The Railway Conquest of the World

by Frederick Arthur Ambrose Talbot

Under these circumstances advance was trying. The top-soil was as hard as rock, and could not be displaced except by dynamite, so that in the deep cuttings in mid-summer it was just as arduous to cut a way through the frozen loam as through the solid rock. The rivers, although they flow with a fierce velocity, freeze up quickly, and the ice assumes a great depth—a train can cross on the congealed surface with perfect safety.

In this country, strange to say, it was found to be easier to work during the winter, notwithstanding the extreme cold, than during the summer, for a higher rate of advance could be maintained when the country was frost-bound. There is an almost total absence of snow, but, on the other hand, during the summer the rainfall is tremendous. The wet season lasts continuously for nearly two months—from the middle of June to the middle of August. The downpour is so terrific that floods are precipitated on every hand, and the resultant situation, as may be surmised, is of the most miserable character. In 1897 the effect of this deluge was experienced to an abnormal degree, for several villages were overwhelmed, and widespread misery was inflicted among the peasants. The railway did not escape, for large stretches of line were washed away and large quantities of material were lost.

The scarcity of labour was felt very severely. Sufficient men could not be recruited locally, and to import navvies from Europe was hopeless. To meet this contingency the Administration authorities sanctioned the employment of exiles, while criminals were requisitioned to build the grade under a military guard. Though recourse to prison labour has been often advocated for railway construction, this is one of the rare instances where it has been brought into actual application through absolute force of circumstances. Assistance was rendered by Chinese labourers, and though at first they proved indifferent in the manipulation of tools, their assistance ultimately proved invaluable, as the majority developed into expert workmen.

As in other parts of the country, the inhabitants were favoured so far as possible in regard to the acquisition of horses, which were necessary for teaming and haulage work generally, in a district where steam traction engines were quite out of the question. The camps were provided also, so far as practicable, with local produce. In this territory, however, a serious situation was precipitated. The harvest failed, and the peasants were faced with starvation. Then the dreaded disease known locally as “Siberia” ravaged the country. It is a plague analogous to the rinderpest of South Africa, and has wrought tremendous havoc throughout the eastern corner of the Russian Empire, its effects being experienced along the shores of the Pacific. In 1898, this calamity assumed such proportions that work had to be brought to a standstill for lack of transportation facilities. The Government attempted to alleviate the situation by organising a special veterinary service to study the plague on the spot, with a view to elaborating some palliative measures. In order to meet the local deficiency the engineers were compelled to dispatch emissaries into Mongolia to purchase the hardy beasts of burden peculiar to that country. Large herds were acquired in this manner and were driven several hundred miles to the grade.

By means of this section the railway was carried so far east as Stretensk, from which point the line was to be continued to Khabarovsk. A modification in the arrangements, however, took place. Under the original scheme the line was to traverse Russian territory entirely, although Manchuria thrust its border so far to the north as to demand a wide detour in order to gain Vladivostok. At last, however, it became possible to carry the railway into Manchuria, and as a link was being built across this country, affording a short-cut to the seaboard, the Amur railway was abandoned, a short length being built to the Chinese frontier to connect with the Eastern Chinese railways instead.

The result is that the extreme eastern end of the line comes to a dead-end at Khabarovsk, and in itself is far from being remunerative. At the time the engineers appeared on the scene the territory had not been explored, signs of settlement were very few and far between, there were no roads, and the population was composed mostly of exiles and prisoners deported from Europe. Construction had to be carried out almost exclusively by convicts, assisted by the military, Chinese and Corean labour. The climate being extremely humid in summer, the work during that period proved terribly exacting, and the difficulties were enhanced by the ravages of the cattle plague. All material, being manufactured in European Russia, had to be brought to the extreme eastern end by water, either via the Suez Canal or the Cape of Good Hope, and consequently delays were frequent and often serious for both grade and men.

The primeval forest was terrible to penetrate owing to the huge trees, which, although they provided ample material for constructional purposes, demanded considerable effort and time for their removal from the right-of-way. As the conquest of Manchuria commenced while this work was in progress, and a shorter cut to Vladivostok was being provided, a spur was driven westwards from Nikolsk to the Chinese frontier to meet the Manchurian railway.

Owing to the rearrangement of the railway chess-board in the East in consequence of the Russo-Japanese war, it is quite possible that the Trans-Siberian railway will be completed as originally planned—that is, through Russian territory entirely, by the completion of the Amur railway from Stretensk to Khabarovsk.

The total cost of the through main line as now in operation was approximately £33,000,000, or $165,000,000. When the various other works incidental to the scheme, such as the connections with the Chinese frontier, are included, the total approaches the enormous figure of £40,000,000, or $200,000,000. This merely represents the building of the track itself between Kotlass in European Russia—now considered a part of the scheme—and Vladivostok, without a single railway car, wagon or engine. As originally designed, the capacity of the line was fixed at three trains each way per day, but the lightness of the construction did not permit this being maintained when the railway was subjected to great pressure, such as attended the transport of troops to the East.

The overhaul of the line was commenced immediately, and the question of doubling the track taken into serious consideration. This latter work is now in progress, and it is estimated that this task alone will represent a prodigious expenditure.