News was received of the German gas attack at Ypres, and precautions had consequently to be taken. The question of respirators became very important, and masks of all sorts and kinds were tried. Here were thousands of men absolutely unprepared, who at any moment might be suffocated, but the idea of taking precautions against gas had never occurred to us, any more than precautions against wells being poisoned. Such things had been ruled out of civilised warfare by the Hague Convention. It is hardly to be wondered at that this perfidious treachery on the part of the enemy took the whole Army at first completely by surprise, but an antidote was quickly provided in the shape of gas helmets.

On the night of the 11th Lieutenant A. V. L. Corry, accompanied by Sergeant Skerry, Lance-Corporal Hodgson, and Private Gillet, went out, and commenced cutting the barbed wire in front of the German trenches. While engaged in this they came in contact with a German patrol, one of which was shot by Lieutenant Corry, a second was killed by a bomb thrown by Private Gillet, while a third was killed by Sergeant Skerry. The German officer in command of the patrol drew his revolver and shot Sergeant Skerry and Corporal Hodgson dead, and wounded Private Gillet, who afterwards succumbed to his wounds. Lieutenant Corry, finding the remainder too numerous to tackle single-handed, had perforce to retire to the trenches.

On the 14th we began a systematic bombardment of the German lines opposite Richebourg—L'Avoué—Festubert. This continued for two days, and prepared the line for the second attack, which was to be carried out by the Second and Seventh Divisions and the Indian Corps. There was a distinct salient at this part of the German line, and it was for this reason that it was chosen for attack. The country was flat, although intersected with water-courses, and owing to the barrage of fire from the enemy constant difficulty was experienced in bringing up any supports.

CHAPTER X
THE BATTLE OF NEUVE CHAPELLE (1ST BATTALION)

1st Batt. March 1915.

For a long time the question had been discussed whether it was humanly possible to break through a line of trenches. Owing to the great defensive power of modern weapons, the thickness of the barbed-wire obstacles, and the dangers the attacking force would have to run in leaving their trenches and crossing the open, it was generally believed that no attack could possibly succeed. Further, in spite of repeated attempts, the Germans had failed time after time to break through our line.

But there was another consideration which we had to take into account. The French had recently suffered enormous losses, with comparatively small gains to set against them, and they were beginning to think that since Ypres we had not taken our proper share of the fighting. Sir John French determined, therefore, to prepare a regularly organised attack on the enemy's line near Neuve Chapelle. He selected this portion in the hope that, if the enterprise succeeded and the ridge overlooking Lille was reached, the La Bassée—Lille line would be threatened. and possibly the enemy might have to abandon Lille. He communicated his plans to Sir Douglas Haig in a secret memorandum, and put him in command of the whole attack.

It was arranged that the assault should be undertaken by the 4th and Indian Corps in the First Army. The guns were to be massed west of Neuve Chapelle, and were to smash the wire entanglements, and break down the enemy's trenches before the infantry attempted to advance. Later they were to concentrate their fire on the enemy's supports and reserves, and prevent any more men from being sent up to the firing line. This was the first time that we used what afterwards became a regular feature of the attack—the barrage of fire.

The sorely tried Seventh Division was again given a very difficult task, and the 1st Battalion Grenadiers was once more to bear the brunt of the attack.

The officers of the Battalion at the time were as follows: