Application of the formula of dependent tenure.
It is probable that this process had gone somewhat further in Normandy than in England. It is probable that the Normans knew that in imposing upon all English lands ‘the formula of dependent tenure’ they were simplifying matters. They seem to think, and they may be pretty right in thinking, that every English land-holder had held his land under (sub) some lord; but apparently they do not think that every English land-holder had held his land of (de) some lord. Not unfrequently they show that this is so. Thus one Sigar holds a piece of Cambridgeshire of Geoffrey de Mandeville; he used to hold it under Æsgar the Staller[637]. We catch a slight shade of difference between the two prepositions; sub lays stress on the lord’s power, which may well be of a personal or justiciary, rather than of a proprietary kind, while de imports a theory about the origin of the tenure; it makes the tenant’s rights look like derivative rights:—it is supposed that he gets his land from his lord. And at least in the eastern counties—so it may well have seemed to the Normans—matters sadly needed simplification. Even elsewhere and when a large estate is at stake they can not always get an answer to the question ‘Of whom was this land holden[638]?’ Still they thought that some of the greatest men in the realm had held their lands, or some of their lands, of the king or of someone else. The formulas which are used throughout the description of Hampshire and some other counties seem to assume that every holder of a manor, at all events if a layman, had held it of the king, if he did not hold it of another lord. Tenure in feudo again they regarded as no innovation[639]. They saw the work of subinfeudation:—Brihtmær held land of Azor and Azor of Harold; we may well suppose that Harold held it of the king and that some villeins held part of it of Brihtmær, and thus we see already a feudal ladder with no less than five rungs[640]. They saw that the thegns owed ‘service’ to their lords[641]. They saw the heriot; they sometimes called it a relief[642]. We can not be sure that this change of names imported any change in the law; when a burgess of Hereford died the king took a heriot, but if he could not get the heriot he took the dead man’s land[643]. They saw that in certain cases an heir had to ‘seek’ his ancestor’s lord if he wished to enjoy his ancestor’s land[644]. They saw that many a free man could not give or sell his land without his lord’s consent. They saw that great and powerful men could not give or sell their land without the king’s consent[645].
Military tenure.
They saw something very like military tenure. No matter with which we have to deal is darker than the constitution of the English army on the eve of its defeat. We may indeed safely believe that no English king had ever relinquished the right to call upon all the free men of his realm to resist an invader. On the other hand, it seems quite clear that, as a matter of fact, ‘the host’ was no longer ‘the nation in arms.’ The common folk of a shire could hardly be got to fight outside their shire, and ill-armed troops of peasants were now of little avail. The only army upon which the king could habitually rely was a small force. The city of Oxford sent but twenty men or twenty pounds[646]: Leicester sent twelve men[647]: Warwick sent ten[648]. In Berkshire the law was that, if the king called out the host, one soldier (miles) should go for every five hides and should receive from each hide four shillings as his stipend for two months’ service. If the man who was summoned made default, he forfeited all his land to the king; but there were cases in which he might send one of his men as a substitute, and for a default committed by his substitute he suffered no forfeiture, but only a fine of fifty shillings[649]. It is probable that a similar ‘five hide rule’ obtained throughout a large part of England. The borough of Wilton was bound to send twenty shillings or one man ‘as for an honour of five hides[650].’ When an army or a fleet was called out, Exeter ‘served to the amount of five hides[651].’ All this points to a small force of well armed soldiers. For example, ‘the five hide rule’ would be satisfied if Worcestershire sent a contingent of 240 men. But not only was the army small; it was a territorial army; it grew out of the soil.
The army and the land.
At first sight this ‘five hide rule’ may seem to have in it little that is akin to a feudal system of knights’ fees. We may suppose that it will work thus:—The host is summoned; the number of hides in each hundred is known. To despatch a company of soldiers proportioned to the number of the hides, for example twenty warriors if the hundred contains just one hundred hides, is the business of the hundred court and the question ‘Who must go?’ will be answered by election, rotation or lot. But it is not probable that the territorializing process will stop here, and this for several reasons. An army that can not be mobilized without the action of the hundred moots is not a handy force. While the hundredors are deliberating the Danes or Welshmen will be burning and slaying. Also a king will not easily be content with the responsibility of a fluctuating and indeterminate body of hundredors; he will insist, if he can, that there must be some one person answerable to him for each unit of military power. A serviceable system will not have been established until the country is divided into ‘five-hide-units,’ until every man’s holding is such an unit, or is composed of several such units, or is an aliquot share of such an unit. Then again the holdings with which the rule will have to deal are not homogeneous; they are not all of one and the same order. It is not as though to each plot of land there corresponded some one person who was the only person interested in it; the occupiers of the soil have lords and again those lords have lords. The king will insist, if he can, that the lords who stand high in this scale must answer to him for the service that is due from all the lands over which they exercise a dominion, and then he will leave them free to settle, as between themselves and their dependants, the ultimate incidence of the burden:—thus room will be made for the play of free contract. At all events when, as is not unusual, some lord is the lord of a whole hundred and of its court, the king will regard him as personally liable for the production of the whole contingent that is due from that hundred. In this way a system will be evolved which for many practical purposes will be indistinguishable from the system of knights’ fees, and all this without any help from the definitely feudal idea that military service is the return which the tenant makes to the lord for the gift of land that the lord has made to the tenant.
