At 8 a.m. the next morning (June 4) the heavy guns and howitzers would open the bombardment of certain strong positions. At 11.5 a.m. an intense bombardment of the enemy trenches would begin. At 11.20 all guns except those on the approach lines would cease fire, and the infantry would cheer, raise their bayonets above the parapet, as though about to assault, with the object of inducing the Turk to occupy his front trenches, which would be heavily bombarded by all guns and howitzers, the machine-guns firing in bursts as targets presented themselves. At 12 noon the first line of infantry would advance, without firing, to the assault of the first objective, the batteries lifting to range on the trenches farther back. At 12.15 the second wave would advance, pass through the first line, and attack the second objective.
Divisional conferences were held at the Headquarters of the 125th Brigade, and General Douglas issued and explained his orders, and disposed the troops under his command as follows: First wave—two battalions of the 127th Brigade consisting of a half-battalion each of the 7th, 5th, 8th and 6th Manchesters, from right to left in the order named. The objective for this line was the front line of the Turkish trenches. A half-battalion of the 5th Lancashire Fusiliers was to follow in support on the left flank. The second wave consisted of the remaining half-battalions of the 127th Brigade. Their orders were to rush through the front line of Turkish trenches and gain the second objective, which was less than a mile from Krithia. A half-battalion of the 6th L.F., as working party, and the 1st Field Company, R.E., were to follow the first wave; the other half-battalion and the 2nd Field Company were to follow the second wave, to consolidate the lines gained. All the above troops were under the command of Brig.-General Noel Lee. The remaining half-battalion of the 5th L.F. was to form the garrison of the line of trenches held as the firing-line before the attack. The 9th Manchesters were to occupy the second line, which was strengthened by redoubts. The 7th and 8th Lancashire Fusiliers were to be in Divisional Reserve. The 9th Manchesters was the only battalion of the 126th Brigade acting with the Division, the 4th and 5th East Lancashires and the 10th Manchesters being still split up among the skeleton battalions of the 29th Division.
Battle of June 4, 1915
The bombardment that opened at 8 a.m. on June 4 was the heaviest and most prolonged that the peninsula had witnessed. At 11 a.m. every available gun both on land and sea was firing, including six batteries of four guns each of the famous 75’s, generously lent by the French Commander. These were firing high-explosive shell. The whole Turkish line was enveloped in smoke, and it seemed impossible that any positions could withstand its fury. The village of Krithia and, indeed, the whole of the hillside appeared to be a mass of flame and dust. The plan to cease fire on the front trenches at 11.20 a.m. had the effect intended, and the enemy prepared to meet the expected assault. A hail of bullets swept over the trenches of the 127th Brigade, and a few moments later the renewal of the bombardment caught the Turks as they were manning the trenches or hastening through the communication trenches to reinforce their thinly held front line.
The last half-hour of waiting was a severe test of nerves, and it was a relief both to the imaginative and the stolid when the hour of noon arrived. But the Manchesters had already been proved. The operations of the end of May, the digging in No Man’s Land to push the first line closer to the enemy, while the Turk knew perfectly well what was intended and had been able, by the light of a waxing moon, to thin out the working-parties, had been highly dangerous and trying to the nerves. The losses had been deplorable, but the will to overcome the difficulties and to face the dangers with resolution had prevailed, and had given officers, N.C.O.s and men confidence in one another. Each platoon, each company, knew that it would not let the others down when the big event should come off. And now the hour had struck. Promptly at twelve o’clock the leading wave of the 127th Brigade went over the top for the first time, and advanced steadily and in good order. They were met by devastating rifle and machine-gun fire, but those who escaped the bullets pressed on in a steady line and by bitter hand-to-hand fighting made good their first objective. In places the wire was untouched by the bombardment, and men died cutting it that their comrades might pass through. The second wave followed at the appointed time. Within five minutes the Turkish first-line trenches had been captured, and the second in half an hour, and during the afternoon the fourth line of Turkish trenches had been penetrated. Sappers accompanying the successive waves found and disconnected buried mines, and assisted in the construction of new trenches and the reversal of captured ones. On the left the 29th Division had seized their first objective, but their further advance was checked, as the barbed wire on their left remained undamaged, and the Indian Brigade was held up by this obstacle. The professional soldiers of this division paid generous tribute to the amateurs of the 4th and 5th East Lancashires and 10th Manchesters, who fought with such spirit and determination within their ranks.
