The Moros of Lake Lanao could be simultaneously attacked from north and south. In 1894, the Spaniards attacked by the north, and transported all their artillery and stores and their small steamers built in sections, by paths on the eastern side of the River Agus. Some of the Moros remained neutral in that campaign. Such were the Dattos of Lumbayangin and Guimba. Their cottas were spared. The distance in a straight line from the mouth of the Agus near Iligan to the lake is fifteen miles.
The path winds a good deal, and the country is hilly, wooded on the heights, and intersected by streams. There is a path on the west bank of the Agus, the country there is more open, and a large part of it is under cultivation. A good outfit of mountain-guns would be required on this northern expedition.
The other attack could be made from the south, the forces landing at Fort Baras, or at Lalabuan. From either of these places there is what in the Philippines is called a road to Ganasi at the southern end of the lake. The distance in a straight line is about twenty miles. The two roads join at about half way, just before coming to the cotta of Kurandangan in the Sultanate of Puálas.
This road is reported to have no steep gradients, no boggy parts, and no unfordable streams. The country is fairly open, as there is no thick forest, but only scrub and cogon, or elephant grass. From a description given by a Tagal who traversed this road, it appears to be practicable for field artillery. The combined attack, north and south, could be supported by an advance from the eastward of irregular forces of the Montéses from the reducciones of the Tagoloan, Sawaga and Malupati Rivers, if they were supplied with arms and ammunition for this purpose.
It seems to me that we have here the usual three courses; the fourth, to do nothing, and allow Moro and Christian to fight it out, would be unworthy of the United States, or of any civilized government.
1. Put a stop to slave-hunting and murdering by a military expedition against the Moro Dattos.
2. Maintain garrisons to keep the peace and protect the missionaries and their converts and trust to their efforts to gradually convert the Moros.
3. Arm all the Christian towns round about the Moros and organise the men as local militia, so that they can protect themselves against Moro aggression.
All these courses are expensive, the second less expensive than the first, the third less expensive than the second.
However, if either the second or third course is adopted, it is very probable that before long the first course would become imperative, for the Moros are faithless and treacherous in the extreme, and no treaty unsupported by bayonets has the least chance of being respected.