Aeroplanes and Dirigibles of War

by Frederick Arthur Ambrose Talbot

The methods practised by the German aerial scout vary widely, and are governed in no small measure by the intrepidity and skill of the airman himself. One practice is to proceed alone upon long flights over the enemy's lines, penetrating just as far into hostile territory as the pilot considers advisable, and keeping, of course, within the limits of the radius of action of the machine, as represented by the fuel supply, the while carefully taking mental stock of all that he observes below. It is a kind of roving commission without any definite aim in view beyond the collection of general intelligence.

This work, while productive and valuable to a certain degree, is attended with grave danger, as the German airmen have repeatedly found to their cost. Success is influenced very materially by the accuracy of the airman's judgment. A slight miscalculation of the velocity and direction of the wind, or failure to detect any variations in the climatic conditions, is sufficient to prove his undoing. German airmen who essayed journeys of discovery in this manner, often failed to regain their lines because they ventured too far, misjudged the speed of the wind which was following them on the outward run, and ultimately were forced to earth owing to the exhaustion of the fuel supply during the homeward trip; the increased task imposed upon the motor, which had to battle hard to make headway, caused the fuel consumption per mile to exceed calculations.

Then the venturesome airman cannot neglect another factor which is adverse to his success. Hostile airmen lie in wait, and a fleet of aeroplanes is kept ready for instant service. They permit the invader to penetrate well into their territory and then ascend behind him to cut off his retreat. True, the invader has the advantage of being on the wing, while the ether is wide and deep, without any defined channels of communication. But nine times out of ten the adventurous scout is trapped. His chances of escape are slender, because his antagonists dispose themselves strategically in the air. The invader outpaces one, but in so doing comes within range of another. He is so harassed that he either has to give fight, or, finding his retreat hopelessly cut off, he makes a determined dash, trusting to his high speed to carry him to safety. In these driving tactics the French and British airmen have proved themselves adepts, more particularly the latter, as the chase appeals to their sporting instincts. There is nothing so exhilarating as a quarry who displays a determination to run the gauntlet.

The roving Teuton scout was considerably in evidence in the early days of the war, but two or three weeks' experience emphasised the sad fact that, in aerial strategy, he was hopelessly outmatched by his opponents. His advantage of speed was nullified by the superior tactical and strategical acumen of his antagonists, the result being that the German airman, who has merely been trained along certain lines, who is in many cases nothing more than a cog-wheel in a machine, and who is proverbially slow-witted, has concluded that he is no match for the airmen of the Allies. He found from bitter experience that nothing afforded the Anglo-French military aviators such keen delight as to lie in wait for a "rover," and then to swoop into the air to round him up.

The proportion of these individual scouts who were either brought down, or only just succeeded in reaching safety within their own lines, and who were able to exhibit serious wounds as evidence of the severity of the aerial tussle, or the narrowness of the escape, has unnerved the Teuton airmen as a body to a very considerable extent. Often, even when an aeroplane descended within the German lines, it was found that the roving airman had paid the penalty for his rashness with his life, so that his journey had proved in vain, because all the intelligence he had gained had died with him, or, if committed to paper, was so unintelligible as to prove useless.

It was the success of the British airmen in this particular field of duty which was responsible for the momentous declaration in Field-Marshal Sir John French's famous despatch:—"The British Flying Corps has succeeded in establishing an individual ascendancy, which is as serviceable to us as it is damaging to the enemy.... The enemy have been less enterprising in their flights. Something in the direction of the mastery of the air has already been gained."

The methods of the British airmen are in vivid contrast to the practice of the venturesome Teuton aerial rovers described above. While individual flights are undertaken they are not of unknown duration or mileage. The man is given a definite duty to perform and he ascends merely to fulfil it, returning with the information at the earliest possible moment. It is aerial scouting with a method. The intelligence is required and obtained for a specific purpose, to govern a contemplated move in the grim game of war.

Even then the flight is often undertaken by two or more airmen for the purpose of checking and counterchecking information gained, or to ensure such data being brought back to headquarters, since it is quite possible that one of the party may fall a victim to hostile fire. By operating upon these lines there is very little likelihood of the mission proving a complete failure. Even when raids upon certain places such as Dusseldorf, Friedrichshafen or Cuxhaven are planned, complete dependence is not placed on one individual. The machine is accompanied, so that the possibility of the appointed task being consummated is transformed almost into a certainty.

The French flying men work upon broadly similar lines. Their fleet is divided into small squadrons each numbering four, six, or more machines, according to the nature of the contemplated task. Each airman is given an area of territory which is to be reconnoitred thoroughly. In this way perhaps one hundred or more miles of the enemy's front are searched for information at one and the same time. The units of the squadron start out, each taking the appointed direction according to the preconceived plan, and each steering by the aid of compass and map. They are urged to complete the work with all speed and to return to a secret rendezvous.

Later the air is alive with the whirring of motors. The machines are coming back and all converging to one point. They vol-plane to the earth and gracefully settle down within a short distance of each other at the rendezvous. The pilots collect and each relates the intelligence he has gained. The data are collated and in this manner the General Staff is able to learn exactly what is transpiring over a long stretch of the hostile lines, and a considerable distance to the rear of his advance works. Possibly five hundred square miles have been reconnoitred in this manner. Troops have been massed here, lines of communication extend somewhere else, while convoys are moving at a third place. But all has been observed, and the commanding officer is in a position to re-arrange his forces accordingly. It is a remarkable example of method in military tactics and strategy, and conveys a striking idea of the degree to which aerial operations have been organised.