Domesday Book and Beyond: Three Essays in the Early History of England

by Frederic William Maitland

Now we ought not to draw inferences from these phrases without knowing that in the Latin of this period such words as confirmare, corroborare, adstipulari are the proper words whereby to describe the act of those who become witnesses to the execution of a deed[921]. Our kings are making use, though it is a lax use, of foreign formulas; what is more, they are adopting the formulas of private deeds. They have no chancellor, as the Frankish kings have, and they do not, as the Frankish kings do, dispense with that rogatio testium which is one of the usual forms of private law[922]. On the continent of Europe all this talk about confirmation, corroboration and consent would by no means imply that the witnesses were more than witnesses. The line which divides attestation from participation is really somewhat fine, and though well enough apprehended by modern lawyers, would not easily be explained to a barbarian ealdorman. A witness does consent to the execution of the instrument which he attests, though he may be utterly ignorant of its import, and, if the law demands that such an instrument shall be attested, then it may well be said of the witness that by attesting it he makes it firm, he confirms it. Until he attested it, it was not a valid instrument[923]. Now we are not saying that the magnates, more especially the bishops, who attested these ancient charters thought of themselves as mere witnesses. Had that been so, a clause expressing the consent of the whole body of great men would hardly have crept into the charters; and it does creep in gradually during the last half of the eighth century[924]. A similar development has been noticed in the charters of the German kings. A clause expressing the consent of the great folk rarely occurs in the Merovingian or the early Carolingian charters, unless they belong to certain exceptional classes. It is said to become common under the weak rule of Lewis the Child; then for a while it becomes rare again, and then once more common under Henry III and Henry IV, though consent and witness are hardly to be distinguished[925]

Function of the witan.

Perhaps from the first in England the cross of at least one bishop was much to be desired or was almost indispensable, for the anathema which the charter pronounces will be a solemn sentence of excommunication when it comes from a bishop, while it will be at best a pious wish if it comes from the king; and it is well to have the cross of every bishop, so that the breaker of the charter may find himself excommunicated in every diocese. This is not all; we may well believe that from the first the king was more or less bound to consult with his great men before he alienated his land. The notion that land could be alienated at all may not have been very ancient, and the king when giving land away may have been expected to pay some regard to the welfare of his realm[926]. The discovery that he had an alienable superiority over free land and free landowners would sharpen this rule. Some of these early donations are to our minds more like cessions of political power than gifts of land; they make over to bishops and abbots rights which the king has exercised rather as king than as landowner. A wholesome practice grows up which is embodied in the clause that states the consent of the witan, and, even when this clause has disappeared, still it is in the presence and with the witness of his councillors that the king makes his grants. This is no purely English phenomenon. When a Norman duke hands his charter to be roborated and confirmed by his fideles, we do not infer that he is disposing of land that is not his[927]. But it is very remarkable that in the earliest English charters the consent of an overlord is treated as a far more serious thing than the consent of the nobles[928]

The king and the people’s land.

Of some value though this ‘constitutional check’ may have been, we can not regard it as a relic of a time when there was land which in any accurate sense of the term was owned by the people. The recorded action of the witan in relation to the king’s grants does not become more prominent, it becomes less prominent, as we go backwards and reach the heptarchic days. But that is not all. Is it not marvellous that there should be land owned by the people and yet that we should have to discover this momentous fact from a few casual phrases occurring in three documents of the ninth and tenth centuries? Are we to suppose that whenever the king is giving away land, this land is the land of the people? Why do not the charters say so? Repeatedly the king speaks of the land that he gives as ‘my land’ (terram iuris mei), and this too in charters which state that the witan give their consent to the grant. Never by any chance does a scribe slip into any such phrase as terram gentis meae, terram gentis Merciorum or the like. And how came it about that from the very earliest time the king could devote the people’s land to the salvation of his own peculiar soul? But, it will be said, no doubt the king had private estates besides having a power over ‘the unallotted lands of the nation,’ and those private estates he could give away as he pleased. But then, how are we to distinguish between those charters whereby he disposed of his own and those whereby he disposed of national lands? The formula which expresses the consent of the wise will certainly not serve our turn. It leads, as we have seen, to a distinction between different ages, not to a classification of the various charters of one and the same king.

King’s land and crown land.

Some historians have supposed that at the outset there was a clear distinction between the king’s private estates and those national lands which were becoming the domains of the crown. Now a vague distinction between what belonged to the king as king and what belonged to him—if we may use so modern a phrase—in his private capacity, we may admit, while at the same time we gravely doubt whether the language or the thought of the eighth or ninth century had any forms in which this distinction could be precisely expressed. Even within the ecclesiastical sphere, where traditions of Roman law may have lingered and where dead saints presented themselves as persons capable of acquiring land, it was by no means easy to distinguish the bishop’s property from his church’s property. We may find a deed whereby some king for the love of God or the salvation of his soul gives land to a certain bishop, and states in strong, clear words that the donee is to have the most absolute power of giving and selling and even, for this sometimes occurs, of bequeathing the land[929]. We shall probably believe that the king intends that this land shall go to increase the territory of the church, and yet we dare not make the bishop either ‘a trustee’ or ‘a corporation sole.

Fate of the king’s land on his death.

As to the king, it would be on his death that the necessity of drawing some distinction between his two capacities would first present itself. Perhaps a brother of his would be elected to the kingdom and his children would be passed by. Clearly this brother should have those lands which have supplied the king with the main part of his revenue, and yet it would be hard that the dead man’s children should be portionless. However, we may strongly suspect that in the earliest time cases of this nature were settled as they arose without the establishment of any general rule, and that even on the eve of the Norman Conquest no definite classification of the king’s estates had been framed. We dare not expect the rule to be more definite than that which settled the title to the kingship, and how exceedingly indefinite the latter was the historians of our constitution have explained. Hereditary and elective elements were mixed up in the title; we can define neither the one nor the other. That ‘superiority’ over all the land of his kingdom of which we have spoken above, though it might be alienated piecemeal among the living, would pass from the dead king to his elected successor. On the other hand, some kings were careful to have certain lands booked to themselves and to obtain from their nobles ‘an express power of testamentary appointment.’ But very possibly there was a wide fringe of disputable matter. King Alfred’s will, with all that he says about what had been done by himself, his father and his brothers, seems to tell us that a prudent king would obtain the consent of his councillors to any disposition that he made of land that was in any sort his. Also it seems to bear witness to a strong feeling that the reigning king should enjoy at any rate the bulk of the lands that his predecessor had enjoyed[930]

The new king and the old king’s heir.