I am of opinion that the French army under General d’Amade, soon to number 12,000 or 13,000 men, could penetrate to any corner of Morocco with facility, maintaining at the same time unassailable communication with their base. A body of the Foreign Legion three hundred strong could cut their way across Morocco. With 60,000 men the French can occupy, hold, and effectively police—as policing goes in North Africa—the entire petty empire. Such an army in time could make the roads safe for Arabs and Berbers as well as for Europeans, punishing severely, as the French have learned to do, any tribe that dares continue its marauding practices and any brigand who essays to capture Europeans; and as for the rest, the safety of life and property within the towns and among members of the same tribes, the instinct of self-preservation among the Moors themselves is sufficient. There is no danger for the French in Morocco.
Nevertheless, their task is not an easy one. Conservatism at home and fear of some foreign protest has kept them from penetrating the country, as they must, in order to subdue it. So far they have made their power felt but locally, and though they have slain wantonly thousands of Moors, their position to-day is to all practical purposes the same as it was after the first engagements about Casablanca. For four months General Drude held Casablanca, with tribes defeated but unconquered all about him. With the new year General Drude retired and General d’Amade took his place, and the district of operations was extended inland for a distance of fifty miles. But beyond that there are again many untaught tribes ranging over a vast territory.
If the French, from fear of Germany, do not intend to occupy all Morocco I can see for them no alternative but to recognise Mulai el Hafid, who as Sultan of the interior is inspiring the tribesmen to war. Hafid’s position, though criminal from our point of view, is undeniably strong.
On proclaiming himself sultan, he sought to win the support of the country by promising a Government like that of former sultans, one that cut off heads, quelled rebellions, and kept the tribes united and effective against the Christians. This was the message that his criers spread throughout the land; and the people, told that the French had come as conquerors, gave their allegiance to him who promised to save them. Hafid’s attitude towards the European Powers was by no means so defiant as he professed to his people. Emissaries were sent from Marakesh to London and Berlin to plead for recognition, but were received officially at neither capital. He then tried threats, and at last, in January, declared the Jehad, or Holy War. But that he really contemplated provoking a serious anti-Christian, or even anti-French, uprising could hardly be conceived of so intelligent a man; and hard after the news of this came an assuring message—unsolicited, of course—to the Legations at Tangier that his object was only to unite the people in his cause against his brother. Later, when one of his m’hallas took part in a battle against the French he sent apologies to them.
The Moors, the country over, have heard of the disasters to the Shawia tribes, at any rate, of the fighting. Knowing the hopelessness of combating the French successfully, the towns of the coast are willing to leave their future in the diplomatic hands of Abdul Aziz, in spite of their distaste for him and his submission to the Christians. Those of the interior, however, many of whom have never seen a European, have a horror of the French such as we should have of Turks, and they will probably fight an invasion with all their feeble force.
Because of the harsh yet feeble policy of the French, the trouble in Morocco, picturesque and having many comic opera elements, will drag on its bloody course yet many months.
CHAPTER VII
FORCED MARCHES
The French Army is an interesting institution at this moment, when it is known that the Navy of France ranks only as that of a second-class Power and it is thought her military organisation is little better. I am not in a position to make comparisons, knowing little of the great armies of Europe, nor is the detachment of troops in Morocco, numbering at this writing hardly 8,000 men, a sufficient proportion of the army of France to allow one to form much of an opinion. But some observations that were of interest to me may also interest others.
The French forces in Morocco represent the best that the colonies of France produce in the way of fighting men. European as well as African troops are from the stations of Algeria, a colony near enough to France to partake of her civilisation yet sufficiently far away to escape conservatism and the so-called modern movements with which the home country is afflicted. If there are weaklings, socialists, and anarchists among the troops they are in the Foreign Legion, absorbed and suppressed by the ‘gentlemen rankers.’ The Army is made up of many elements. Besides ordinary Algerians, it includes Arabs from the Sahara and negroes who came originally perhaps as slaves from the Soudan; besides Frenchmen, there are in the famous Foreign Legion—that corps that asks no questions—Germans, Bulgarians, Italians, Russians, and even a few Englishmen. The main body of the Army is composed of Algerians proper, Mohammedans, who speak, or at least understand, French. They are officered by Frenchmen, who wear the same uniforms as their men: the red fezzes and the baggy white bloomers in the case of infantry, the red Zouave uniform and boots in the cavalry. These Algerians, of course, are regular soldiers, subjected to ordinary military discipline, but there are too the Goumiers, or Goums, of the desert, employed in irregular corps for scout duty and as cavalry, and they, I understand, are exempt from camp regulations and restrictions except such as are imposed by their own leaders. And in the last month similar troops have been organised from the tribesmen of the conquered Shawia districts near to Casablanca.
Algerians and Goumiers, Europeans and Africans, camp all together in the same ground, their respective cantonments separated only by company ‘streets.’ The various commands march side by side and co-operate as if they were all of one nationality, a thing which to me, as an American, knowing that such conditions could not obtain in an American army, speaks wonders for the French democracy.