Before leaving M. de Beust I confessed to him that my mission did not stop short with Vienna, but that I was also going to England. I asked him if he had no message for me to carry to the English Cabinet, and if Austria, under certain conditions, would not take part in common action.
“I authorise you to say to Lord Granville that, if England wished effectively to intervene with the object of obtaining honourable conditions of peace for France, England would not be alone and Austria would go with her.”
This answer, which might appear to be full of promise, did not signify very much and did not greatly compromise him who made it, in good faith I admit, but with the certainty that England would not put him to the necessity of keeping his word. The situation, therefore, was one of frightful simplicity. It was this:—
If the Powers—I do not of course refer to Russia, who was in a situation by herself—if the Powers had been able to intervene for France without exposing themselves to a war with Prussia, intervention would have taken place and France would not have remained alone to face Germany in negotiating for conditions of peace.
France was, in fact, at this moment in the position of having regained the sympathies of those who had turned away from her at the beginning of the war. Moreover, the question was being asked with a certain amount of anxiety whether the crushing of France would not become a permanent danger to the general peace. If there had been any possibility of influencing Prussia’s determination without the mobilisation of soldiers, intervention would not have failed us, and M. de Beust’s answer would not have been an evasive promise but the sincere pledge of a friend willing to give all that circumstances permitted him. I am inwardly convinced that M. de Beust intended keeping his word should England have been able to decide to take a similar initiative. But, as we shall see hereafter, England absolutely refused, and always for the master reason that she did not wish to be exposed to a rebuff from Prussia, who in the last instance would only have heeded the voice of a general at the head of an army.
The “quos ego’s” of the conqueror held back Europe—for, “if Prussia would not listen, what was then to be done?”
It was thus the fate of France to remain alone from the beginning of the war to its close, and Prussia was well aware of it. She therefore proclaimed, most energetically and with disdainful pride, to the whole of Europe that she would not allow anyone to interfere in her affairs, or to interpose as mediator between her and France; peace would be concluded on conditions which she alone would settle with France, and Europe had nothing to say to this arrangement which only concerned the two principal parties.
And Europe allowed this thing because she had no means of checking it. She knew well that words were not enough for Prussia, and she was not armed so as to throw her sword if necessary into the balance in order to give her words weight.
From Vienna I went direct to London, where I arrived in the first days of December.