The Railway Conquest of the World

by Frederick Arthur Ambrose Talbot

In 1870, commercial interests petitioned for the establishment of a shorter route between the east coast and the Norwegian capital. Surveyors, therefore, were deputed to investigate the interior and to ascertain the practicability of building such a railway. After infinite labour the engineers reported favourably upon the project, but pointed out that the work would be unprecedentedly arduous, and would be highly expensive.

For five years the scheme lay dormant, but in 1875 the Government decided to commence the enterprise, with a section of line 67½ miles long, connecting the seaboard at Bergen with Vossevangen. In deference to views prevailing at the time, however, the narrow- or metre-gauge was adopted, and in 1883 it was opened for traffic.

Although no further headway was made with the continuation of the main scheme, it was not abandoned by any means. A mountain barrier, the Dovrejelf range, barred the way to the interior. Its penetration was recognised as one demanding great skill, for the peaks are precipitous, with sides dropping into valleys so narrow as to be mere defiles on the sea side of the chain. Apart from these physical handicaps, however, the rain- and snow-falls upon the highest levels were found to be tremendous, and it was essential that elaborate examination should be made concerning these adverse influences before the location was decided definitely.

A cautious policy was practised. No attempt to proceed beyond Vossevangen was made until the mountain wall had been searched through and through. No less than twelve alternative routes were prepared and submitted to the Government. These demonstrated the conclusive fact that no route could offer avoidance of the snow and rain. The question was to follow a location, if possible, where these drawbacks were emphasised to the least degree. For this purpose several meteorological stations were established among the mountains and on the plateau to gather exhaustive data by daily observations.

The outcome was the production of some decidedly startling facts, even to those who were convinced of the extremely inclement conditions prevailing inland. The observers had been instructed to record particularly the maximum fall of snow during twenty-four hours, the depth of the snow among the mountains during the winter, and the effect of the winds which swept the plateau mercilessly during the latter season. It was found that snow fell every month during the year at Fjeldberg, even June, July and August not being free from such visitations, while at another point the snowfall in winter aggregated no less than 11 feet. At no point along the projected location of the line was a depth of less than 8 feet recorded, while the general average was from 10 feet to 14 feet.

The winds were found to drive the dry, fleecy flakes before them like dust, to pile up huge drifts in sheltered places, running up to 161 feet deep. Some of these drifts remained throughout the summer, and were found to be of respectable proportions. The sum of these reports presaged the fact that, when the line was completed, the question of maintaining it free from snow-blocks would demand superhuman effort.

At last the Government decided to proceed with the undertaking. The advantages and disadvantages of the various locations had been weighed diligently, and promoted the decision to adopt the Gravehals route. The authorities regarded this location with misgiving in the first instance, because it involved the piercing of a tunnel 17,420 feet in length, at an elevation of 2,818 feet. Funds were voted to build the next section from Vossevangen to Taugevand, a distance of 47 miles. In this distance the line was to be lifted a matter of 4000 feet to the highest point to be attained between the Atlantic seaboard and Christiania.

The route selected comprised the boring of no less than 12 tunnels, making in the aggregate not less than 11¼ miles, of which the Gravehals tunnel represented over 3 miles. While this difficult section was being prosecuted, the Government resolved to come to a definite conclusion as to the route the railway should follow after attaining the summit at Taugevand, so as to enable operations to be continued without delay when the latter point was reached.

The exposed position of the Gravehals tunnel rendered the work exhausting to the men. As the timber line is about 2000 feet below, the mountain-sides are quite bare, and there is no protection against the elements whatever. The work is the longest of its kind in Northern Europe, and has proved probably one of the most exacting to construct. It extends through granite which was found to be exceedingly tough, so that boring was unavoidably slow, especially at times when everything appeared to be pitted against the contractors.

The firm who accepted the contract undertook to complete the work for £158,400, or $792,000, which was considered to be a very low price. It was attacked from both ends, and mechanical boring was adopted. Convenient water power was harnessed to drive the Brandt rock drills, which worked under a pressure of some 1,200 pounds per square inch. Boring proceeded somewhat slowly, more so, in fact, than the contractors had anticipated; but this was due to the extreme hardness of the rock encountered, while the work was handicapped by delays which the contractors could not have controlled. In the first place labour proved scarce and expensive. The men working on the coast, although experienced in drilling and blasting rock, could not be persuaded to proceed up-country to practise their skill. The situation was too remote, and the elements were too bitter, and seeing that extensive railway construction was proceeding at the same time in other and more congenial parts of the country, there was no cogent reason why the men should hie to an inhospitable locality for work.