Sunshine and Storm in Rhodesia / Being a Narrative of Events in Matabeleland Both Before and During the Recent Native Insurrection Up to the Date of the Disbandment of the Bulawayo Field Force

by Frederick Courteney Selous

After leaving Spargot's the next halting-place was Dawson's store at the Umzingwani river, which was reached late at night. The store it was found had been burnt and destroyed by the Kafirs, but the mule stables were still standing, and in them a plentiful supply of maize was obtained for the horses. The latter were all placed inside the stable fence, whilst the men lay down behind their saddles on the rising ground outside. The pickets were fired on during the night, but a few volleys from a portion of the Africander Corps drove the Kafirs off, though they were afterwards heard calling to one another in the hills near the river.

"When day broke no natives were to be seen, and the horses were at once saddled up, and the march continued. Spiro's store, thirty-seven miles from Bulawayo, was found to have been totally destroyed by fire, but Grainger's hotel, twelve miles farther on, was still standing. The Kafirs had, however, apparently only just left it before the patrol arrived, as everything was in the utmost disorder, and water was discovered in a bucket which had evidently only just been brought up from the stream, as some of it had been spilt on the ground. A large supply of maize was again found in the mule stables, so the horses got another good feed.

In the evening the expedition moved on to Grainger's second store, which it was found had not been interfered with by the natives. Here Friday night was passed, the men again lying down behind their saddles. Early the following morning Dawson's store at "Amanzi minyama" was reached. It was found to have been very recently deserted by its European occupants, and since their departure had been partially looted by Kafirs. From here a move was made to Mr. Nicholson's camp, some four miles farther down the road, where it was thought that all the white men in the Gwanda district had probably collected. On arriving there a most excellent fort was discovered on the top of a kopje near the camp. Whilst the fort was being strengthened, Mr. Zeederberg, the well-known post contractor, and three more men rode down the Tuli road to discover how far ahead the Gwanda people were. Mr. Zeederberg and one of these men rode through to Tuli, in order to despatch telegrams to Bulawayo; but the other two returned the following day, after having caught up the waggon with the people from Dawson's store, who were retiring on Tuli, and who reported that the Gwanda party was thirteen hours ahead of them, making for the same destination. On Sunday, 5th April, two more despatch-riders were sent to Tuli with farther messages for Bulawayo, asking that reinforcements and a Hotchkiss gun should be sent down to meet the patrol on its return, as, from information received from a native scout, it was believed that the Kafirs would attack them in force at some point along the road. On Wednesday morning the despatch-riders returned, with a message informing Captain Brand that it was impossible to send the reinforcements asked for, and requesting him to return as soon as possible to Bulawayo. On Monday, the day after the despatch-riders had left, an escort which had been sent in charge of a waggon to Dawson's store to bring in some supplies was fired on by the Kafirs. Captain Van Niekerk with some men of the Africander Corps, and some of C troop under Mr. Holland, immediately went off in pursuit, but beyond a few stragglers saw nothing of them. On the following day Captain Van Niekerk and Mr. Purssell went out with a force to patrol round the store and bring in all the remaining stores left. They found the country strewn for several miles with blankets, boots, etc., left by the Kafirs in their hasty flight on the preceding day, but again no resistance was met with.

From a photo by C. H. Newberry, Bulawayo.
CAPTAIN VAN NIEKERK
who commanded the Africander Corps of the Bulawayo Field Force in many engagements during the last campaign.

From this point I will proceed with the narrative in Lieutenant Webb's own words, as follows:—"We started early the next morning, 9th April, on our return journey. By lunch time we had marched fifteen miles, and reached Grainger's store No. 2. This place we found had been burnt to the ground by the Matabele during our stay at Gwanda, and judging by the spoor a large number of them had been at work. We decided to stay the rest of the day at this place, and were careful to take every necessary precaution in case of a night attack. Next morning we saddled up at daybreak, and covered twelve miles to Grainger's store No. 1, before halting. This store had in our absence shared the same fate as the other, and we recovered nothing from the ashes. As we were now entering a most dangerous section of the road, we were careful to use extra vigilance. At about ten o'clock we came up with some cattle at the foot of the range of hills on our left, but before capturing them, narrowly inspected the hills for natives, as we suspected a trap. Sure enough on a ridge about 1000 yards away we made out a body of men hiding under cover. We at once put the Maxim on them, and as they retreated in haste up the side of the hill, we found that several hundreds of them had been waiting in ambush. They only returned our fire with one or two shots. We were then going through thick bush, with hills a couple of hundred yards away towering on each side.

"Upon emerging from these, we came to the ruins of Spiro's store, and about a mile beyond we saw a column of smoke ascending, and rightly conjectured that this was the place where they meant to attack us. The situation was all in their favour. We had to pass through a narrow neck amongst the hills in order to emerge into comparatively open country, though even this latter afforded them ample cover from our fire. The first evidence we had of the ambuscade was a steady and prolonged fire directed at the head of the column (composed of our corps) from the kopjes on the left flank. We at once returned the fire; but so well was the enemy concealed amongst the rocks, that I may tell you—though you will hardly credit my statement—that I scarcely saw one of them for half an hour. As the column was pressing on to get out of the dangerous position we were in, a few of Captain Brand's men fired just in front of the faces of the mules drawing the provision waggon. The mules swerved round suddenly, and broke the disselboom. Whilst the damage was being repaired, Mr. Jobson, who was in command of the Maxim, brought his gun into action with the greatest coolness and promptitude; but this unfortunate accident delayed us for half an hour, and was largely responsible for the wounds of many horses and men.

"When we at last emerged from the pass, the disorganised appearance of the column showed the severity of the enemy's fire, and I firmly believe it was due to the fact that there were a number of old campaigners in the Africander Corps, which was commanded by our cool and experienced chief Captain Van Niekerk, that we escaped annihilation. When we had got the men into skirmishing order, we were better able to cope with the enemy; and when I tell you that the latter were over 1000 strong and followed us for over five miles at a distance of little more than 200 yards, you will be better able to judge of the task we had in hand. Our route lay over successive ranges of ridges and valleys, and afforded plenty of cover for the enemy, as the grass was about three feet high, and the country thickly studded with bush and trees. They formed a half-moon round us and skirmished excellently, taking advantage of every bit of cover. They also fought with ferocious determination, and often showed pluck verging on lunacy. They were kept well in hand by their leaders, who constantly urged them to fire low. Our horses and men were now falling with deadly monotony, and we all saw the importance of getting into more open country. Our men were firing steadily and rapidly all this time, and the Maxim did good service; but being on the move and owing to the tactics of the enemy, did not do the execution we were accustomed to see in the first Matabele war.

"At last, after about three hours' fighting, we saw about a mile ahead of us a round stone kopje, for which we made in order to take a short halt. The enemy at once saw through our movement, and a number of them endeavoured to defeat our object by out-flanking our advance. Our horsemen, however, were too sharp for them, and by hard riding reached the kopje first, and held them in check until the main body arrived. The kopje we thus reached was nothing but a huge flat rock, showing out about twelve or fifteen feet above the surrounding country. It was almost surrounded by broken rocks and trees, and under this cover—in some instances only some thirty to forty yards from where we were standing—the Matabele concealed themselves, and continued their fire upon us. This alone will give you some idea of their astounding audacity and bravery. We had to charge them four times to make them at last give in and retire. It was now about sundown (5.30 P.M.), and we had actually been about six hours fighting over five miles of country.