In consequence of this, the rebels abandoned Cavite, Viejo, and Binacayan, which were occupied the following day without resistance.

The rebels, however, on the 4th, and again on the 5th, attacked the troops in Noveleta and sustained the combat for some time, killing 10 and wounding 33 Spanish, but leaving 50 of their own dead on the ground.

On the 6th the division marched from Noveleta, which was occupied by a garrison of marines, and took the direction of San Francisco, the advanced guard in extended order across the same open ground upon which the engagement of April 1st was fought. The rebel positions on the right flank were marked by lines of skirmishers with their supports and reserves. The Tagals had, however, inundated the part of this plain immediately in front of the town, and the advance was made with great difficulty; the guns and ammunition boxes having to be carried by the gunners with the assistance of the infantry. With undaunted bravery the troops struggled on under a heavy fire, but Lachambre, realising the difficulty and the danger incurred, changed the direction of the advance. The right wing under Arizon inclined to the right, and the left, under Marina, bore away to the left. Half a brigade crossed the River Ladron, notwithstanding the opposition of the rebels, and attacked the town from the east. Firmer ground was soon reached, the guns that had cost so much labour taking up, were mounted, and a rain of shell soon fell amongst the rebels. The infantry poured in steady volleys, advancing in the intervals of firing. The whole combined attack being within a proper distance for the final rush, Lachambre gave the word, and like greyhounds released, the Spanish and native infantry leaped to the assault. The parapet was high and deep the ditch, for the defenders had not spared their labour on it, and as the Spanish line reached the edge, the rebels boldly mounted the parapet and discharged their arms at close quarters. In this critical moment the moral superiority of the white man once more was manifest. The Spanish troops reached the parapet and a hand-to-hand combat with the bolder rebels took place, the bayonet against the spear or bolo. The less-determined of the enemy fled, and in a few minutes 120 Tagals lay dead against the parapet, and five guns and eighty rifles remained as trophies to the victors. The companies re-formed for the pursuit, but the enemy fired the thatched huts to interpose a curtain of flame between them and their pursuers; a measure which was only partially successful, for some of the troops, nimbly darting through the lanes, shot down or bayoneted many of the fugitives, killing 400 in the pursuit, besides those who died at the entrenchments. The Spanish loss was 25 killed and 125 wounded, including several officers. The fighting had lasted four hours over very difficult ground, and the troops were exhausted. Lachambre therefore camped in the town, which has many fine edifices and a spacious, church and convent. The bells of the church, in a joyful peal, announced the Spanish triumph. The rebels were under the command of Andrés Bonifacio, the President of the formidable Katipunan. This terrible blow to the insurrection was followed by the occupation of the towns of Santa Cruz and Rosario, without firing a shot.

Many of the natives had joined the rebellion under compulsion, and had long desired to submit themselves. Now they came in by hundreds every day to claim the amnesty offered by General Polavieja.

Fifty-two days had the campaign lasted, fifty-seven combats had taken place, and the total loss of the division was 1 general, 14 officers, and 168 men killed, and 56 officers and 910 men wounded. Probably a far larger number died or were invalided from disease, induced by the fatigue, exposure and privations inseparable from such a campaign, especially as most of the men were mere youths, raw recruits, and with little possibility of taking care of themselves, even if they knew how. Notwithstanding the excessive fatigue and the depressing nature of the surroundings, the Spanish troops maintained a fine martial spirit, and ever showed themselves ready to respond to the calls made upon them. They were well led by their officers, who devoted themselves unsparingly in their country’s service, and they had confidence in their generals, who were untiring in their exertions to do their best for their men. Lachambre displayed the greatest solicitude for the well-being of the force under his command; whilst showing the utmost resolution, and pushing his attacks home in every case, yet he sacrificed his men as little as possible, and always had patience to wait till his flanking attacks could join in the assault. The distances the division had to traverse were very small, but the absence of roads and bridges made the provisioning of the army a matter of the utmost difficulty.

Those who know the poverty of the Spanish Army in animals, vehicles, and stores, will understand what Lachambre and his staff accomplished. On the 12th April, 1897, the division was broken up, and the brigades were stationed at various places in Cavite and the neighbouring provinces.

The general, brigadiers, officers, and troops, are fortunate in having as chronicler of their exploits, so painstaking and appreciative an officer as Lieut.-Colonel Don Federico de Monteverde y Sedano, who in his book, ‘La Division Lachambre,’ published in 1898, gives a detailed account of the campaign, with sketches illustrative of the various actions. Señor Monteverde does justice to every Spaniard, from the divisional-general downwards. I could wish he had said something more about the services of the 73rd and 74th Regiments of Native Infantry, who seem to have been always in the forefront of the battle and where the hardest work was being done, as in assisting the magnificent engineer corps, without whom I doubt if the campaign could have been successful. His book, however, is invaluable to those who may have to conduct operations in the Philippines, and the invariable success achieved by Lachambre, contrasts remarkably with the failures in the early part of the rebellion, and one cannot help seeing a parallel between this little war and the greater one in South Africa. Each was mismanaged at the beginning, but as soon as the invading forces were organised in one command, success was achieved.

A few days after the breaking up of the division, General Polavieja embarked for Spain, very much broken in health. In a letter written on the 9th March to the Minister of War, Polavieja declared himself too ill to ride and asked for his relief. He, however, still remained at Parañaque, directing the campaign till after the capture of San Francisco.

The Spanish press took sides for or against him, the papers advocating the interests of the friars praised him, whilst the Liberal press held him up to ridicule.

There is no doubt that he directed the military operations in an efficient manner, but under his government the arbitrary arrests, cruelties, and tortures, inflicted upon all who were suspected of being sympathisers with the rebels, or from whom money would be extorted, that had begun under Blanco, continued and increased. For Blanco, having been informed of the cruelties inflicted, issued an order forbidding the practice.