Familiarity with the chemical composition of the humble potato prompted the Germans to regard it from two distinct view-points. The one, as in these islands, concerned its food potentialities; the second took into consideration its possible application as a raw material for several industries, such as the manufacture of alcohol, starch, glucose, dextrine, and other articles of commerce. Consequently, potato quotations upon the Teuton markets were dual and distinct. The one price, which was the higher, related to produce intended for the table, while the second, and lower, governed its industrial use.
The provision of two separate markets for the commodity produced the inevitable result. Farmers were assured of lucrative prices for their crop set aside for edible use, while the second market absorbed practically the whole of what was not required to satisfy the first-named demand, and that at an attractive figure. Accordingly, there was every inducement to bring more and more acres under the tuber, which led to the reclamation of poor soils regarded as utterly useless for general agriculture.
But the encouragement thus extended wrought many other far-reaching benefits. To persuade the poor soils devoted to the culture of the potato to become fertile led to an increased demand for artificial fertilizers, and provided a big domestic outlet for the native potash. The farmers were enlightened as to the many virtues possessed by such manures and were urged to use them liberally. The potash deposits were not the only home resources to enjoy prosperity from such propaganda. The steel industry reaped a certain measure of profit, because the land offered an encouraging market for the enormous accumulations of basic slag arising from the working in steel. Then the alcohol derived from the potato assisted other industries, notably that concerned with the manufacture of coal-tar dyestuffs. From this it will be seen that the increased production of the potato, and its submission to the most economic processes, exercised a repercussive effect in various directions.
It was the pursuit of this policy which enabled Germany to raise 54,000,000 tons of potatoes a year. Of this enormous yield approximately 30,000 tons were used to feed other industries with essential raw materials. The energy displayed by the farmer resulted in the supply exceeding the demand, so it became necessary to devise measures to cope with the glut to avoid the grower, from the receipt of absurdly low prices, being discouraged. The German farmer does not favour clamping: he desires to dispose of his product immediately it is gathered. With such an enormous output this tendency proved an awkward obstacle. The auxiliary industries planned their operations upon a twelve months scale. That is to say, they naturally desired to work steadily the whole year round. The raw material from the soil came to hand in tidal waves, and inconveniently.
The problem of meeting these sudden seasonal surges provoked difficulty and dissatisfaction. The dependent industries acquired their requirements, which left a very large quantity of potatoes upon the growers’ hands. They could not hold them through the winter owing to the extreme susceptibility of this vegetable to injury from frost. The merchants were ready to accept delivery and to hold them in store against the calls of commerce, but only at a price which was so low as to leave the growers on the wrong side. The latter, dissatisfied, threatened retaliation in the form of curtailment of production. At this declaration the alcohol-distilling interests took alarm. To secure themselves against any shortage of raw material they decided to hasten to the farmers’ assistance, the merchants being ignored. The Alcohol Association and the Farmers’ Societies collaborated to perfect ways and means of saving the surplus both from destruction and the profiteering of the factors. The co-operation of the Government was also sought. The last-named assented to extend tangible aid and forthwith prizes to the value of £1,500—$7,500—were offered to stimulate inventive fertility. As a result of the various discussions it was decided that the most promising solution of the vital question would be to convert the potato into a dried product.
Inventive effort responded very promptly upon the narrowing down of the issue. As a result of searching tests two dehydrating methods were adopted. By these processes the potatoes are washed, cooked, dried, and reduced to a flake and shredded form respectively. The product from the first-named process is described as “flocken” from its flake-like character, while the second is called “schnitzel.” The latter is the cheaper process, the cost of dehydrating a ton of potatoes being about 4s.—$1.00—while the conversion of a ton of tubers into flocken costs 10s.—$2.50. However, the capital investment incurred with the machinery for producing schnitzel is higher than that for yielding the flake, and initial outlay being the most compelling feature it is the process which has been most widely adopted. In 1914 there were over 400 factories in operation converting the surplus potato crop into a dried form, of which about 75 per cent. followed the flocken method. But it does not matter which process is employed, the result is the same—the production of a dried potato pulp, capable of being kept indefinitely so long as it is protected against the ravages of damp, and which suffers no injury from frost. From this dehydrated potato it is possible to work up a cheap, excellent cattle-food.
The ability to render the potato into a convenient dry form at a low figure prompted other countries, notably Japan and the United States of America, to resort to similar methods, but to a different end. The potato is rich in carbohydrates, and this fact suggested the subsequent milling of the dry material into a flour, commercially known as “farina,” which has proved a conspicuous commercial success. The demand for this flour is expanding rapidly, because it serves as excellent material for the preparation of bun-flours, cake-flours, custard-powders, soups, and other foodstuffs, designed and marketed with the primary idea of lessening the worries and labours of the housewife.
Previous to the war the price for this imported article varied between £25 and £35—$125 and $175—per ton, the cost of production ranging from £14 to £20—$70 to $100—per ton. The margin of profit was sufficiently wide to warrant the development of the process. Under war conditions the price soared as high as £90—$450—per ton, but subsequently dropped to about £45-£50—$225-$250. A very marked diminution upon this latter figure is improbable, owing to the increased manufacturing costs which now rule.
Therefore the question arises as to whether Britain cannot turn the balance of her potato crop to greater commercial advantage. There is no reason why we should not do so, seeing that in 1913 we imported over 40,000 tons of farina, while in 1917 the value of our importation of this flour rose to £1,040,319—$5,201,595—for about 25,000 tons. It must be conceded, however, that under present conditions less scope exists for such a manifestation of enterprise in this country, seeing that our potato crop is only about one-tenth of what Germany normally raises. But the demand for the by-products in this country is every whit as heavy and sustained as in Germany, while the fact that in this raw material we have the base wherewith to revive an industry—the production of starch—which Germany wrenched from us by unscrupulous trading, alone should be sufficiently attractive to warrant such an attempt being made. Our consumption of starch is heavy, exceeding 50,000 tons a year, while our purchases of dextrine and unpotable methylic-alcohol, both of which can be made from the potato, run into £70,000—$350,000—apiece during the year. Even the industrial alcohol, despite the adverse taxation conditions which prevail, is in urgent demand for many new industries.
If we confine the issue to the farina we have a distinctly promising outlook. British inventive effort has been encouraged, and has evolved a process and product of this character which are immeasurably superior to those of the foreigner. To us the domestic manufacture of farina is of far wider significance than its mere mention might suggest, inasmuch as it would prove of far-reaching value as an ingredient to the loaf. As a matter of fact the authorities, in their resolve to grapple with the national food question, provisionally ear-marked 2,000,000 tons of the 1918 British potato crop for conversion into farina, to be blended with the domestic wheaten flour, to induce the supplies of the last-named to go farther. The conclusion of hostilities rendered this precautionary measure unnecessary.