On the right, however, an initial success was soon followed by a reverse which had disastrous consequences. The R.N. Division had gone forward with a dash that did credit to these young untrained soldiers, and with a considerable measure of success. On their right the French had rushed a formidable redoubt, called from its shape “the Haricot,” but unfortunately their colonial troops, magnificent in attack, lack the confidence and dogged resolution in adversity that characterize our “native” troops from the Punjab and Nepal. They gave way before a furious bombardment and counter-attack, and the Haricot, once more in Turkish possession, proved a fatal obstacle. With their right flank exposed to the concentrated fire of innumerable machine-guns the Naval Division, cruelly reduced in numbers—one brigade losing sixty officers—were compelled to fall back to their original line, leaving the right flank of the 42nd Division in the air, the gap being 300 yards from front to rear. The Turk possesses individual initiative and resource in full measure, and he was quick to take advantage of the situation. Also, he was amply provided with bombs, whereas at this date our men had none—a serious handicap in close fighting. His bombing parties began to eat their way into this flank, which was also enfiladed by rifle and machine-gun fire, and in spite of the most determined opposition of the Manchesters, of the L.F. who were in support, and of a party of Engineers under Lieutenant Oscar Taunton, who threw back the enemy’s grenades until wounded, the position became critical.
In the meantime the 7th Lancashire Fusiliers had been moved up to the old fire trenches when these were vacated by the second wave, and at 2.45 p.m. two companies of the 8th L.F. were sent to fill the gap between the right of the 127th Brigade and the R.N. Division. At 3.35 p.m. it was seen that the enemy was massing troops in a nullah on this flank, seriously threatening the foremost line. The French Commander had, however, promised to make a fresh attack on the Haricot at 4 p.m., and this, by enabling the R.N. Division to advance, should relieve the pressure. Our Allies were unable, however, to make this attack, and the position of the 7th Manchesters on the right becoming quite untenable, the Divisional Commander, after consulting the Corps Commander, at 6.30 p.m. ordered the withdrawal of the foremost line to the main Turkish trench. The retirement was made with the greatest reluctance; indeed, the few remaining officers had great difficulty in making the men realize that the order to withdraw must be obeyed. The idea of giving up the ground they had won was almost unbearable, for the four Manchester battalions had resolved to hold on to their gains, whatever the cost might be. “C” Company of the 6th Manchesters had penetrated to a considerable distance beyond the bifurcation of the nullahs, but, being enfiladed from the higher ground on the right, found it impossible to retire. Its commander, Captain H. B. Pilkington, was mortally wounded in the head, but, propped up in the trench, he continued to direct and encourage his men. The company was practically wiped out.
The cost had indeed been great. Of the 770 men of the 6th Manchesters only 160 answered to the roll-call that night. A company of the 8th Manchesters which at noon leapt out of the trenches nearly 200 strong, could only muster 18, and from the other units there were similar reports. Early in the afternoon Brig.-General Noel Lee had received a shell-wound in the throat from which he died on June 21 in hospital at Malta. When he fell, Lieut.-Colonel Heys, 8th Manchesters, assumed command, until, an hour later, he was compelled to return to his battalion, as hardly any of its officers were left; and he was killed soon after he rejoined. The last remaining officer of this battalion, Captain Oldfield, was killed shortly after he had organized the withdrawal of the battalion. Lieut.-Colonel Lord Rochdale, 6th Lancashire Fusiliers, was ordered to succeed Colonel Heys, and he remained in temporary command of the 127th Brigade until June 21. The 7th Manchesters had also lost their C.O., Major Staveacre, who had succeeded to the command of the battalion on May 28, when Lieut.-Colonel Gresham was invalided to Malta.
The work of the Battalion Medical Officers and stretcher-bearers was beyond praise, but what can be said of the grit of the wounded! One M.O. records that from the 120 men who passed through his Regimental Aid Post, many being badly wounded and obviously in great pain, he did not hear even a whimper. Much difficulty was experienced in getting the wounded down the crowded and battered trenches and communication ways. The advanced Dressing Station of the 3rd Field Ambulance was in the Achi Baba Nullah, half a mile above Backhouse Post; that of the 1st Field Ambulance was at Clapham Junction. It was a rough journey for wounded men from either of these posts to the Central Clearing Station on “W” Beach; only hand carriage was available for those who could not walk, and there were many casualties among the bearers, though they were not fired upon deliberately. The wounded could not be attended to quickly enough to prevent a line of stretcher cases, waiting to be dressed, forming outside the stations.
The Territorials had proved themselves in the Division’s first pitched battle, not merely with credit, but with distinction. Though the assaulting waves had been exposed to converging fire from higher ground on either flank their attack had been brilliantly successful. At the end of the day the front had only been advanced by 400 yards, yet the Manchesters had gained 1000 yards, and could have advanced still farther. Indeed, there can be little doubt that the Turkish centre had been pierced, and that, had not the troops on their right been compelled to fall back, or had there been reserves to bring forward, they would have seized the high ground behind the village of Krithia, the key to the Achi Baba position. The Division had captured 217 prisoners, including 11 officers.