The 42nd (East Lancashire) Division 1914-1918

by Frederick P. Gibbon

On the night of September 21-22 the Division relieved the 37th Division in the left sector of the 4th Corps front, rather more than a mile east of Havrincourt Wood, and just east of Trescault, places with which the Division had made acquaintance in the spring of 1917. D.H.Q. was moved to Velu Wood, taking over what had been the H.Q. of the German 14th Reserve Corps, a beautifully fitted place in the middle of a copse, completed by the enemy just in time to serve the Division. The 126th Brigade, now under the command of Brig.-General T. H. S. Marchant, D.S.O., held the line, 2500 yards in width, with all three battalions. On the night of the relief Havrincourt Wood was heavily gassed, between 2000 and 3000 Yellow Cross shells being used. In spite of excellent gas discipline casualties were severe, and these included Lieut.-Colonel Peel, D.S.O., commanding the 10th Manchesters, who, though badly gassed, refused to go down the line. From the 22nd to the 26th September the front was quiet, activity being confined to the gunners and to patrols. The latter were vigorous and successful, capturing prisoners and improving the position east of Trescault at Bilhem Farm. Further south, a daylight patrol of the 5th East Lancashires did good work in front of Beaucamp, a strongly held village in the 5th Division’s area.

UNSEEN TRENCH, PART OF THE HINDENBURG LINE S.E. OF HAVRINCOURT.

ANOTHER TRENCH IN THE HINDENBURG DEFENCE SYSTEM NEAR HAVRINCOURT.

On the night of September 26th the front was taken over by the 125th Brigade on the right and the 127th on the left, preparatory to one of the most ambitious attacks ever made by the 42nd or any other division. This was no less than the piercing of the famous Hindenburg trench system, by smashing a way through a two-mile depth of the most strongly and scientifically defended positions in the history of warfare. The enemy had succeeded in withdrawing his battered troops, and had placed fresh divisions in line opposite the 4th Corps front. These were given complete assurance that the British advance would be held up at this “impregnable” line, which would be their winter position, and against which the Allies would fling themselves in vain. German orders issued at this date laid down that not a foot of ground was to be given up here.

The Objectives, September 27

The objectives of the 4th Corps and of the corps on its left consisted of two main ridges—the Beaucamp Ridge to the south and the Flesquières Ridge to the north. These were separated by the Ribecourt Valley. From the Beaucamp Ridge three large spurs projected northward into the valley, and these spurs formed the objectives of the Division. The most easterly of the three spurs (which are separated by deep re-entrants and very steep gradients) was known as Highland Ridge, and this is the highest and steepest of the three. East of Highland Ridge the ground drops abruptly to the narrow Couillet Valley, running south to north into the Ribecourt Valley. Beyond the Couillet Valley the ground rises sharply to Welsh Ridge. The great double row of trenches of the Hindenburg Line extended diagonally across the spurs, facing approximately S.S.W.

The 42nd Division was on the left of the 4th Corps front, with the 5th Division on its right and the 3rd Division (6th Corps) on its left. The “jumping-off” line was roughly about 600 to 1000 yards east of Havrincourt village on the north and of Trescault on the south. The attack was to be made in five bounds, the successive objectives being termed the Black, Red, Brown, Yellow, and Blue Lines, the summit of Highland Ridge being the Blue Line, which was more than two miles east of the starting line of the 127th Brigade on the left and rather less from the 125th’s line on the right. On reaching Highland Ridge patrols were to be sent into the Couillet Valley and on to Welsh Ridge as far as a Green Line about two miles beyond the Blue Line. The bounds were to be made by the leap-frog method, companies passing over one another in turn as each objective was secured. “B” and “C” Companies of the M.G. Battalion would accompany the 127th and 125th Brigades respectively; “A” and “D” Companies would take part in the barrage. Zero hour for the Third Army was fixed at 5.20 a.m. on September 27th; but as the 3rd Division on the left and the 5th Division on the right would advance along higher ground than the 42nd, it was arranged that the 42nd should not move until these divisions had had time to make good the higher ground on its flanks. The Lancashire Fusiliers were therefore timed to leave at 7.52 a.m., and the Manchesters at 8.20 a.m.

The attack was preceded by a short intense bombardment by six brigades of Field Artillery, one brigade of Heavy Artillery, and the trench mortars; and at its scheduled time each infantry brigade advanced in successive waves under a creeping barrage of shrapnel and machine-gun bullets. Two Mark IV tanks were allotted to the 125th Brigade and six to the 127th, but two of these broke down at the start, a third developed engine trouble, and by noon a fourth and fifth were put out of action after doing useful work.[21] The assistance of the others in dealing with machine-gun nests was very valuable, and they were handled with great skill.