However, there was no alternative but to put in the Guards Division and try and regain as much of the lost ground as possible. Major-General Lord Cavan sent round on the 25th a stirring message to the men, reminding them that great things were expected of the Division, and they were full of confidence as they went into action.
The easiest task fell to the lot of the 1st Guards Brigade, under Brigadier-General Feilding, on the left. It was to advance in the direction of the Bois Hugo and straighten the line, so that it would run parallel to the Lens—La Bassée road. The 2nd Brigade, under Brigadier-General Ponsonby, was to take and hold the Chalk Pit and Puits 14 bis, and the 3rd Brigade, under Brigadier-General Heyworth, to advance against Hill 70. But to a large extent the movements of the 1st and 3rd Brigades depended on the success of the attack of the 2nd Brigade.
Accomplishing their work at once, Feilding's Brigade secured a good position on the ground over which the Twenty-fourth Division had retired. General Feilding, who understood that he was to assist the other brigades by fire as far as possible, at once collected as many smoke-bombs and smoke-candles as he could, and at zero hour formed a most effective smoke-screen, which drew off the fire of a great many German guns from the other attackers.
Success at first also attended the attack of Ponsonby's Brigade. It took the Chalk Pit and Puits 14 bis, but then a tremendous fire from machine-guns in Bois Hugo swept it down, and it was unable to keep its hold on these positions. This made it very difficult for the other brigades to move forward. But on learning that Ponsonby's Brigade was fighting furiously for the possession of the Chalk Pit, Lord Cavan decided that the only way to relieve the strain on them was to order Heyworth's Brigade to advance. It did so, and this course proved successful in enabling Ponsonby's Brigade to retain possession of the Chalk Pit. Going forward, Heyworth's Brigade took Hill 70, but it too found it impossible to keep what it had won. The enemy's trenches were marked on the map as being on the crest of the hill, but in reality they were on the reverse slope, and had never been touched by shell-fire.
The net result of the attack of the Guards Division was the establishment of the British front along a line running, roughly, northward from the south-eastern end of Loos and parallel to the Lens—La Bassée road. Another attempt to gain Puits 14 was made by the 1st Battalion Coldstream on the 28th, but was no more successful than the first. As before, a small party reached the Puits, but was driven out again by enfilade fire.
Measured by the length of the advance made during the battle and the extent of ground taken from the enemy, the results of the battle of Loos would seem distinctly disappointing, more especially when the casualty list of 45,000 men is considered. But to estimate these operations in terms of geography is a mistake. The smallness of the theatre of operations and the comparatively narrow depth of our advance give a totally misleading impression of the success of the battle. It is obviously more valuable to put out of action 50,000 Germans and gain half a mile than to gain five miles and only inflict a loss of 10,000. When it is realised that we drove the enemy from positions which they considered impregnable to the assaults of modern weapons, that their casualties must have been as heavy as, if not heavier than, our own, and that we took 3000 prisoners (including 50 officers), 26 field-guns, and 40 machine-guns,—it will be seen that Lord Kitchener's description of the battle as a substantial success was not very far wide of the mark.
The 2nd Battalion
The following were the officers of the 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards who took part in the battle:
Lieut.-Colonel G. D. Jeffreys, Commanding Officer.
Major Lord Henry Seymour, Second in Command.