in favour of the utility, but far inferior utility, of that thing—and it has value. Why? Because the man who has taken the trouble to make the candle will not give it to me except upon condition of my rendering him an equivalent service.
What we have, then, to compare and to judge of, in order to determine Value, is not the relative utility of things, but the relation of two services.
On these terms, I do not reject Storch’s definition.
Permit me to recapitulate a little, in order to show clearly that my definition contains all that is true in the definitions of my predecessors, and eliminates everything in them which is erroneous either through excess or defect.
The principle of Value, we have seen, resides in a human service, and results from the appreciation of two services compared.
Value must have relation to Effort. Service implies a certain Effort.
Value supposes a comparison of Efforts exchanged, at least exchangeable. Service implies the terms to give and to receive. [p169]
Value is not, however, in fact proportional to the intensity of the Efforts. Service does not necessarily imply that proportion.
A multitude of external circumstances influence value without constituting value itself. The word service takes all these circumstances in due measure into account.