Domesday Book and Beyond: Three Essays in the Early History of England

by Frederic William Maitland

We have said that seignorial justice is regarded as having its origin in royal grants, and in the main this seems true. We hardly state an exception to this rule if we say that grantees of justice become in their turn grantors. Not merely could the earl who had soke grant this to one of his thegns, but that thegn would be said to hold the soke ‘under’ or ‘of’ the earl. Justice, we may say, was already being subinfeudated[401]. But now and again we meet with much more startling statements. Usually if a man over whom his lord has soke ‘withdraws himself with his land,’ or ‘goes elsewhere with his land,’ the lord’s soke over that land ‘remains’: he still has jurisdictional rights over that land though it is commended to a new lord. We may be surprised at being very frequently told that this is the case, for we can hardly imagine a man having power to take his land out of one sphere of justice and to put it into another. But that some men, and they not men of high rank, enjoyed this power seems probable. Of a Hertfordshire manor we read: ‘In this manor there were six sokemen, men of Archbishop Stigand, and each had one hide, and they could sell, saving the soke, and one of them could even sell his soke with the land[402].’ This case may be exceptional; there may have been a very unusual compact between the archbishop and this egregiously free sokeman; but the frequency with which we are told that on a sale the soke ‘remains’ does not favour this supposition.

Soke and mund.

We seem driven to the conclusion that in some parts of the country the practice of commendation had been allowed to interfere even with jurisdictional relationships: that there were men who could ‘go with their land to what lord they chose’ and carry with them not merely their homage, but also their suit of court and their ‘forfeitures.’ This may seem to us intolerable. If it be true, it tells us that the state has been very weak; it tells us that the national scheme of justice has been torn to shreds by free contract, that men have had the utmost difficulty in distinguishing between property and political power, between personal relationships and the magistracy to which land is subject. But unless we are mistaken, the house-peace in its decay has helped to produce this confusion. In a certain sense a mere ceorl has had what is now called a soke,—it used to be called a mund or grið—over his house and over his loaf-eaters: that is to say, he has been entitled to have money paid to him if his house-peace were broken or his loaf-eaters beaten. This right he has been able to transfer to a lord. In one way or another it has now come into the lord’s hand and become mixed up with other rights. In Henry I.’s day a lawyer will be explaining that if a villein receives money when blood is shed or fornication is committed in his house, this is because he has purchased these forfeitures from his lord[403]. This reverses the order of history.

Soke and jurisdiction.

Such is the best explanation that we can give of the men who sell their soke with their land. No doubt we are accusing Domesday Book of being very obscure, of using a single word to express some three or four different ideas. In some degree the obscurity may be due to the fact that French justiciars and French clerks have become the exponents of English law. But we may gravely doubt whether Englishmen would have produced a result more intelligible to us. One cause of difficulty we may perhaps remove. In accordance with common wont we have from time to time spoken of seignorial jurisdiction. But if the word jurisdiction be strictly construed, then in all likelihood there never has been in this country any seignorial jurisdiction. It is not the part of the lord to declare the law (ius dicere); ‘curia domini debet facere iudicia et non dominus[404].’ From first to last this seems to be so, unless we take account of theories that come to us from a time when the lord’s court was fast becoming an obsolete institution[405]. So it is in Domesday Book. In the hundred court the sheriff presides; it is he that appoints a day for the litigation, but the men of the hundred, the men who come together ‘to give and receive right,’ make the judgments[406]. The tenants of the Bishop of Winchester ‘hold the bishops’ pleas’ at Taunton; Earl Roger borrows sokemen ‘to hold his pleas[407].’ Thus the erection of a new court is no very revolutionary proceeding; it passes unnoticed. If once it be granted that all the justiciary profits arising from a certain group of men or tract of land are to go to a certain lord, it is very much a matter of indifference to kings and sheriffs whether the lord holds a court of his own or exacts this money in the hundred court. Indeed, a sheriff may be inclined to say ‘I am not going to do your justice for nothing; do it yourself.’ So long as every lord will come to the hundred court himself or send his steward, the sheriff will have no lack of capable doomsmen. Then the men of the lord’s precinct may well wish for a court at their doors; they will be spared the long journey to the hundred court; they will settle their own affairs and be a law unto themselves. Thus we ought not to say that the lax use of the word soke covers a confusion between ‘jurisdiction’ and the profits of ‘jurisdiction,’ and if we say that the confusion is between justice and the profits of justice, we are pointing to a distinction which the men of the Confessor’s time might regard as somewhat shadowy. In any case their lord is to have their wites; in any case they will get the judgment of their peers; what is left to dispute about is mere geography, the number of the courts, the demarcation of justiciary areas. We may say, if we will, that far-sighted men would not have argued in this manner, for seignorial justice was a force mighty for good and for ill; but it has not been proved to our satisfaction that the men who ruled England in the age before the Conquest were far-sighted. Their work ended in a stupendous failure.

