The Confessor’s writs.

For one moment longer we may dwell on the indisputable fact that he dealt out jurisdictional rights with a lavish hand. This we gather, not so much from his Latin land-books, as from English writs in which he announces to the bishop, earl, sheriff and great men of a county that he has given land in that county to some church ‘with sake and soke and toll and team’; sometimes he adds ‘with infangennethef, grithbrice, foresteal, hamsocn, flymena-fyrmth,’ and so forth. Sometimes the donees are to have these rights in all their own lands. Sometimes he gives them the hundredal jurisdiction over lands that are not their own. Thus to St. Benet of Ramsey he gives soken over all the men in a hundred and a half—over all the men who are ‘moot-worthy, fyrd-worthy, and fold-worthy,’ whosesoever men they may be: that is to say (as we understand it) he gives a jurisdiction over all the free men of the district, the men who attend the moots, who attend the host and who are not compelled by any soca faldae to send their sheep to a seignorial fold, and this although those men be bound to St. Benet neither by tenure nor by personal commendation[937]. Again, he concedes that the donee’s tenants shall be quit of shires and hundreds[938]. Again, he gives the favoured church taxational power: whenever the king takes a geld, be it army-geld, or ship-geld, the monks may impose a similar tax upon the township and keep the proceeds to their own use[939]. In short, it seems not too much to say that any delegation and appropriation of justice of which our Norman kings were guilty had an ample warrant in the practice of St. Edward.

Cnut’s practice.

Now the theory which would make him an innovator in this matter receives a rude shock from a writ of Cnut[940]. The king announces that the Archbishop of Canterbury is to be worthy throughout his lands of his sake and soke and grithbrice, hamsocn, foresteal, infangennethef and flymena-fyrmth. Until the genuineness of this writ, which does not stand quite alone[941], be disproved, the charge that has been brought against Edward fails. He was but following in the steps of the great Dane, though it may be that he rushed forward where his predecessor had trod cautiously.

Cnut’s law.

Having seen what Cnut could do upon occasion, we turn to the famous passage in his dooms which declares what ‘rights the king has over all men[942].’ In Wessex and Mercia (in the Danelaw the list is somewhat different) he has hamsocn, foresteal, flymena-fyrmth and fyrd-wite ‘unless he will honour a man yet further and grant him this worship.’ Now if we had not before us his writ for the archbishop, we might perhaps argue that this law merely decreed that the profits of certain pleas were not to be covered by the ‘farms’ paid to the king by the sheriffs and other national officers. But in the writ we see that Cnut allows to the archbishop just the excepted rights, just that ‘worship’ which men are not to have as a general rule. Nor surely can we say that what is conceded is, not jurisdiction itself, but merely the profits of jurisdiction. The archbishop is to have sake as well as soke, and those who have contended for the strictest interpretation of royal grants have not contended that the former of these words can mean anything but ‘causes,’ ‘pleas,’ ‘jurisdiction.’ Therefore when it is interpreted by the aid of this writ, Cnut’s law seems to imply that private jurisdiction is a common thing. The king is already compelled to protest that there are certain pleas of the crown that are not covered by vague and general words.

The book and the writ.

Now express grants of sake and soke first become apparent to us in documents of a certain class, a class that we do not get before the last years of the tenth century. It is necessary therefore that we should make a short digression into the region of ‘diplomatics.’ The instruments of the Confessor’s reign, and we may add of the Norman reigns, which we loosely call royal charters or royal land-books divide themselves somewhat easily into two main classes, which we will call respectively (1) charters and (2) writs. These names are not very happy, still they are the best that occur to us. If we have regard to the form of the instrument, the distinction is evident. The charter is with rare exceptions in Latin. It begins with an invocation of the Triune God or perhaps with a sacred monogram. On the other hand, there is no address to mortal men; there is no salutation. There follow a pious arenga setting forth how good a thing it is to make gifts, how desirable it is, since men are very wicked, that transactions should be put into writing. Then the king states that he gives, or has given, or will give—the use of the future tense is not uncommon—certain land to a certain person. Then comes a clause which we shall hereafter call ‘the clause of immunity’:—the land is to be free from certain burdens. Then comes the anathema or damnatory clause, threatening all breakers of the charter with excommunication here and torment hereafter. Then in the charters of the time before the Conquest the boundaries of the land are described in English. Then comes the sign of the cross touched by the king’s hand and the crosses of the witan or nobles who ‘attest’ or ‘attest and consent to’ the grant. In the writ all is otherwise. In the Confessor’s day it is usually, in the Norman reigns it is sometimes, an English document. It begins, not with an invocation, but with a salutation;—the king greets his subjects or some class of his subjects: King Edward greets ‘Herman bishop and Harold earl and all my thegns in Dorset,’ or ‘Leofwin bishop and Edwin earl and all my thegns in Staffordshire’:—and then he tells them something. He tells them that he has granted lands or liberties to a certain person. There follows a command or a threat—‘I command and firmly enjoin that none shall disturb the grantee,’ ‘I will not suffer that any man wrong the grantee.’ The boundaries are not described. There is seldom any curse. The king makes no cross. If any witnesses are mentioned, they are few and they do not make crosses.

Differences between book and writ.

Now these formal differences correspond more or less exactly to a substantial difference. As every modern lawyer knows, a written document may stand in one of two relations to a legal transaction. On the one hand it may itself be the transaction: that is to say, the act of signing, or of signing and delivering, the document may be the act by which certain rights are created or transferred. On the other hand, the instrument may be but evidence of the transaction. Perhaps the law may say that of such a transaction it will receive no evidence save a document written and signed; perhaps it may say that the testimony of documents is not to be contradicted by word of mouth; but still the document is only evidence, though it may be incontrovertible evidence, of the transaction; the transaction may have been complete before the document was signed[943]. This material distinction is likely to express itself in points of form; for instance, such a phrase as ‘I hereby give’ is natural in the one case; such a phrase as ‘Know all men by this writing that I have given’ is appropriate in the other. Instruments of both kinds were well enough known in the Frankish kingdom; their history has been traced back into the history of Roman conveyancing[944]. It would be out of place were we here to discuss the question whether the Anglo-Saxon land-book was a dispositive or merely an evidential document; suffice it to say that with rare exceptions the instruments that are of earlier date than the Confessor’s reign are in form charters and not writs. On the other hand, the documents of the Angevin kings which treat of gifts of lands and liberties, though we call them charters, are in form (if we adopt the classification here made) not charters but writs. In form they are evidential rather than dispositive; they are addressed to certain persons—all the king’s lieges or a class of the lieges—bidding them take notice that the king has done something, has given lands, and then adding some command or some threat. This command or threat makes them more than evidential documents; the Sciatis me dedisse is followed by a Quare volo et firmiter praecipio; it is not for no purpose that the king informs his officers or his subjects of his having made a gift; still in form they are letters, open letters, ‘letters patent,’ and the points of difference between the Angevin charter and the Angevin ‘letters patent’ (strictly and properly so called) are few, technical and unimportant when compared with the points of difference which mark off these two classes of documents from the ancient land-book[945]. In short before the end of the twelfth century, the writ-form or letter-form with its salutation, its ‘Know ye,’ its air of conveying information coupled with commands, has entirely supplanted the true charter-form with its dispositive words and its air of not merely witnessing, but actually being, a gift of land.