‘I now ask you to give me a faithful answer, and I will abide by the truth. On what principle of international law can there be armed intervention between a nation and the monarch it has deposed? I wait for your reply in the firm belief that, on careful review of the situation, your answer cannot fail to reflect a bright lustre upon your judgment and justice.
‘In peace. This 24th Haeja, 1325.’
Europeans in Morocco are mostly sympathisers with Mulai Hafid; and their hopes for the success of his Holy War lead them often—no doubt unconsciously—to exaggerate the difficulties of the French and to enlarge upon the numbers of the tribesmen opposing them. Though Hafid declared that his purpose in proclaiming the Jehad was only to unite the tribes in support of him, he has been drawn by this proclamation into war with the French. The forces that have been recruited by his deception have either pressed him or have taken upon themselves to combat the French invasion; and their opposition would seem to make it impossible for the French to recognise Hafid as Sultan. For this would be tantamount to a defeat of the French in the minds of the ignorant Moors. On the other hand Hafid’s position is now exceedingly difficult; for him it is either to fight or to surrender to his brother.
In leaving Morocco it would be picturesque to say with Pierre Loti: ‘Farewell, dark Moghreb, Empire of the Moors, mayst thou remain yet many years immured, impenetrable to the things that are new! Turn thy back upon Europe! Let thy sleep be the sleep of centuries, and so continue thine ancient dream! May Allah preserve to the Sultan his unsubdued territories and his waste places carpeted with flowers, there to do battle as did the Paladins in the old times, there to gather in his rebel heads! May Allah preserve to the Arab race its mystic dreams, its immutability scornful of all things, and its grey rags; may He preserve to the Moorish ruins their shrouds of whitewash, and to the mosques inviolable mystery!’
But for my part there is no sentimental feeling for Morocco. That a government is old is no reason, for me, that it should be maintained. Because the Moors have always ridden horses, I see no reason why they should not ride in carriages or even in trains. In fact, I sympathise with the unfortunate beasts of burden and with the suffering Moors themselves. I was not affected, like the great French writer, more by the beauty and the romance of the country than by the horror and distress; and, instead of his fair sentiment, I say: Let in the French! For the Moghreb I should like to see a little less of crime, a little less of base corruption, a little less of ignorance and needless suffering, a little less of cruelty, a little less of bestial vice. The French can do some little for Morocco, and no other Power can go in. I say, Let in the French!
MAP OF
MOROCCO
Yet a last word, to the French: You boast your knowledge of Mohammedans; do you know that the Moors dread you for what they have heard from their fathers you did in the early days in Algeria? Nor have your methods about Casablanca reassured them. You have slain wantonly, even under General Drude. General d’Amade has penetrated the country time after time and accomplished ‘enormous slaughter.’ But for what purpose? This is all unnecessary. It would seem that your object has been to provoke further hostility, that you may have excuse to continue your occupation and to extend it. This is undoubtedly good politics; but rather unfair to the ignorant Moors, don’t you think? And is it good for your soldiers, Algerians or Europeans, to use them in this fashion?