WARLENCOURT VILLAGE, LOOKING TOWARDS PYS.
But the time had not yet come for the British Armies to begin their great offensive. They made their preparations and awaited the word. Every brigade of the 42nd Division had raided and seized posts and pushed the enemy back fifty or five hundred yards at one point or another. In the latter half of July the 127th Brigade, by means of the attacks already referred to, had advanced their line on a front of nearly 2000 yards to a depth in places of about 1000 yards, almost to Staff Wood and Observation Wood, 800 yards east of La Signy Farm. In August the possibility of a new enemy attack in force was still contemplated, as it was calculated that there were more than thirty German divisions which had not yet been employed. So the work on the defences continued with unabated energy, the Pioneer Battalion, the three Field Companies, the Tunnelling Companies, and the infantry being kept hard at work on tunnelled dugouts and fortified posts, and it was said that the Division was praying that the Germans might attack. The 179 and 252 Tunnelling Companies did fine work, in which Captain Dean was especially prominent. The names Sixth Avenue, La Sucrerie, La Signy Farm, Quarry O.P., and Euston Dump recall many incidents, and Captain Buckley and his Divisional Observers will remember the magnificent view obtained over “Bocheland” to Bapaume from Appletree O.P. One of the difficulties in the construction of the many strong points in this sector was the wonderful crop of wheat, which was such an obstruction to the field of fire that much of it had to be rolled flat with an agricultural roller.
On the night of August 12-13 the 127th Brigade relieved the 126th in advanced posts which had only been occupied that afternoon. During the relief the enemy returned in great force and made three determined attacks to regain the lost position. They were beaten off with great loss. Corporal M. Shea, 6th Manchesters, in charge of a Lewis-gun section, though wounded in the first attack, stuck to his post and directed the fire of his gun. He was suffering extreme pain, but refused to go to the Aid Post until the third attack was finally beaten off and the situation saved.
The enemy now began to withdraw his battered line to more favourable defensive positions east of the Ancre. He was followed up closely, harassed constantly by artillery, machine-guns and infantry, and given no rest. Patrols found Watling Street untenanted except by dead Germans, and the trenches had been practically obliterated by the howitzers of the Divisional Artillery. By day and night field guns and heavies pounded the German trenches and strong points, and the effect of the “double crashes” fired nightly on roads behind the enemy positions, was shown a few days later when the troops crossed the Serre Ridge and saw the roads littered with damaged transport. Infantry patrols pushed forward and engaged his rearguards; successful raids and local attacks were made; and by August 20 the Division had passed beyond Serre village and had reached a line running just west of the Beaucourt—Puisieux road. The line had been advanced by 3500 yards on a front of 3800 yards, and many prisoners and much material had been captured. A message from Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, congratulating the Division “on the vigour it has displayed in following up the retreating enemy,” was much appreciated by all ranks.
For seventy-five days the Division had been in the line, an unusually long period. The heavy work upon the defensive system, the numerous raids and minor operations, the constant harassing of the enemy, the consolidating of the new positions gained, the advancement of the line with its added difficulties of transport and supply, all these—in the hottest months of the year—had imposed a great strain upon all units. But the troops were fired by enthusiasm, and had no desire to be relieved at such a time as this. Their one desire was to get the Boche on the run; and when the rumours of impending advances finally gave place to definite detailed orders and preparations, the weariness and strain were lightly cast aside. The Germans had done their worst, and had made deep impressions on the allied front. The 42nd Division now meant to go for the Hindenburg Line—and to “go one better.”
CHAPTER XI
THE BEGINNING OF THE END
(August 21st—September 6th, 1918)
“The Third Army has been ordered to press the enemy back towards Bapaume without delay, and to make every effort to prevent the enemy from destroying road and rail communications.” The Battle Instructions issued to the 42nd Division on August 20th begin with the above words, and the Division rejoiced that the signal was down at last for the Third Army to join in the Great Allied offensive, and that General Byng’s attack was planned to open before dawn on the morrow. The 4th Corps had three Divisions in the front line, the 42nd, the New Zealanders, and the 37th, from right to left. On the right of the 42nd was the 21st Division of the 5th Corps. The Division’s attack was planned on a two-brigade front, with the 127th Brigade on the right, and the 125th on the left. There were three objectives. The first was a line roughly parallel to the present frontage of the Division and about a thousand yards to the east, and the advance was made by fighting patrols, brigades being in echelon with the left brigade leading. The second objective included some high ground on the left flank, and mainly concerned the 125th Brigade; and the third, and most important, objective was, on the left, Beauregard Dovecot, a group of shell-shattered trunks—the remains of trees which formerly surrounded the now obliterated Dovecot—on high ground where five roads meet, and on the right a point within a few hundred yards of the village of Miraumont, and looking down upon it.
The organization of the Division was now designed to secure effective co-operation of all arms under the new conditions of open warfare. The Division had done well in the stationary warfare of continuous lines of trenches; it had shaped still better in the offensive-defensive method of Defence in Depth in which it had been so thoroughly trained by its present Commander; now it was to be tested by the novel experience of open warfare. Infantry Brigade Groups were composed as follows—