Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr President, there is just one thing that even my friend George Chamberlain cannot do. He cannot create war between us and the men and the women and the children of Canada. We are too near akin to one another in blood and in language and in literature and in law and in everything else that makes men and women akin to one another for that.
The greatest crime that the world could possibly witness would be a war between the people of the United States and the people of Canada. It is unthinkable from a sane man’s standpoint, no matter what happens, no matter what occurs....
The Senator says that we assert and we dare to maintain our rights. Of course we do. So do they assert and so do they dare maintain their rights, and they are weaker than we. All the more reason why we should be considerate in our treatment of them, and by God’s blessing we are going to be. We are not hunting retaliation with Canada, either from her ports or from ours. We are seeking nothing except justice in the world.
There is one more thing to be said, Mr. President. A pathway of commercial retaliation is a pathway of war. In the long run it means that. It can not mean anything else. What we want is the old Democratic standpoint of the utmost free-trade relations with everybody on the earth. The utmost they grant us we ought to grant them. That spells peace; that spells amity; that spells friendship. The opposite course spells war in the long run, and to attempt to convert these 3,000 miles of boundary between us and Canada into an area of retaliation and trade hostility is to convert it ultimately into a relationship of war.
I, for one, have been opposed to it all the time, and I am opposed to it now. I can not conceive of a greater crime than having our children kill the children of the Canadians or have their children kill our children in an absolutely useless species of hostility. If we start with trade hostilities, we will wind up with warlike hostilities.
Senator Williams was one of the foremost in defending Great Britain and inciting to war with Germany. Senator Chamberlain had said that there was entirely too much Toryism in the Senate as well as in the House; but though he had mentioned no names, the Toryism of which he had referred stood self-revealed the next day.
France’s Friendship for the United States.
France’s Friendship for the United States.—The “French and Indian wars” with which the American settlers had to contend in theearly history of the colonies long antedated the Revolution, and massacres were instigated by French policy of conquest and retaliation. In the Revolution a number of patriotic Frenchmen, nursing a long grievance against France’s ancient enemy, England, saw opportunity to enfeeble their country’s hated rival. Encouraged by Frederick the Great, who had a score to settle with England for the treachery which Bute had practiced against him in paying secret subsidies to Frederick’s enemy, Austria, while England was allied with him, by heroic efforts they succeeded in sending succor to the colonies in the form of troops (many of them Germans) under Lafayette. This is so well understood that the American historian, Benson J. Lossing, specifically points out in his writings what he calls the “superstition” that we owe our “being as a nation to the generosity of the French monarch and the gallantry of French warriors.” Revealing the motives that governed France, he writes:
In the Seven Years War, which ended with the treaty of 1763, France had been thoroughly humbled by England. Her pride had been wounded. She had been shorn of vast possessions in America and Asia. She had been compelled, by the terms of the treaty, to cast down the fortifications of Dunkirk and to submit forever to the presence of an English commissioner, without whose consent not a single paving stone might be moved on the quay or in the harbor of a French maritime city. This was an insult too grievous to be borne with equanimity. Its keenness was maintained by the tone of English diplomacy, which was that of a conqueror—harsh, arrogant, and often uncivil. A desire for relief from the shame became a vital principle of French policy, and the most sleepless vigilance was maintained for the discovery of an opportunity to avenge the injury and efface the mortification.
The quarrel between Great Britain and her colonies, which rapidly assumed the phase of contest after the port of Boston was closed, early in the summer of 1774, attracted the notice and stimulated the hope of the French government. But it seemed hardly possible for a few colonists to hold a successful or even effective contest with powerful England—“the mistress of the seas;” and it was not until the proceedings of the First Continental Congress had been read in Europe, the skirmish at Lexington and the capture of Ticonderoga had occurred, and the Second Congress had met, thrown down the gauntlet of defiance at the feet of the British ministry and been proclaimed to be “rebels” that the French cabinet saw gleams of sure promise that England’s present trouble would be sufficiently serious to give France the coveted opportunity to strike her a damaging blow.