Domesday Book and Beyond: Three Essays in the Early History of England

by Frederic William Maitland

The same vagueness enshrouds the infancy of the escheat propter defectum tenentis. Already in 825 a king tells how he gave land to one of his praefecti who died intestate and without an heir, ‘and so that land by the decree of my magnates was restored to me who had before possessed it[1033].’ Here we seem to see the notion that when a gift has spent itself, when there is no longer any one who can bring himself within the words of donation, the given land should return to the giver. In another quarter we may see that when the king makes a gift he does not utterly abandon all interest in the land that is given. Cenwulf of Mercia in a charter for Christ Church at Canterbury tells us that King Egbert gave land to a certain thegn of his who on leaving the country gave it to the minster; but that Offa annulled this gift and gave away the land to other thegns, saying that it was unlawful for a thegn to give away without his lord’s witness (testimonio) the land given to him by his lord[1034]. Cenwulf restored the land to the church; but he took money for it, and he does not say that Offa had acted illegally. There is much to show that the ‘restraint on alienation’ is one of the oldest of the ‘incidents of tenure.’ Our materials do not enable us to formulate a general principle, but certain it is that the holders of book-land, whether they be laymen or ecclesiastics, very generally obtain the consent of the king when they propose to alienate their land either inter vivos or by testament. We may not argue from this to any definite condition annexed to the gift, or to any standing relationship between the donor and the donee like the ‘tenure’ of later times. After all, it is a very natural thought that a reward bestowed by the king should not be sold or given away. The crosses and stars with which modern potentates decorate their fideles, we do not expect to see these in the market[1035]. The land that the king has booked to his thegn is an ‘honour’ and the giver will expect to be consulted before it passes into hands that may be unworthy of it. It may be just because the gift of book-land is made by the king and corroborated by all the powers of church and state, that the book is conceived as exercising a continuous sway over the land comprised in it. The book, it has well been said, is the lex possessionis of that land[1036]. It can make the land descend this way or that way, and the land will come back to the king if ever the power of the book be spent. What is more, from the first we seem to see a germ of our famous English rule that if a gift be made without ‘words of inheritance’ the gift will endure only during the life of the donee:—will endure, we say, for a gift is no mere act done once for all but a force that endures for a longer or a shorter period. Certain it is that most of the charters are careful to say that the gift is not thus to come to an end but is to go on operating despite the donee’s death[1037].

Alienation of book-land.

And even when, as is generally the case, the book made in favour of a lay-man says that the donee is to have the power of leaving the land to whomsoever he may please, or to such heirs as he may choose, we still must doubt whether his testamentary power is utterly unrestrained, whether he will not have to consult the royal donor when he is making his will. The phenomena which we have here to consider are very obscure, because we never can be quite certain why it is that a testator is seeking the king’s aid. We have to remember that the testament is an exotic, ecclesiastical institution which is likely to come into collision with the ancient folk-law. From an early time the church was striving in favour of the utmost measure of testamentary freedom, for formless wills, for nuncupative wills[1038]. The very largeness of its claims made impossible any definite compromise between church-right and folk-right. So far as we can see, no precise law is evolved as to when and how and over what a man may exercise a power of testation. The church will support testaments of the most formless kind; on the other hand, the heirs of the dead man will endeavour, despite the anathema, to break his will, and sometimes they will succeed[1039]. Consequently the testator will endeavour to obtain the crosses of the bishops and the consent of the king. He has already a book which tells him that he may leave the land to a chosen heir; but if he be prudent he will not trust to this by itself. Kings change their minds.

The heriot and the testament.

Then the law about heriots complicates the matter. The heriot has its origin in the duty of the dying thegn or of his heirs to return to his lord the arms which that lord has given or lent to him. We have to use some such vague phrase as ‘given or lent’; we dare not speak more precisely[1040]. A time comes when the king provides his thegn, no longer with arms, but with land; still the heriot is rendered[1041]. In the tenth century this render is closely connected with the exercise of testamentary power. The thegn offers a heriot with a prayer that ‘his will may stand.’ He presents swords and money to the king in order that he may be worthy of his testament[1042]. When we find such phrases as this, we can not always be certain that the land of which the testator is going to dispose is land over which a book purports to give him testamentarypower; he may be hoping that the king’s aid will be sufficient to enable him to bequeath the unbooked land that he holds[1043]. In other cases he may be endeavouring to dispose of lands that have merely been ‘loaned’ to him for his life by the king. But this will hardly serve to explain all the cases, and we so frequently find the holder of book-land applying for the king’s consent when he is going to make an alienation of it inter vivos that we need not marvel at finding a similar application made when he is about to execute a testament[1044].

The gift and the loan.

This having been said, we shall not be surprised to find that in ancient times the difference between a gift of land and a loan of land was not nearly so well marked as it would be by modern law. The loan may be regarded as a temporary gift, the gift as a very permanent, if not perpetual, loan. We know how this matter looks in the law of Bracton’s age. By feoffment one gives land to a man for his life, or one gives it to him and the heirs of his body, or to him and his heirs: but in any case, the land may come back to the giver. The difference between the three feoffments is a difference in degree rather than in kind; one will operate for a longer, another for a shorter time; but, however absolute the gift may be, the giver never parts with all his interest in the land[1045]. Or we may put it in another way:—in our English law usufruct is a temporary dominium and dominium is a usufruct that may be perpetual. Or, once more, adopting the language of modern statutes, we may say that the tenant for life is no usufructuary but ‘a limited owner.’ We are accustomed to bring this doctrine into connexion with rules about dependent tenure:—the donor, we say, retains an interest in the land because he is the tenant’s lord. But, on looking at the ancient land-books, we may find reason to suspect that the confusion of loans with gifts and gifts with loans (if we may speak of confusion where in truth the things confounded have never as yet been clearly distinguished) is one of the original germs of the rule that all land is held of the king. After all, the king—and he is by far the greatest giver in the country and his gifts are models for all gifts—never can really part with all the rights that he has in the land that he gives, for he still will be king of it and therefore in a sense it will always be part of his land. To maintain a sharp distinction between the rights that he has as king and the rights that he has as landlord, jurisprudence is not as yet prepared.—But we must look at the land-loan more closely.

The precarium.

Foreign historians have shown how after the barbarian invasions one single form of legal thought, or (if we may borrow a term from them), one single legal ‘institute’ which had been saved out of the ruins of Roman jurisprudence, was made to do the hard duty of expressing the most miscellaneous facts, was made to meet a vast multitude of cases in which, while one man is the owner of land, another man is occupying and enjoying it by the owner’s permission. This institute was the precarium. Originally but a tenancy at will, it was elaborated into different shapes which, when their elaboration had been completed, had little in common. For some reason or another one begs (rogare) of a landowner leave to occupy a piece of land; for some reason or another the prayer is granted, the grantor making a display of generosity and speaking of his act as a ‘benefit’ (beneficium), an act of good-nature and liberality. An elastic form is thus established. The petitioner may, or may not, promise to pay a rent to his benefactor; the benefactor may, or may not, engage that the relationship shall continue for a fixed term of years, or for the life of the petitioner or for several lives. Usually this relationship between petitioner and benefactor is complicated with the bond of patronage: the former has commended himself to the latter, has come within his power, his protection, his trust (trustis), has become his fidelis, his homo. At a later time the inferior is a vassus, the superior is his senior, for the word vassus, which has meant a menial servant, spreads upwards. Then the precarium, as it were, divides itself into various channels. One of its streams encompasses the large province of humble tenancies, wherein the peasants obtain land from the churches and other owners on more or less arduous conditions, or reserve a right to occupy so long as they live the lands that they have given to the saints. Another stream sweeps onward into the domain of grand history and public law. The noble obtains a spacious territory, perhaps a county, from the king by way of ‘benefaction’; the precarium becomes the beneficium, the beneficium becomes the feudum[1046]. The king can not prevent the beneficia, the feuda, from becoming hereditary.

The English land-loan.