Snugly and safely entrenched in the Morristown hill-country, Washington left to Putnam the post he so dearly loved, that of real danger, within fifteen miles of New Brunswick, where the enemy lay in strength. At Princeton, thirty miles from headquarters, Putnam remained until May, when he was detached and sent into the Hudson Highlands. The British had lost fewer men at Trenton and Princeton than the Americans had lost at Fort Washington, yet the former were singularly dispirited. With the Commander-in-Chief withdrawn to the hills, the road to Philadelphia lay open to the enemy, and only Old Put opposing them, like a lion in the path; but for some reason they did not avail themselves of the situation.
Putnam's division formed the right wing of the American army in cantonment that winter, with the center at Morristown and the left wing on the Hudson. At the opening of the spring campaign of 1777 Washington was uncertain whether the British would leave their winter quarters in New York for New England, the Hudson Highlands, or for Philadelphia. He was inclined to believe that Philadelphia would be the first and chief objective, and wished to hold himself in readiness for marching thither at a moment's warning; but again there were rumors of an invasion from Canada by way of the lakes and the Hudson, so this region must be protected.
Existing forts must be strengthened, others erected, a boom stretched across the Hudson to impede the passage of British ships, and obstacles of all kinds placed in the path of the British, should they advance northward. Needing a reliable man in this emergency, Washington sent Putnam to Peekskill, on the Hudson, preceded by a letter to General McDougall, then in command there, which was, to say the least, not very flattering to the gallant soldier who had been his right-hand man in the various retreats through the Jerseys. "You are acquainted with the old gentleman's temper," he wrote; "he is active, disinterested, and open to conviction," etc.
Washington would have been more fortunate if all his officers had been as "active, disinterested, and open to conviction" as Old Put—for instance, Lee, Arnold, Gates, and others—but he had allowed his prejudices to warp his former opinion of Putnam's sterling qualities.
Hardly had Putnam begun his work on the Hudson before there was a mighty movement in the port of New York, and, fearing there might be an attempt upon Philadelphia, Washington drew upon the old soldier's command until he had scarcely a thousand men at call. Then followed the commander's magnificent strategy at Middlebrook, whereby he finally defeated the British plans and brought about the complete evacuation of New Jersey, after which Putnam was strengthened in his position; only to be weakened again, the process being repeated until he felt called upon to protest.
Putnam was later accused by Hamilton, Washington's aide-de-camp, of making a "hobby-horse" out of his desire to march upon New York, and of riding it on all occasions; but it was no less a hobby-horse with him than the defense of Philadelphia was with his Commander-in-Chief, who many times imperiled the safety of other sections by withdrawing troops in hot haste and flying to the succor of a city which was captured and occupied by the British notwithstanding.
Washington rode his hobby-horse full-tilt at the unfortunate Putnam and threw him to the ground. With one hand, as it were, he wrote him to keep an eye on the movements of the enemy and be fully prepared to meet them; but with the other he signed an order for the weakening of his force. The consequences came when Burgoyne, having descended from Canada and invaded northern New York, Putnam found himself between two fires, that of the former and that of Sir Henry Clinton, who finally set out on the long-meditated trip up the Hudson in order to cooperate with the southward-marching army.
Putnam had learned of the successive moves on the military chess-board as Burgoyne progressed in his triumphal march. First, of the fall of Ticonderoga, in June; then of Fort Edward; finally, of the glorious victory achieved by his former comrade in the Indian wars and at Bunker Hill, the redoubtable General Stark, at Bennington. He was called upon to furnish reenforcements not only to Washington, unfortunate in his defense of Philadelphia, but to Schuyler and Gates in the north.
The post of danger, as usual, Old Put occupied in the Highlands, and he was delighted; only repining that whenever he was nearly ready to do something, away went his troops on some wild-goose mission, of which he knew neither the end or aim.
Washington surmised that Howe's scheme of sailing southward with an army aboard his ships was for the purpose of luring him away from the real point of attack, which was to be in the Highlands, so he wrote Putnam to be on the alert and to send spies down to New York to ascertain Clinton's plans. "If he has the number of men with him that is reported, it is probably with the intention to attack you from below, while Burgoyne comes down upon you from above." Thus wrote Washington in August, but still the depletion of the perplexed Putnam's command went steadily on. When he protested he was recommended to hurry up the militia from Connecticut, or some other New England State, and thus supply the place of the seasoned troops he had trained, with raw recruits.