The Divisional Artillery, which covered the whole of the front, had far more fighting than the infantry. The policy was one of “Offensive-Defensive.” The enemy’s guns, and above all his trench-mortars, were very active, and long acquaintance with this sector enabled him accurately to register the targets he periodically engaged. His “minnies” were the pet aversion of the men in the trenches. But here the Germans had not the advantage they possessed at Lombartzyde, and punishment was meted out to them. As a counter-measure a standing order was issued that for every T.M. shell fired by the enemy he must receive five in return, and with the exception of the few occasions when prevented by limitation of ammunition, all T.M. crews loyally and gladly carried out the order. Good use was made of the Punishment Fire scheme inaugurated in the Nieuport sector. A selection, carefully based on all available intelligence, was made of those targets which would cause the enemy the most immediate damage and inconvenience. These were registered, and when the enemy shell fire exceeded what was considered the limit of normal harassing, prompt and effective retribution was dealt out to him by guns of all calibres from the 15-inch howitzers to the 18-pounder field-guns.
Of the three machine-gun companies of the Division—the fourth arrived in February—two and a half companies were in action covering the front. A few of their guns fired indirect S.O.S. barrages, and the remainder were sighted for direct fire in carefully chosen positions distributed in depth. Every inch of ground over which the enemy must advance was swept by machine-gun fire, direct or indirect, frontal or flanking. To take two examples only—the ground from the canal at Death or Glory Sap up to and beyond Red Dragon Crater was swept by the direct flanking fire of two guns cunningly emplaced in the railway embankment on the south side of the canal; and the northern face of the bastion of Givenchy was swept by the indirect fire of four guns near Festubert Keep. In addition to their defensive duties the machine-gun companies carried out day and night harassing programmes.
A brief reference must be made to the work of the 179th Tunnelling Company, R.E., in the right sector. Most of their heavy work, such as the construction of tunnelled dug-outs and emplacements, and the maintenance of infantry sub-ways, proceeded unseen by the men of other arms, for the entrances to the deep-mining system were closed to the curious. The strata in which mining operations were possible had become so honeycombed with galleries and listening-saps that no new offensive mining could be undertaken without instant detection. The methods of keeping touch with enemy activities were full of interest. In a little chamber off the main gallery a man sat in front of a board on which was a plan of the mine system. A telephone receiver was fixed over his ears. By inserting a plug into the board at any of the sapheads he could listen by a microphone to the enemy’s subterranean activities in the vicinity of this particular sap. A pump at work in an adjacent trench, an enemy miner patrolling the gallery or tiptoeing to an adjacent saphead—even such sounds as these could be detected with uncanny distinctness.
The system of holding the line by tactical localities and immediate counter-attack, which afterwards proved so successful as compared with continuous line, was made the subject of strenuous training. The reorganization was planned with the double object of reducing the number of men required to garrison the trenches, and at the same time of strengthening the defence by a series of self-contained, mutually supporting localities, disposed in depth and connected, so far as possible, by underground, shell-proof passages, with wire-entanglements so sited as to bring an approaching enemy under the fire of these localities. The term “locality” is used to denote an area of ground of tactical importance which is organized for defence in depth to form a centre of resistance. The guiding principle is that its front and flanks should be held by infantry posts and machine-guns while reserves are kept in hand ready for counter-attack within the locality. A large number of concrete machine-gun emplacements, command posts, etc., were constructed, and as there was no adequate system of light railways or tramways serving the front, a heavy strain was thrown upon the transport in bringing up R.E. material alone. The value of this work was seen later during the German offensive on the Lys in April, 1918, the sector being then held by the 55th (West Lancashire Territorial) Division. Major-General Jeudwine, commanding the 55th Division, in a letter to Major-General Solly-Flood, stated that the work of the East Lancashires had greatly assisted the West Lancashires to defeat the onslaughts of the enemy—and thus hold inviolate that most important tactical feature, Givenchy—and that he had pleasure in acknowledging the debt they owed to their predecessors.
Raids
There were raids on both sides, but while those of the enemy revealed a lack of determination and of the true offensive spirit, ours were entered upon and carried through with zest. In the southern sector the Germans were particularly inactive, but the Division opposite Givenchy showed rather more enterprise.[11] Twice they attempted to raid “J” and “K” saps, and on the first occasion succeeded in entering our trenches, only to be promptly ejected. Other attempts further north were equally futile. On the British side the raids provided welcome breaks in the monotony of trench routine. The most important raid by our troops took place on February 11 in the left sector, opposite Festubert. The artillery put down a “box” barrage, enclosing an area by three walls of bursting shells, and Captain D. B. Stephenson, with two other officers and ninety-seven men of the 9th Manchesters and an officer and six sappers of the 429 Field Company, went “over the top” in two waves. In places the wire had been imperfectly cut, so men lay flat on the “concertinas” to keep the wire down while their comrades scrambled across. As the barrage enclosed the enemy within the “box,” they could not get away nor could reinforcements reach them, so they had no choice but to fight man to man, and at this the Germans were no match for the Ashton men. At least twenty-five were killed, seven prisoners and two machine-guns were secured, and the sappers blew up three enemy dug-outs with gun-cotton. It was a good night’s work, carried out with great dash.
On the following night, Lieutenant A. Elliott, 7th L.F., with Sergeant T. Gerrard, Corporal J. Phipps, and two men, reconnoitred a mineshaft situated well within the enemy’s lines, near the Brickstacks. After exploring the tunnel he left a guard over it and went back for a demolition party, returning with an officer and three men of a tunnelling company and seven Fusiliers carrying explosive. Elliott helped the tunnellers to lay the charge, and then sent back all the men except Phipps, who remained with him to guard the entrance while the tunnelling officer lit the fuse. The mineshaft was completely destroyed and the whole party returned in safety. Elliott and the two N.C.O.s had been associated in two night adventures on February 1-3, in the course of which they discovered the mineshaft and explored the tunnelling system for 150 yards. Afterwards they located and bombed an enemy post, inflicting casualties.
On February 15 the Division was relieved by the 55th Division and withdrawn to 1st Corps Reserve in the Busnes—Burbure—Fouquieres area, with D.H.G. first at Hinges and later at Labouvriere. The divisional artillery were relieved a few days later, but the pioneers and the sappers remained at work in the line during the whole of the Division’s period of rest. The billets in the rest-area were good, sports were encouraged, and concerts held in the local halls. Training was carried on vigorously. Suitable ground for musketry and field work existed in the divisional area, and full use was made of it. The training always had in view open and semi-open warfare, and it included the hasty occupation of defensive positions in depth, counter-attacks on small and large scales, the use of ground for manœuvre, and of different weapons in attacks on strong points. This training proved most valuable in the operations following upon the enemy offensive in March. The Division also provided large working parties for work on the rear lines of defence within the Corps area.
Shortly before the Division was relieved it had received its pioneer battalion, the 1/7th Northumberland Fusiliers, transferred from the 50th Division. This battalion, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Liddell, D.S.O., had been given little time to carry out its reorganization from a four-company infantry battalion to a three-company pioneer battalion before being set to work on the 1st Corps defences. The territorial spirit is strong, and the Northumberland men did not conceal their chagrin at having to leave the division in which they had won renown at High Wood and elsewhere, but they soon threw themselves into the work and play of their new division with such zeal that they rapidly won popularity and a reputation for great courage and efficiency. Their work was of the greatest value to the Division, both when resisting the German onrush, and no less when the tide turned. They also showed much prowess in all games and sports.
Reorganization