WHY FREDERICKSBURG WAS LOST
I promised to give my convictions relative to the responsibility for the disaster of Fredericksburg, and I might as well do it here.
Recalling the fact heretofore stated that we seemed to have been thrown against Marye's Heights to be sacrificed; that we were not ordered to charge their works, but to advance and maintain a line of battle-fire where such a thing was absolutely impossible, I come to the inquiry, what was the character and purpose of the movement and why did it fail? So thoroughly impressed was I that there was something radically wrong about it, that I determined to solve that question if possible, and so made a study of the subject at that time and later after my return home. I had personal friends in the First and Sixth Corps, which had operated on the extreme left, and I discussed with them the movements that day. Finally, after my return home, I got access to Covode's congressional reports on the conduct of the war covering that campaign, and from all these sources learned what I then and now believe to be substantially the facts about that campaign. The army was divided into three grand divisions, composed of two army corps each, namely, the Second and Ninth, the right grand division, commanded by Sumner; the First and Sixth, the left grand division, commanded by Franklin, and the Third and Fifth, the centre, commanded by Hooker. The plan of battle was to hold Lee's army at Fredericksburg by a "feint in force" (which means an attack sufficiently strong to deceive the enemy into the belief that it is the real or main attack) at that point, whilst the left grand division was to throw a pontoon bridge across the river three miles below and turn his flank (i.e., get behind them) in the rear of Marye's Heights. For this purpose the left grand division was to advance and attack vigorously. If successful, Lee would then have been between Franklin's forces on the left and our own on the right, with every possibility of being crushed. Hooker was to hold his division in readiness to support either wing. Had this plan been carried out, our work at the right would, at its conception, have been as it appeared to be, a mad sacrifice of men, but with an opportunity later on of pushing forward and reaping a victory. In that event, our position would have made us a tremendous factor in the result.
Now how was the plan carried out? The student will be puzzled on finding such a paucity of records concerning this disastrous movement. The official documents are remarkable for what they do not contain. A study of Covode's reports on the conduct of the war will, I think, justify my conclusions, viz., that the disaster of Fredericksburg was due not to accident, nor to a faulty plan of battle, but to a failure of the left grand division to perform the vital part assigned to it. My information gained at the time was that Franklin was to remain concealed until the signal for our attack came; then he was to cross over and attack vigorously, a military expression, meaning to put all possible vigor and power into the movement. The signal was given as our attack began. Whatever force may have crossed the river at that time, my information was that the division known as the Pennsylvania Reserve, now numbering probably not more than six thousand men, under General Meade, was the only body of troops which made a determined attack on Lee's right, in support of our work in front of Marye's Heights. Realizing the opportunity, General Meade pushed forward with his usual vigor and, though meeting strenuous opposition, soon found himself well in Lee's rear, but without support. He sent back aide after aide to hurry forward the supporting lines, but without avail, finally galloping back himself. He found General Birney resting near the bridge with his division. An eye-witness[E] to Meade's interview with Birney says the language of General Meade as he upbraided Birney for not coming to his support was enough to "almost make the stones creep;" that Meade was almost wild with rage as he saw the golden opportunity slipping away and the slaughter of his men going for naught. He said Birney responded that he agreed with General Meade fully, and was ready and most anxious to come to his support, but that his orders were peremptory to await further orders in his present position: that he had been for an hour trying to find General Franklin to obtain permission to move forward. This loss of time and want of support to Meade's charge changed a possible victory into a fearful disaster. This was substantially the testimony of Major-General Reynolds, commanding the First Corps, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. Burnside rode down to the left and vigorously expostulated with Franklin for his failure to carry out his orders, and peremptorily ordered him to make the attack as originally directed, whilst he repeated the movement at the right. It was now considerably after noon, and this order was undoubtedly a mistake. The plan of battle had been revealed, and there was practically no hope of success. Had the left grand division vigorously performed its part in the earlier movement, can any one doubt the result? I cannot think so. Had Meade, Reynolds, or Hancock been in command on the left that day, I feel confident that Fredericksburg would have been recorded a glorious victory instead of a horrible slaughter.
Now, why did the left grand division fail to make the attack as ordered? Halleck, in his report on the operations at Fredericksburg, says "alleged misunderstanding of orders." Here is his language:
"It was intended that Franklin's grand division, consisting of the corps of Reynolds (First) and Smith (Sixth), should attack the enemy's right and turn his position on the heights in the rear of Fredericksburg, while Sumner and Hooker attacked him in front. But by some alleged misunderstanding of orders Franklin's operations were limited to a mere reconnoissance, and the direct attacks of Sumner and Hooker were unsupported." "Rebellion Records," vol. xxi., page 47.
