The letter of Mr Poinsett to Congress will throw much light upon this subject, and I shall therefore insert it.

“Department of War,

“December 30, 1837.

“Sir:— In answer to the resolution of the House of Representatives, in relation to the protection of the western frontiers of the United States, I have the honour to transmit the accompanying reports of the chief engineer and the acting quarter-master general, together with a report of the commissioner of Indian affairs. That expected from General Gaines will be sent as soon as it is received.

“In presenting these documents, which are ably drawn up, and contain full and satisfactory information on all the topics embraced by the resolution, I might have considered my duty fully discharged, had not other plans been previously recommended, which I regard as entirely inefficient, but which have received, in some measure, the sanction of Congress. A survey has been directed to determine the line of a road, which, it is contemplated, shall extend from some point of the Upper Mississippi to Red River, passing west of Missouri and Arkansas; and it is proposed to place a cordon of temporary posts of ordinary construction along it, as a sufficient measure for the defence of that part of the country. In pursuance of the orders of Congress, officers have been appointed to perform that duty, and, upon their report being received, measures will be taken to carry into effect the intentions of Congress, unless, upon a deliberate review of the whole matter, some more eligible plan of defence shall be adopted. My own opinion has been, from the time I first considered the subject, that such a chain of posts, strung along the best road that can be constructed, furnished with all the means to operate, and with competent garrisons to occupy them, is not calculated to afford that protection which the border States have a right to expect from the Government, nor to redeem its pledge to protect the emigrant tribes from the savage and warlike people that surround them. The only possible use of such a road would be to facilitate occasional communications between the posts in time of peace. Supplies would not be transported along it, for they must be brought from the interior. Succours could not reach the posts by that direction, for they would be furnished by the militia within the line; and any attempt to concentrate the forces composing the garrisons in the event of an outbreak, would probably be attended with disastrous consequences; for the troops, whose route must be well known, would be exposed to be attacked and destroyed in detail. The enemy, having nothing to dread on their flanks or rear, might approach this road without risk, and attack the detachments on their line of march, before they could concentrate their forces so as to offer an effectual resistance.

“After mature reflection, I am of opinion that military posts ought to be established and kept up within the Indian territory, in such positions as to maintain peace among the Indians, and protect the emigrant and feebler tribes against the stronger and more warlike nations that surround them; which the United States are bound to do by treaty stipulations. To withdraw those which now exist there, would be to violate our faith, as there is reason to apprehend that it would be the signal of war. Persons well acquainted with that country assure us that war would break out among the Indians, ‘just so soon as the troops are removed from those posts,’ and all accounts from that quarter confirm that impression.

“Independently of the military protection which the existence of these posts in the interior of the Indian country afford to the emigrating tribes, and the good they are calculated to effect by the beneficial influence the officers are enabled to exert over the surrounding Indians, they more effectually cover and protect the frontier than ten times the number of fortresses, strung along in one line, could do.

“With the very limited knowledge of that country as yet in possession of this department, it appears to me that six or seven permanent exterior posts would be sufficient to preserve the peace of that frontier. It will be necessary, at the same time, to establish, at convenient points, an interior line of posts, to serve as places of refuge for the inhabitants in periods of danger and alarm, until the militia can march to their succour from the interior, and the troops be put in motion upon the rear of the invaders. Eight of these would be amply sufficient, from which patrols might be kept up along the frontier to enforce the intercourse laws. Both descriptions of forts should be so constructed as to be defended by a small garrison, and in a manner that each part may be successfully maintained against a very superior force, both during the time the whole is being completed, and in the event of any portion of it being burnt or destroyed. This arrangement would require the establishment of a few depôts of arms and supplies, from which communications should be opened to the posts. The accompanying skeleton map presents a view of the relative positions of the posts and depôts, and of the communications from them to the line of defence for the speedy transportation of succours and supplies. A regular force of five thousand men would be sufficient to garrison these posts, and, with a competent reserve at Jefferson barracks, and an effective force at Baton Rouge, would, I think, both ensure the safety of the western frontier, and enable the Government to fulfil all its treaty stipulations, and preserve its faith with the Indians. I would recommend, as an important auxiliary to this system of defence, the organisation of an efficient volunteer force, to be raised in each of the frontier States; the men to be mustered into service for a certain term of time, the officers to be appointed according to their State laws, and to be instructed a certain number of days in each year by the regular officers of the United States army at the posts within the States, and to receive pay during that period. In this manner an efficient corps of officers may be created, and a body of volunteers be at hand to march to the succour of the border settlers and repel the invaders, whenever they are called upon by the proper authority.

“I venture to hope, if these measures are adopted by Congress, and carried into effect at an early day, so as to anticipate any hostile movement of the Indians, peace will be preserved on our Western borders; but if they should, unfortunately, be delayed until the discontent which exists among many of the tribes breaks out into open hostility, and the first movements of that wild and warlike people prove successful, as they infallibly would do in our present unprepared state, it might require double the force and quadruple the means I have here indicated to restore and preserve peace along that extended frontier. All which is respectfully submitted.

“JR Poinsett.