The Secretary of War submitted to Congress the first instalment of his report under the resolution of March 3, 1853, on February 27, 1855. As yet the labors of compilation and examination of the field manuscripts were by no means completed, but he was able to make general statements about the probability of success. At five points the continental divide had been crossed; over four of these railways were entirely practicable, although the shortest of the routes to San Francisco ran by the one pass, Cochetopa, where it would be unreasonable to construct a road.
From the routes surveyed, Secretary Davis recommended one as "the most practicable and economical route for a railroad from the Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean." In all cases cost, speed of construction, and ease in operation needed to be ascertained and compared. The estimates guessed at by the parties in the field, and revised by the War Department, pointed to the southernmost as the most desirable route. To reach this conclusion it was necessary to accuse Governor Stevens of underestimating the cost of labor along his northern line; but the figures as taken were conclusive. On this thirty-second parallel route, declared the Secretary of War, "the progress of the work will be regulated chiefly by the speed with which cross-ties and rails can be delivered and laid.... The few difficult points ... would delay the work but an inconsiderable period.... The climate on this route is such as to cause less interruption to the work than on any other route. Not only is this the shortest and least costly route to the Pacific, but it is the shortest and cheapest route to San Francisco, the greatest commercial city on our western coast; while the aggregate length of railroad lines connecting it at its eastern terminus with the Atlantic and Gulf seaports is less than the aggregate connection with any other route."
The Pacific railway surveys had been ordered as the only step which Congress in its situation of deadlock could take. Senator Gwin had long ago told his fears that the advocates of the disappointed routes would unite to hinder the fortunate one. To the South, as to Jefferson Davis, Secretary of War, the thirty-second parallel route was satisfactory; but there was as little chance of building a railway as there had been in 1850. In days to come, discussion of railways might be founded upon facts rather than hopes and fears, but either unanimity or compromise was in a fairly remote future. The overland traffic, which was assuming great volume as the surveys progressed, had yet nearly fifteen years before the railway should drive it out of existence. And no railway could even be started before war had removed one of the contesting sections from the floor of Congress.
Yet in the years since Asa Whitney had begun his agitation the railways of the East had constantly expanded. The first bridge to cross the Mississippi was under construction when Davis reported in 1855. The Illinois Central was opened in 1856. When the Civil War began, the railway frontier had become coterminous with the agricultural frontier, and both were ready to span the gap which separated them from the Pacific.
[CHAPTER XIII]
THE UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
It has been pointed out by Davis in his history of the Union Pacific Railroad that the period of agitation was approaching probable success when the latter was deferred because of the rivalry of sections and localities into which the scheme was thrown. From about 1850 until 1853 it indeed seemed likely that the road would be built just so soon as the terminus could be agreed upon. To be sure, there was keen rivalry over this; yet the rivalry did not go beyond local jealousies and might readily be compromised. After the reports of the surveys were completed and presented to Congress the problem took on a new aspect which promised postponement until a far greater question could be solved. Slavery and the Pacific railroad are concrete illustrations of the two horns of the national dilemma.
As a national project, the railway raised the problem of its construction under national auspices. Was the United States, or should it become, a nation competent to undertake the work? With no hesitation, many of the advocates of the measure answered yes. Yet even among the friends of the road the query frequently evoked the other answer. Slavery had already taken its place as an institution peculiar to a single section. Its defence and perpetuation depended largely upon proving the contrary of the proposition that the Pacific railroad demanded. For the purposes of slavery defence the United States must remain a mere federation, limited in powers and lacking in the attributes of sovereignty and nationality. Looking back upon this struggle, with half a century gone by, it becomes clear that the final answer upon both questions, slavery and railway, had to be postponed until the more fundamental question of federal character had been worked out. The antitheses were clear, even as Lincoln saw them in 1858. Slavery and localism on the one hand, railway and nationalism on the other, were engaged in a vital struggle for recognition. Together they were incompatible. One or the other must survive alone. Lincoln saw a portion of the problem, and he sketched the answer: "I do not expect the Union to be dissolved,—I do not expect the house to fall, but I do expect it will cease to be divided."
The stages of the Pacific railroad movement are clearly marked through all these squabbles. Agitation came first, until conviction and acceptance were general. This was the era of Asa Whitney. Reconnoissance and survey followed, in a decade covering approximately 1847–1857. Organization came last, beginning in tentative schemes which counted for little, passing through a long series of intricate debates in Congress, and being merged in the larger question of nationality, but culminating finally in the first Pacific railroad bills of 1862 and 1864.