Domesday Book and Beyond: Three Essays in the Early History of England

by Frederic William Maitland

As to the sort of jurisdiction that a lord of our Leges has, we can make no statement in general terms. Such categories as ‘civil’ and ‘criminal’ are too modern for use. We must of course except the pleas of the crown, of which a long and ungeneralized list is set before us[312]. We must except the pleas of the church. We must except certain pleas which belong in part to the king and in part to the church[313]. Then we observe that the justice of an archbishop, bishop or earl, probably the justice of a baron also, extends as high as infangenethef, while that of a vavassor goes no higher than such offences as are emendable. The whole matter however is complicated by royal grants. The king may grant away a demesne manor and retain not only ‘the exclusive soke’ (i.e. the soke over the pleas of the crown), but also ‘the common soke’ in his hand[314], and a great man may by purchase acquire soke (for example, we may suppose, the hundredal soke) over lands that are not his own[315]. Then again, we may suspect that what is said of ‘soke’ in general does not apply to any jurisdiction that a lord may exercise over his servi and villani. As to the servi, very possibly the lord’s right over them is still conceived as proprietary rather than jurisdictional, while for his villani (serf and villein are not yet convertible terms) the lord, whatever his rank may be, will probably hold a ‘hallmoot[316]’ and exercise that ‘common soke’ which does not infringe the royal preserves. On the whole, the law of the thirteenth century seems to evolve itself somewhat easily out of the law of these Leges, the process of development being threefold: (1) the lord’s rank as bishop, abbot, earl, baron, becomes unimportant; (2) the element of tenure becomes all-important; the mere fact that the man holds land of the lord makes him the lord’s justiciable; thus a generalization becomes possible which permits even so lowly a person as a burgess of Dunstable to hold a court for his tenants[317]; (3) the obsolescence of the old law of wíte and wer, the growth of the new law of felony, the emergence in Glanvill’s book of the distinction between criminal and civil pleas as a grand primary distinction, the introduction of the specially royal processes of presentment and inquest, bring about a new apportionment of the field of justice and a rational demarcation of feudal from franchisal powers. Still when we see the lords, especially the prelates of the church, relying upon prescription for their choicest franchises[318], we may learn (if such a lesson be needed) that new theories could not master all the ancient facts.

The Norman kings and private jurisdiction.

Whether the Conqueror or either of his sons would have admitted that any justice could be done in England that was not his justice, we may fairly doubt. They issued numerous charters which had no other object than that of giving or confirming to the donees ‘their sake and soke,’ and, so far as we can see, there is no jurisdiction, at least none over free men, that is not accounted to be ‘sake and soke.’ Occasionally it is said that the donees are to have ‘their court.’ However far the feudalization of justice had gone either in Normandy or in England before the Conquest, the Conquest itself was likely to conceal from view the question whether or no all seignorial jurisdiction is delegated from above; for thenceforward every lay tenant in chief, as no mere matter of theory, but as a plain matter of fact, held his land by a title derived newly and immediately from the king. Thus it would be easy for the king to maintain that, if the lords exercised jurisdictional powers, they did so by virtue of his grant, an expressed grant or an implied grant. Gradually the process of subinfeudation would make the theoretical question prominent and pressing, for certainly the Norman nobles conceived that, even if their justice was delegated to them by the king, no rule of law prevented them from appointing sub-delegates. If they claimed to give away land, they claimed also to give away justice, and no earnest effort can have been made to prevent their doing this[319].

Sake and soke in Domesday Book.

Returning from this brief digression, we must consider sake and soke as they are in Domesday Book. For a moment we will attend to the words themselves[320]. Of the two soke is by far the commoner; indeed we hardly ever find sake except in connexion with soke, and when we do, it seems just an equivalent for soke. We have but an alliterative jingle like ‘judgment and justice[321].’ Apparently it matters little or nothing whether we say of a lord that he has soke, or that he has sake, or that he has soke and sake. But not only is soke the commoner, it is also the wider word; we can not substitute sake for it in all contexts. Thus, for example, we say that a man renders soke to his lord or to his lord’s manor; also we say that a piece of land is a soke of such and such a manor; no similar use is made of sake.

Meaning of sake.

Now as a matter of etymology sake seems the easier of the two words. It is the Anglo-Saxon sacu, the German Sache, a thing, a matter, and hence a ‘matter’ or ‘cause’ in the lawyer’s sense of these terms, a ‘matter’ in dispute between litigants, a ‘cause’ before the court. It is still in use among us, for though we do not speak of a sake between two persons, we do speak of a man acting for another’s sake, or for God’s sake, or for the sake of money[322]. In Latin therefore sake may be rendered by placitum:—‘Roger has sake over them’ will become ‘Rogerius habet placita super eos[323]’; Roger has the right to hold plea over them. Thus easily enough sake becomes the right to have a court and to do justice.

Meaning of soke.

As to soke, this has a very similar signification, but the route by which it attains that signification is somewhat doubtful. We must start with this that soke, socna, soca, is the Anglo-Saxon sócn and has for its primary meaning a seeking. It may become connected with justice or jurisdiction by one or by both of two ways. One of these is explained by a passage in theLeges Henrici which says that the king has certain causes or pleas ‘in socna i.e. quaestione sua.’ The king has certain pleas within his investigation, or his right to investigate. A later phrase may help us:—the king is entitled to ‘inquire of, hear and determine’ these matters[324]. But the word might journey along another path which would lead to much the same end. It means seeking, following, suing, making suit, sequi, sectam facere. The duty known as soca faldae is the duty of seeking the lord’s fold. Thus soca may be the duty of seeking or suing at the lord’s court and the correlative right of the lord to keep a court and exact suit. Without denying that the word has traversed the first of the two routes, the route by way of ‘investigation’—in the face of theLeges Henrici we can hardly deny this—we may confidently assert that it has traversed the second, the route by way of ‘suit.’ There are several passages which assure us that soke is a genus of which fold-soke is a species. Thus:—‘Of these men Peter’s predecessor had fold-soke and commendation and Stigand had the other soke[325].’ In a document which is very closely connected with the great survey we find what seems to be a Latin translation of our word. The churches of Worcester and Evesham were quarrelling about certain lands at Hamton. Under the eye of the king’s commissioners they came to a compromise, which declared that the fifteen hides at Hamton belonged to the bishop of Worcester’s hundred of Oswaldslaw and ought to pay the king’s geld and perform the king’s services along with the bishop and ought ‘to seek the said hundred for pleading’:—requirere ad placitandum, this is the main kind of ‘seeking’ that soke implies[326]. If we look back far enough in the Anglo-Saxon dooms, there is indeed much to make us think that the act of seeking a lord and placing oneself under his protection, and the consequences of that act, the relation between man and lord, the fealty promised by the one, the warranty due from the other, have been known as sócn[327]. If so, then there may have been a time when commendation and soke were all one. But this time must be already ancient, for although we do not know what English word was represented by commendatio, still there is no distinction more emphatically drawn by Domesday Book than that between commendatio and soca.

Soke as jurisdiction.