Feudalism and army service.
That this process had already done much of its work when the old English army received its last summons, we can not doubt, though it is very possible that this work had been done sporadically. We see that the land was being plotted out into five-hide-units. In one passage the Norman clerks call such a unit an honour, an ‘honour of five hides[652].’ There is an old theory based upon legal texts that such an honour qualifies its lord or owner to be a thegn. If a ceorl prospers so that he has five hides ‘to the king’s útware,’ that is, an estate rated as five hides for military purposes, he is worthy of a thegn’s wergild[653]. Then the Anglo-Saxon charters show us how the kings have been endowing their thegns with tracts of territory which are deemed to contain just five or some multiple of five hides[654]. The thegn with five hides will have tenants below him; but none of them need serve in the host if their lord goes, as he ought to go, in person. Then each of these territorial units continues to owe the same quantum of military service, though the number of persons interested in it be increased or diminished, and thus the ultimate incidence of the duty becomes the subject-matter of private arrangements. That is the point of a story from Lincolnshire which we have already recounted:—A man’s land descends to his four sons; they divide it equally and agree to take turns in doing the military service that is due from it; but only the eldest of them is to be the king’s man[655]. Then we see that the great nobles lead or send to the war all the milites that are due from the lands over which they have a seignory. There are already wide lands which owe military service—we can not put it otherwise—to the bishop of Winchester as lord of Taunton:—they owe ‘attendance in the host along with the men of the bishop[656].’ The churches of Worcester and Evesham fell out about certain lands at Hamton; one of the disputed questions was whether or no Hamton ought to do its military service ‘in the bishop’s hundred of Oswaldslaw’ or elsewhere[657]. This question we take to be one of great importance to the bishop. Lord of the triple hundred of Oswaldslaw, lord of three hundred hides, he is bound to put sixty warriors into the field and he is anxious that men who ought to be helping him to make up this tale shall not be serving in another contingent.
Default of service.
But from Worcestershire we obtain a still more precious piece of information. The custom of that county is this:—When the king summons the host and his summons is disregarded by one who is a lord with jurisdiction, ‘by one who is so free a man that he has sake and soke and can go with his land where he pleases,’ then all his lands are in the king’s mercy. But if the defaulter be the man of another lord and the lord sends a substitute in his stead, then he, the defaulter, must pay forty shillings to his lord,—to his lord, not to the king, for the king has had the service that was due; but if the lord does not send a substitute, then the forty shillings which the defaulter pays to the lord, the lord must pay to the king[658]. A feudalist of the straiter sort might well find fault with this rule. He might object that the lord ought to forfeit his land, not only if he himself fails to attend the host, but also if he fails to bring with him his due tale of milites. Feudalism was not perfected in a day. Still here we have the root of the matter—the lord is bound to bring into the field a certain number of milites, perhaps one man from every five hides, and if he can not bring those who are bound to follow him, he must bring others or pay a fine. His man, on the other hand, is bound to him and is not bound to the king. That man by shirking his duty will commit no offence against the king. The king is ceasing to care about the ultimate incidence of the military burden, because he relies upon the responsibility of the magnates. How this system worked in the eastern counties where the power of the magnates was feebler, we can not tell. It is not improbable that one of the forces that is attaching the small free proprietors to the manors of their lords is this ‘five hide rule’; they are being compelled to bring their acres into five-hide-units, to club together under the superintendence of a lord who will answer for them to the king, while as to the villeins, so seldom have they fought that they are ceasing to be ‘fyrd-worthy[659].’ But in the west we have already what in substance are knights’ fees. The Bishop of Worcester held 300 hides over which he had sake and soke and all customs; he was bound to put 60 milites into the field; if he failed in this duty he had to pay 40 shillings for each deficient miles. At the beginning of Henry II.’s reign he was charged with 60 knights’ fees[660].