I did not understand what that might mean, as on the one side Prussia was loftily announcing these claims, and on the other England was definitely decided not to oppose her. I finally understood that this was another theory of Mr. Gladstone’s. All he meant was that England simply did not approve of Prussia’s annexation of the two provinces, but that she could do nothing to stop it.
From the commencement of our conversation Mr. Gladstone had expressed great confidence in our ultimate success. At the end he reverted to this theme. “Your efforts,” said he, “are prodigious and will be crowned with success. You will end by being victorious.” He then reopened the question of England’s intervention and said: “Perhaps our intervention may be useful later.”
“Later,” said I. “May I ask when?”
“When the French armies are victorious.”
“What,” said I. “Is it then that you intend to intervene? Is that what your friendship consists of? You want to intervene against us?”
“No,” said he, “for you. But the opportunity will then be more favourable than now, and Prussia will give way to us more easily....”
I answered the eminent statesman as I had already answered his excellent colleague Lord Granville, that this was a singular manner of practising friendship and that at any rate his friendship would then be useless.
“Hic Rhodos, hic salta! It must be intervention now or never!”
* * * * *
I will not end this summary account without mentioning some curious phrases uttered by Mr. Gladstone concerning the Second Empire.