The Inhabitants of the Philippines

by Frederic H. Sawyer

What could be finer than the late Colonel Stotsenburg’s leading of the Nebraska regiment in the attack on Quíngua, where he was killed? And since we are speaking of brave men, shall we not remember the late General Antonio Luna and his gallant rally of his army in the advance from Macabébe, when he fearlessly exposed himself on horseback to the American fire, riding along the front of his line? To justify the slow progress of the army, jungles, forests, swamps and hills were introduced on the perfectly flat arable land such as that around Malolos, Calumpit, and San Fernando, extending in fact all the way from Manila to Tarlac.[3] This country supports a dense population, and almost every bit of it has been under the plough for centuries. The only hill is Arayat. During the dry season, say from November to May or June, the soil is baked quite hard, and vehicles or guns can traverse any part of it with slight assistance from the pioneers. The only obstacles are the small rivers and creeks, mostly fordable, and having clumps of bamboos growing on their banks providing a perfect material for temporary bridges or for making rafts.

The campaign was marked by an absence of co-operation between the land and sea forces. Admiral Dewey, apparently, was not pleased with the way things were managed, for he is said to have stayed on board his ship for months at a time. The warships remained at anchor in Manila Bay whilst arms[4] and ammunition were landed at the outposts or on the coasts without hindrance, and it was not till November that troops were landed at Dagupan, the northern terminus of the railway, though this obviously ought to have been done in February, so as to attack the enemy front and rear.

The necessity for small gunboats soon made itself felt, but such was the jealousy of the army towards the navy that it was decided that these must be army gunboats, and General Otis is reported to have purchased thirteen small gunboats at Zamboanga, in March 1899, without consulting or informing Admiral Dewey or even asking for an escort for them. It so happened that the Spaniards evacuated Zamboanga before any American forces arrived, and the insurgents promptly took possession of the gunboats already paid for and proceeded to plunder them of everything useful to them. A native account says that they took the gunboats up the Rio Grande into the interior, but this is denied by the Americans. Ultimately a cruiser was sent down to convoy the gunboats, and if I am correctly informed, they were commissioned in charge of junior naval officers.

Obviously, the services of the navy should have been utilised to the utmost extent, and advantage should have been taken of the prestige they had gained by the victory over the Spaniards, and of the great popularity and sympathetic personality of Admiral Dewey. A serious responsibility rests upon whoever allowed jealousy to prevent the co-operation of the land and sea forces, since by failing to secure this they needlessly sacrificed the lives of American soldiers and prolonged the war.

Lieut.-General Sir Andrew Clarke, R.E., a former governor of the Straits Settlements, and the greatest authority in England on the affairs of the Malay States and Islands, was good enough to write a letter which was forwarded to Mr. Day, and published in the Blue Book, p. 628.

He pointed out that, although a moderate military force might be desirable at one or two important centres, a naval force was of more value, especially gunboats able to move freely amongst the islands and ascend the many rivers and inlets of the sea.

Therefore to the fleet and its officers he advised that political and civil administration of the Philippines should, at least in the first instance, be entrusted. Sir Andrew believed, and I venture to say that I thoroughly agree with him, that amongst the officers of the United States navy, active and retired, can be found many men of wide experience, broad views, and generous sympathy well fitted to administer the affairs of the protectorate. Sir Andrew also advised, as Foreman did, and as I do, that the members of the Religious Orders, i.e., the Augustinians, the Dominicans, the Franciscans, and the Recollets, should be advised to return to Spain, receiving compensation for their property.

Sir Andrew Clarke summed up his advice as follows: “Enlist native sympathy by fairness and justice, and rule through native agents, supervised by carefully selected American residents.”

As the fleet, by destroying the Spanish squadron, had rendered it possible to bring troops by sea, and by capturing the arsenal and blockading the Port of Manila, had invigorated the insurrection, and in fact had brought about the cession of the islands by Spain, it would appear to outsiders that it and its officers had a strong claim to the leading part in completing the settlement and pacification of the Archipelago for which the best authorities considered them to possess special qualifications. Besides, if peace was really wanted, it would have been better to entrust the negotiations to the man who had had his fight rather than to one looking for his chance. The craze for military renown is nowhere more rampant than in the United States. Occasions are few and far between, and we must not expect generals to throw them away and fly in the face of Providence.

This, however, did not commend itself to those who pull the strings; we ignore the reasons, but we see the result. Perhaps it was thought that to allow Dewey to add to his victor’s laurel wreath the palm of the pacificator would be too much honour for one man, and might raise him to an inconvenient height in the estimation of his fellow citizens.