He soon reasserted himself as the leader of the insurrection, which was already in active progress, and gained some signal successes against the Spaniards. On the 24th May he issued a proclamation enjoining his followers to make war in a civilized manner and to respect property.
I do not intend to discuss the negotiations between Mr. Pratt and Aguinaldo, nor between the latter and Admiral Dewey. This subject has been very fully treated by Mr. Foreman in the second edition of his book. The treating with Aguinaldo was not approved by Mr. Day at Washington, and the Consul-General and Consuls who had participated in it, and even taken credit for it, were severely rapped over the knuckles and promptly adopted an apologetic tone (see Blue Book). But whatever was the agreement with Aguinaldo, it is evident that had it not been for his assistance and that of the insurgents, the Spanish forces could have retired from Manila to Tarlac or other place inland out of reach of the guns of the fleet and could have prolonged their resistance for years.
The Tagal Republic.
The Tagals had made much progress since the insurrection of 1896–7. Their ideas had advanced considerably since their rudimentary organization in the Province of Cavite, as can be gathered from the improved style of the various proclamations and decrees published by Aguinaldo.
They now organized a Government, a real Civil Administration, extending over a great part of Luzon, and sent an expedition to Visayas. They established a Constitution, a representative government, and reopened the courts and schools, whilst the native clergy carried on public worship as usual. Aguinaldo repeatedly asserted the determination of the Tagal people to fight to the death for independence. At this time the insurgents held 9000 Spaniards as prisoners of war, and they claimed to have 30,000 men under arms.
Paymaster Wilcox, U.S.N., and Mr. Leonard R. Sargent who travelled through part of Luzon for more than 600 miles, and during six weeks, reported[1] to Admiral Dewey that a regular and orderly Administration had been established, and was in full working order.
Aguinaldo was at the head of this Government and of the army co-operating with the American forces by the written request of General Anderson. This should have ensured him and those with him at the very least courteous and considerate treatment at the hands of the American Commanders, and in fact he received this from Admiral Dewey. But as soon as the direction of affairs passed into the hands of the general commanding the army the deeply-rooted contempt felt by Americans for the coloured races was allowed full play, Aguinaldo and his staff found themselves ignored, or treated with scarcely veiled contempt, and the estrangement was gradually increased.
I do not know which party was the aggressor on February the 4th, 1899, each swears that it was the other. The cui bono test cuts both ways, for whilst it appears that the attack on Manila secured two doubtful votes in the Senate for the ratification of the Treaty whereby the Philippines were bought from Spain, on the other hand, Aguinaldo may have felt it necessary to prove to America that the Philippines would fight rather than bow their necks to the Yankee yoke. So that both parties may have had an interest in beginning hostilities. In any case, the next day Aguinaldo offered to withdraw to a greater distance if an armistice was arranged, but Otis declared that “fighting must go on.”
Personally, I think that if a sympathetic and conciliatory attitude had been adopted, had the local government established been recognized, had Aguinaldo and his staff been given commissions in the Native Army or Civil Service, and the flower of the Tagal Army taken into the service of the United States, a peaceful settlement could have been made on the lines of a Protectorate.