‘But here they seem more inclined than they should be to that party which advocates “pleasure,” as being that which they define as either the whole, or the most important part of human happiness. And, what is more surprising, they even draw arguments in support of so nice an opinion from the principles of religion, which is usually sombre and severe, and of a stern and melancholy character. For they never dispute about happiness without joining some principles drawn from religion to those derived from rational philosophy; without which, reason is, in their opinion, defective and feeble in the search for true happiness. Their religious principles are as follow. The soul is immortal, and, by the goodness of God, born to happiness. He has appointed rewards after this life for man’s virtues and good deeds—punishment for his sins. Now, though these principles appertain to religion, yet they think that they are led by reason to believe and assent to them. Apart from these principles, they unhesitatingly declare that no man can be so foolish as not to see that pleasure is to be pursued for its own sake through thick and thin; so long as he takes care only not to let a less pleasure stand in the way of a greater, and not to pursue any pleasure which is followed in its turn by pain.
‘For they consider “virtue” austere and hard to strive after; and they deem it the greatest madness for a man not only to exclude all “pleasure” from life, but even voluntarily to suffer pain without prospect of future profit (for what profit can there be, if you gain nothing after death, after having spent the whole of your life without pleasure, that is, in misery?).
‘But now they do not place happiness in the enjoyment of every kind of pleasure, but in that only which is honest and good. For they think that our nature is attracted to happiness, as to its supreme good, by that very “virtue” to which alone the opposite party ascribes happiness. For they define “virtue,” the living in accordance with nature; inasmuch as, to this end, we are created by God. They believe that he follows the guidance of nature who obeys the dictates of reason in the pursuit or avoidance of anything; and they say that reason first of all inflames men with a love and reverence for the Divine Majesty, to whom we owe it both that we exist, and that we are capable of happiness; and secondly, that reason impresses upon us and urges us to pass our lives with the least amount of care and the greatest amount of pleasure ourselves; and, as we are bound to do by the natural ties of society, to give our assistance to the rest of mankind towards attaining the same ends. For never was there a man so stern a follower of “virtue,” or hater of pleasure, who, whilst thus enjoining upon you labours, watchings, and discomfort, would not tell you likewise to relieve the want and misfortunes of others to the utmost of your ability, and would not think it commendable for men to be of mutual help and comfort to one another in the name of humanity. If, then, it be in human nature (and no virtue is more peculiar to man) to relieve the misery of others, and, by removing their troubles, to restore them to the enjoyment of life, that is, to pleasure—does not nature, which prompts men to do this for others, urge them also to do it for themselves? For a joyful life—that is, a life of pleasure—is either an evil—in which case, not only should you not help others to lead such a life, but, as far as you can, prevent them from leading it, as being hurtful and deadly; or, if it be a good thing, and if it be not only lawful, but a matter of duty to enable others to lead such a life—why should it not be good for yourself first of all, who ought not to be less careful of yourself than of others? For when nature teaches you to be kind to others, she does not bid you to be hard and severe to yourself in return. Nature herself then, in their belief, enjoins a happy life—that is, “pleasure”—as the end of all our efforts; and to live by this rule, they call “virtue.”
‘But, since nature urges men to strive together to make life more cheerful (which, indeed, she rightly does; for no man is so much raised above the condition of his fellows as to be the only favourite of nature, which cherishes alike all whom she binds together by the tie of a common shape), she surely bids you urgently to beware of attending so much to your own interest as to prejudice the interest of others. They think, therefore, that not only all contracts between private citizens should be kept, but also public laws, which either a good prince has legally enacted, or a people neither oppressed by tyranny, nor circumvented by fraud, has sanctioned by common consent for the apportionment of the conveniences of life; that is, the material of pleasure. Within the limits of these laws, it is common prudence to look after your own interests; it is a matter of duty to have regard for the public weal also. But to attempt to deprive another of pleasure in favouring your own, is to do a real injury. On the other hand, to deprive yourself of something in order that you may give it to another, that is indeed an act of humanity and kindness which in itself never costs so much as it brings back. For it is not only repaid by the interchange of kindnesses; but also the very consciousness of a good action done and the recollection of the love and gratitude of those whom you have benefited, afford more pleasure to the mind, than the thing from which you have abstained would have afforded to the body. And, lastly, God repays the loss of these small and fleeting pleasures with vast and endless joy; a doctrine of the truth of which religion easily convinces a believing mind.
‘Thus, on these grounds, they determine that, all things being carefully weighed and considered, all our actions, and our very virtues among them, regard pleasure and happiness after all as their object.’—Utopia, 1st ed. Leaf h, ii. et seq.
[566] J. S. Mill’s Essay on Utilitarianism, p. 24.
[567] Utopia 1st ed. Leaf i, i.
[568] Leaf i, ii.
[569] Leaf i, iii.
[570] Leaf h, ii.