Soke and commendation.

To the sake and soke of the old English law we shall have to return once more in our next essay. Our discussion of the sake and soke of Domesday Book was induced by a consideration of the various bonds which may bind a man to a lord. And now we ought to understand that in the eastern counties it is extremely common for a man to be bound to one lord by commendation and to another lord by soke. Very often indeed a man is commended to one lord, while the soke over him and over his land ‘lies in’ some hundred court which belongs to another lord or is still in the hands of the king and the earl. How to draw with any exactness the line between the rights given to the one lord by the commendation and to the other lord by the soke we can not tell. For instance, we find many men who can not sell their land without the consent of a lord. This we may usually regard as the result of some term in the bargain of commendation; but in some cases it may well be the outcome of soke. Thus at Sturston in Norfolk we see a free man of St Etheldreda of Ely; his sake and soke belong to Archbishop Stigand’s manor of Earsham (Sturston and Earsham lie some five miles apart); now this man if he wishes to give or sell his land must obtain the licence both of St Etheldreda and of Stigand[408]. And so as regards the forfeiture of land. We are perhaps accustomed to think of the escheat propter delictum tenentis as having its origin in the ideas of homage and tenure rather than in the justiciary rights of the lord. Howbeit there is much to make us think that the right to take the land of one who has forfeited that land by crime was closely connected with the right to other wites or forisfacturae. ‘Of all the thegns who hold land in the Well wapentake of Lincolnshire, St Mary of Lincoln had two-thirds of every forisfactura and the earl the other third; and so of their heriots; and so if they forfeited their land, two-thirds went to St Mary and the remainder to the earl[409].’ St Mary has not enfeoffed these thegns; but by some royal grant she has two-thirds of the soke over them. In Suffolk one Brungar held a small manor with soke. He was a ‘free man’ commended to Robert Wimarc’s son; but the sake and soke over him belonged to St Edmund. Unfortunately for Brungar, stolen horses were found in his house, and we fear that he came to a bad end. At any rate he drops out of the story. Then St Edmund’s Abbot, who had the sake and soke, and Robert, who had the commendation, went to law, and right gladly would we have heard the plea; but they came to some compromise and to all seeming Robert got the land[410]. If we are puzzled by this labyrinthine web of legal relationships, we may console ourselves with the reflection that the Normans also were puzzled by it. They seem to have felt the necessity of attributing the lordship of land to one lord and one only (though of course that lord might have another lord above him), of consolidating soke with commendation, homage with justice, and in the end they brought out a simple and symmetrical result, albeit to the last the relation of seignorial to hundredal justice is not to be explained by any elegant theory of feudalism.

Sokemen and free men.

Yet another problem shall be stated, though we have little hope of solving it. The writ, or rather one of the writs, which defined the scope of the survey seems to have spoken of liberi homines and sochemanni as of two classes of men that were to be distinguished from each other. In Essex, Suffolk and Norfolk this distinction is often drawn. In one and the same manor we shall find both ‘free men’ and sokemen[411]; we may even hear of sokemen who formerly were ‘free men[412].’ But the import of this distinction evades us. Sometimes it is said of sokemen that they ‘hold freely[413].’ We read that four sokemen held this land of whom three were free, while the fourth had one hide but could not give or sell it[414]. This may suggest that the principle of the division is to be found in the power to alienate the land, to ‘withdraw’ with the land to another lord[415]. There may be truth in the suggestion, but we can not square it with all our cases[416]. Often enough the ‘free man’ can not sell without the consent of his lord[417]. We have just met with a ‘free man’ who had to obtain the consent both of the lord of his commendation and of the lord of his soke[418]. On the other hand, the sokeman who can sell without his lord’s leave is no rare being[419], and it was of a sokeman that we read how he could sell, not only his land, but also his soke[420].

Difference between ‘free men’ and sokemen.