The Division returned to the front line on the night of April 1-2, the 125th Brigade and the 1/7th Northumberland Fusiliers holding the right sub-sector, and the 126th Brigade and the three Field Companies, R.E., the left, with the 127th Brigade in support. All three infantry brigades had their headquarters in Essarts, a village on which a disproportionate amount of “hate” seemed to be concentrated. On the night of the 2nd the 125th Brigade raided a new enemy work east of the Bucquoy—Ablainzevelle road and established a strong point in the work; and at 2 a.m. on the 3rd the 32nd Division, on the left of the 42nd, made a successful attack upon Ayette, capturing 200 prisoners, and establishing a line east of Ayette.
At 5 a.m. on the 5th of April the 125th Brigade front and the neighbourhood of Essarts were heavily shelled, gas being freely used. The 126th Brigade, moving into support trenches at Essarts, suffered very severely, the 10th Manchesters losing more men than in the whole of the previous twelve days fighting. H.E. and gas shells alternately poured down for the space of five hours. The night was pitch-black, as the men stumbled along the muddy trenches, unable to see or breathe. The trenches, already a foot deep in mud, were described as “slime and blood, carpeted with bodies.” But when the bombardment lifted, the men extracted their dead and wounded comrades, and resumed their tasks, their resolve to “best the Boche” being no whit abated. The Composite Battalion, also near Essarts, had fifty casualties, and the Divisional Artillery also suffered, though less severely. At 8 a.m., under cover of a trench-mortar hurricane bombardment, which inflicted very heavy casualties, not only among the front-line troops but also in the reserve companies, and completely destroyed a machine-gun section, the enemy attacked and succeeded in throwing back the left of the 8th Lancashire Fusiliers, the two companies being wiped out almost to a man. The 7th L.F. and the right company of the 8th were able to hold their ground, and the latter began to work its way up the trench to the north, but was forced to fall back when nearly surrounded, owing to the retirement of the left company of the left battalion of the division on its right. All lines being down, communication was bad, but at 11.40 a.m. orders were issued that the survivors of the 8th L.F. must eject the enemy at once. They counter-attacked, and at noon reached the main cross-roads in Bucquoy, where hand-to-hand fighting took place amid the ruins of the village. Lieut.-Colonel St. Leger Davies[16] was mortally wounded by machine-gun fire, and Captain G. W. Sutton, M.C. assumed command and successfully organized the consolidation of the line regained until he, too, was severely wounded. Very fierce fighting continued, and two platoons of the 5th L.F. were brought up. The counter-attack progressed favourably until the line of the Bucquoy—Ayette road was reached, when it was held up by machine-gun fire. Touch had again been lost with the battalion on the right, and the 5th L.F., bringing up their remaining company, formed a defensive flank in touch with the 7th L.F., and the attack was brought to a standstill. The fighting, which had been very bitter all day, gradually died down, and at 8 p.m. the front was quiet, touch being regained on the right flank during the night.
The morning of the 6th was quiet except for artillery fire on both sides. Later information revealed the fact that the attack of the previous day on the divisional front formed part of one of the fiercest and last attacks with which the enemy followed up his initial offensive. Its repulse proved of very great importance. The 5th East Lancashires were put at the disposal of the 125th Brigade, and their place on Henley Hill, the key to the position between Essarts and Ablainzevelle, was taken by the Composite Battalion. Later in the day the 126th Brigade was moved to Souastre, and on the following night the other infantry brigades were also relieved by the 62nd Division, D.H.Q. being opened at Pas Château, about ten miles west of Bucquoy. On the night of the 8th the R.E., the M.G. Battalion, and the Pioneer Battalion were relieved, and also a company of the 8th Manchesters, which by some mischance had not been relieved on the previous day. Being naturally annoyed at this delay the company vented its displeasure upon the Boche by raiding Ablainzevelle, inflicting many casualties, and capturing prisoners and a machine-gun.
The casualties in the Division from March 24 to April 8 numbered 126 officers and 2839 other ranks, but heavy as this total was, the loss inflicted upon the enemy by the Division was far greater. The evacuation of the wounded had proceeded smoothly in spite of the heavy traffic and congestion at the Dressing Stations, and very few casualties had fallen into the hands of the enemy. No man did better work for the wounded than Padre E. C. Hoskyns, M.C., attached to the 7th Manchesters. At Achiet-le-Grand, on March 24, he collected a large number of casualties of many units and of various divisions, tended them under heavy fire, and, though himself slightly wounded, remained with them until they could be evacuated. Later, he collected wounded and stragglers, organized carrying-parties, and got the last party safely off just before the enemy arrived. Good work was done by the Military Police, who had a very difficult task in managing traffic about Bucquoy, Essarts, and Hannescamps, and who performed acts of conspicuous gallantry. The Signal Company had shown its usual efficiency, intrepidity and capacity for hard work.
Machine-gunners and Lewis-gunners were sorely tried by the need to carry their guns a distance of seven miles or more into action before undergoing the sufficiently severe strain of continuous fighting. The M.G. Battalion, splendidly led by its Commander, Lieut.-Colonel W. K. Tillie, D.S.O., had done its full share in the gallant and successful resistance made at Ervillers, Bucquoy, Ablainzevelle and elsewhere. The efficacy of the Lewis-gun was clearly brought out, and was enhanced by the initiative of the personnel who used it. It was also satisfactory to note the effective use of infantry weapons, particularly the rifle, and the reliance placed upon them by the men after the first few hours fighting. The attention that had recently been given to rifle practice proved invaluable, for the men discovered that provided they applied the lessons learnt, the enemy had little chance of getting to close quarters.
Factors of Success
Two of the factors that contributed to the Division’s success may be summarized as follows—
(1) The spirit of mutual trust and camaraderie, from the highest to the lowest, which had been fostered in the Division. While the spirit of emulation to carry out the Divisional Motto animated every unit, each knew that it could rely confidently upon the others.
(2) The rigorous training of the Division in the offensive method of defence in depth, and the system of holding tactical localities by units—as opposed to long lines—combined with preparedness for immediate local counter-attack.
Every branch of the divisional organization had been severely proved in the fire of this epic struggle, and had stood the test gloriously. It is impossible to praise too highly the conduct of all ranks throughout the operations, the initiative of the subordinate commanders in directing and controlling their commands, and the tenacity, keenness and fighting spirit of all arms and all ranks. Whether repelling attacks, or counter-attacking, or withdrawing in accordance with orders, their cheerfulness and high spirits never flagged. They were quite confident that they could “lick Jerry” at any time or in any place, and however weak and exhausted the flesh might be the spirit was always willing. The reply given by a brigade to H.Q. inquiry as to its state of exhaustion is typical: “Can’t march, but can fight.”