Is the theory of a misunderstanding of orders tenable? The records show that on the 11th of December, two days before the battle, Burnside ordered his division commanders to so dispose their troops as to bring them within easy reach of Fredericksburg, and that on that day at twelve o'clock noon these officers were ordered to meet him personally at his head-quarters for final instructions. There are no records of what those instructions were, but is it credible that either general retired from that conference with a misunderstanding as to the plan of battle or of his own part in it? Certain it is that neither Sumner nor Hooker misunderstood.
And the excuse said to have been made by Franklin, that he did not deem the attack on the left practicable, is not consistent with the idea of misunderstanding. Otherwise, why did he attack at all? General Halleck's guarded language clearly indicates where he placed the responsibility for that disaster, and that he did not credit the "misunderstanding of orders" theory. It is plainly evident Burnside did not accept that excuse, as appears from his celebrated Order No. 8, issued a month later, relieving Franklin, Smith, Newton, Cochran, and Ferrero, and stating as his reason that "it being evident that these officers can be of no further service to this army,"—the first named being the commander of the left grand division, the second the commander of the Sixth Corps, and the others subordinate commanders in that wing of the army. General Burnside explained to the Committee on the Conduct of the War[F] that in asking the President to approve this order, and making that a condition upon which he would consent to remain at the head of the army, he had explicitly stated, "that was the only condition on which he could command the Army of the Potomac." In other words, he could not command that army with those officers as his subordinates. The inference that there had been insubordination is inevitable. It was the current belief amongst us officers of the army that the battle of Fredericksburg had been lost through a want of hearty co-operation, if not direct disobedience of orders, on the part of the officer commanding on the left that day, and some of his subordinates, and that this was due to a spirit of jealousy. McClellan had but recently been removed from the command of the army, and the officers relieved were strong personal friends and partisans of the latter. Again, Burnside, his successor, was alleged to be junior in actual rank to Franklin. Whether either of these facts supplied the motives for the jealousy which lost that battle, if such was true, the judgment day alone will reveal. It is devoutly to be hoped that the light of that day will relieve the terrible disaster of Fredericksburg of this awful shadow, and that nothing worse than a "misunderstanding of orders" was responsible for it.
That Order No. 8 was disapproved at Washington, and General Burnside promptly tendered his resignation of the command of the Army of the Potomac. He felt that he had not received and was not likely to receive the cordial and hearty support of all his subordinate officers, and under those circumstances he did not want the responsibility of command. He expressed himself as anxious to serve his country and willing to work anywhere it might please the President to place him. He was not relieved, however, until a month or so later. In writing the foregoing I know that many brave men will take exception. I would say, however, that I have made a somewhat careful study of the subject from an absolutely unprejudiced stand-point, and such are the conclusions I reached, and they were shared by many of my fellow-officers who were in that campaign. The losses in this battle amount to nearly one-third the troops actually engaged, a most remarkable fact, and which stamps this engagement as one of the bloodiest in all history. Burnside reports his loss as twelve hundred and eighty-four killed and nine thousand six hundred wounded, making a total loss, including the missing, of twelve thousand six hundred and fifty-three. Of this loss the right grand division (the Second and Ninth Corps) lost five thousand three hundred and eleven. The left grand division, Franklin's (First and Sixth Corps, which numbered considerably more than the right grand division), lost three thousand four hundred and sixty-two, and most of this was sustained in the second attack in the afternoon. These facts sustain the belief above referred to in the army, that the main attack in the morning on the left was not what it should have been, and was the cause of the disaster.
A remarkable fact connected with this loss is the great number of wounded as compared with the killed. Usually the former exceeds the latter in the proportion of three and four to one, but at Fredericksburg it was nearly nine to one. How this is to be explained I never understood, unless it be that most of the casualties were from exploding shells. The minute fragments of a shell scatter very widely and wound, whilst there are fewer of the large pieces which kill. For example, the shell that exploded in the front of our second company, as it was turning to enter the street leading out towards Marye's Heights, previously described, knocked out ten men, only one of whom was instantly killed. It is safe to estimate that of the nine thousand six hundred reported as wounded, one-third died or were permanently disabled therefrom.