Aug. 23.
From La Longueville the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers marched on August 23, during the last stages of its journey, across the field of Malplaquet, where more than 200 years before the regiment had fought with distinction, through Blaregnies and Genly to the outskirts of Mons, where it bivouacked. There it received orders to advance, which were countermanded before they could be carried out, and the Battalion was told to remain where it was. There was nothing to do but have breakfast and an hour's sleep by the roadside, with showers falling at intervals. All the time heavy firing could be heard from the direction of Mons, and shells bursting could be observed in the distance.
Orders then came for the Battalion to march back to Quevy le Petit, about five miles off, where the men fondly imagined they would again be comfortably billeted. But hardly had they arrived there when they were sent forward again. As they were marching down a dusty track General Scott-Kerr rode up, and directed the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers and the Irish Guards to move up close behind the ridge east of Spiennes in support of the Irish Rifles. At the same time the two Coldstream battalions were ordered to entrench themselves just east of Harveng, presumably as a precaution in case the Brigade should have to retire. Heavy firing was now going on all round, and the ridge which overlooked St. Symphorien to the north was being vigorously shelled by the Germans, who had got the range to a nicety, and were bursting their shells over it with accuracy. It was about 6 P.M. when the Battalion, advancing through Harveng, proceeded in artillery formation for about one and a half miles to the hill near Spiennes. The men huddled close together under the banks on the reverse slope of the hill just over the railway line, while bullets and shells whistled over their heads. As they were lying there they were amused to see the signalman walk slowly down the line as if nothing in particular was happening. He had to light the lamps, and saw no reason why the ordinary routine which he had carried out probably for many years should be interfered with. One of the officers called out to him in French, and explained that the Germans were advancing, but he merely murmured "ça m'est égal," and continued his work, apparently unconscious of the bullets that were striking the line.
Meanwhile, Colonel Corry and Major Jeffreys went up to the position occupied by the Irish Rifles, who were holding their own well under a heavy rifle fire.
When they returned to their men it was getting dark, and at 10.30 a message came from the O.C. Irish Rifles, that his battalion was retiring. It appeared therefore to Colonel Corry that the position was becoming untenable, since the Irish Rifles on his left had already retired, and both flanks of the Battalion were exposed. He consulted Colonel Morris of the Irish Guards, and they both came to the conclusion that the best course would be to retire to Harveng.
The difficulty was to communicate with the Brigadier. The telephone to Brigade Headquarters had been cut by shell-fire, and so Colonel Corry rode back to find General Scott-Kerr. He could not be discovered, and was reported to have gone to Divisional Headquarters. There seemed no prospect whatever of finding him, and it was now past midnight. Thereupon Colonel Corry determined to take upon himself the responsibility of ordering the retirement of the two battalions. His impression was that in a case like this, when local conditions could not be known to the Divisional Staff, it was for the man on the spot to make his own decision.
Superior authority, however, afterwards held that while under exceptional circumstances such powers might well be delegated to the man in mediis rebus, in a case like this it could not be admitted that an officer in actual touch with the enemy was the best judge of how long a position should be held. It was felt that there were many considerations in a decision of this sort, of which the officer in the front line could know very little. Colonel Corry was therefore severely blamed for his action, and was a fortnight later relieved of his command.
Aug. 24.
At 1 o'clock in the morning the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers and the Irish Guards retired, but they had only gone a couple of miles towards Harveng when they were ordered to go back and occupy the ridge they had just left. Back they went, and got as far as the foot of the hill, only to receive another order to retire to Harveng. By this time the men were absolutely tired out. They had started at 3.30 the previous morning, and had been on the move for twenty-four hours, with only occasional halts by the roadside.
It was just at this point in the engagement that Sir John French received what he described in his despatch as a most unexpected message. It came from General Joffre, who informed him that the French Forces had been compelled, by superior numbers, to retire, and that consequently the Fifth French Army, which was immediately on our right, had vacated its line. Two German corps were advancing on the British position, while a third corps was engaged in a turning movement in the direction of Tournai. Divisions of French Territorials had been promised in support of the left flank, but, except for a Brigade at Tournai, no French troops arrived from the west. There was therefore no alternative for Sir John French but to retire.