The troops encamped on the downs of San Nicolas, one brigade on each side of the River Zapote. Notwithstanding the comparatively favourable emplacement of the camp, the troops and their officers suffered severely from the effect of the climate upon frames weakened by over-exertion, by indifferent nourishment and by sleeping on the ground. Malarial fevers, intestinal catarrh, dysentery, and rheumatism sapped their vitality, whilst nostalgia preyed upon the younger soldiers and depressed their spirits. Since the 15th February the division had lost in killed, wounded, and invalided, no less than 135 officers, and troops in greater proportion.
Yet still greater exertions were to be required from the soldiers. The 4th Brigade was incorporated in the division, and two additional battalions, one from the 3rd Brigade and the other from the Independent Brigade, brought the number of combatants nearly up to 12,000.
Having previously made a practicable road by Almansa to Presa Molino and Salitran, defended by redoubts at the most difficult fords, and having organised his transport with such means as the country afforded, Lachambre again set out, his objective being Imus, but the attack was to be from Salitran.
The work of the native engineer soldiers, and of the 74th Native Regiment in constructing this road and the redoubts, merits the highest praise, and it must be admitted that it is almost impossible for an army of white men to carry on a campaign in the Philippines or in similar territory, without the assistance of native pioneer or engineer troops.
The road being ready, and the convoys of provisions having gone forward, on the morning of the 22nd March the division started on its march to Salitran, where it arrived on the evening of the 23rd, having had some sharp skirmishes on the way.
Early on the 24th the division set out for Imus, and once more the formidable trenches and redoubts of Anabo II., restored, strengthened, and crowded with determined defenders, barred their path. These works had once already been taken by assault, and had cost the division the loss of the brave General Zabala and other officers and men.
Protected on each flank by a deep ravine with a river at the bottom, and with open ground in front, the attack had been rendered more difficult by flooding the arable land before the trenches, and the position of the rebels was an exceedingly strong one. Lachambre had to accept a direct attack, but he sent a body of troops forward on each flank to advance simultaneously and overlap the ends of the entrenchment.
The infantry deployed, the firing line advanced under fire without stopping to within three hundred yards of the parapet, when they halted, taking what cover they could and keeping up a steady fire. Then the mountain battery was brought up and fired common shell at close range, breaching the parapet. A rush forward soon brought the firing-line within 150 yards of the parapet. General Marina, watching the engagement well to the front, had one of his staff officers killed at his side; seeing the favourable moment arrive, he gave the order for the assault.
Once more the troops exhibited their conspicuous bravery. The long line, led by its officers, dashed forward with the bayonet, the bugles sounding the charge, and with impetuous speed, soon reached the parapet. However terrible the attack, the stout-hearted Tagals stood firm, disdaining to fly.
Bolo and bayonet clashed, European courage and Malay fury had full play, till in the end, as ever in equal numbers and in stand-up fight, the European prevailed. Many of the defenders fell, the rest sought safety in flight.